The Public Works Loan Board 1817-76 and the financing of public infrastructure by Webster, Ian
The Public Works Loan Board 1817-76 and the financing of 
public infrastructure
WEBSTER, Ian
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/9939/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
WEBSTER, Ian (2015). The Public Works Loan Board 1817-76 and the financing of 
public infrastructure. Doctoral, Sheffield Hallam University. 
Repository use policy
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the 
individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print 
one copy of any article(s) in SHURA to facilitate their private study or for non-
commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or 
use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain.
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk
i 
 
 
 
 
The Public Works Loan Board 1817-76 and the Financing 
of Public Infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
Ian Webster 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of 
Sheffield Hallam University 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
 
March 2015 
 
 
  
ii 
 
Abstract 
 
The Public Works Loan Board 1817-1876 and the financing of public 
infrastructure. 
The Public Works Loan Board was formed in 1817, mainly to lend money to finance 
public infrastructure. Nearly 200 years later, the PWLB is the major source of loans 
to finance local government infrastructure. Yet no history has been written of the 
PWLB, and there is very little mention of the PWLB in academic literature. This 
thesis therefore relies on the unused PWLB archive to explore five case studies of 
lending to mine owners, turnpike trusts, poor law unions, local boards of health and 
local school boards. 
The first two case studies cover the PWLB’s first ten years, and show that its lending 
to mine owners and turnpike trusts was too limited to have much impact. It is also 
clear that the PWLB was acting like a cautious commercial provider of loans at the 
prevailing market interest rates. Even so, it made losses because of parliamentary 
and Treasury actions. In the last three case studies, the PWLB’s role changed 
materially, as it became a provider of low interest rate loans to public bodies. In this 
role the PWLB became an agent of a central government that was compelling local 
government to invest heavily in workhouses, water supply and sewer facilities, and 
elementary schools. The result was that PWLB lending soared and was profitable, 
and public infrastructure investment rose sharply. The case studies highlight the 
characteristics that determined the success or failure of the PWLB. They also chart 
the major movement of power from local authorities to central government. 
The PWLB provided more than half of the finance for the building of workhouses, 
schools, and water and sewer facilities during three critical periods. The PWLB was 
therefore essential to the success of the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act, the 1870 
Elementary Education Act and the 1872 Public Health Act. By 1876, the PWLB had 
become an important provider of finance for public infrastructure provision.  
 
 
Ian Webster,     PhD thesis, Sheffield Hallam University, March 2015. 
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Abbreviations   
 
  
 
BL British Library 
 
BoE Bank of England 
 
BoT Board of Trade 
 
BPP British Parliamentary Papers 
 
CERC Church of England Record Centre 
 
CoE Church of England 
 
DNB Dictionary of National Biography 
 
ED Education Department. In the 1870s the Committee of (the 
Privy) Council on Education was increasingly known as the 
Education Department 
 
GBH General Board of Health, predecessor to LGAO 
 
HLG Housing and Local Government, the code given to the PLC 
files in the National Archives at Kew 
 
LGAO Local Government Act Office. Successor to GBH, and 
predecessor to LGB. 
 
LGB Local Government Board 
 
LBH Local Board of Health, later also known as Local Board 
 
LMA London Metropolitan Archives 
 
LSB London School Board. Also known and Schools Board for 
London 
 
MBW Metropolitan Board of Works 
 
NA National Archives at Kew 
 
NS National Society 
 
PLC Poor Law Commission 
 
PWLB Public Works Loan Board. Until 1842, they were known as 
the Exchequer Bill Loan Commissioners 
 
PWLC 
 
RSA 
Public Works Loan Commissioners. An alternative name for 
PWLB 
Rural Sanitary Authority 
 
RV Rateable value 
 
  
Selected definitions 
Capital spending 
Capital spending is incurred for assets that are expected to last for 
many years. The cost is therefore spread over a similar number of 
years. Land, buildings and equipment are all generally seen as capital 
spending. Public bodies and those interested in budgets and their 
financing will talk in terms of capital spending. Annual returns were 
invariably of capital spending. In contrast, current or revenue spending 
 
x 
 
is on items consumed within a single year, and is generally recurring. 
Public works 
              Infrastructure was not a word used in the nineteenth century. ‘Public 
works’ was used instead. Adam Smith used ‘public works’ to cover 
roads, bridges, canals and harbours. Smith recognised that ‘public 
works’ implied that the works ‘facilitate(d) the commerce of any 
country’.1 ‘Internal improvements’ had a similar meaning, and a similar 
implication. 
Social overhead capital 
 W. W. Rostow’s ‘social overhead capital’ had the same meaning as 
‘public works’ but was updated to include modern utilities.2 By social 
overhead capital, Rostow ‘meant capital invested in roads, utility 
systems, communications, education, health and other government 
facilities as the foundation of economic development’.3 
Infrastructure 
              Infrastructure only became a common term in the 1980s. It is a very 
broad term that can include ‘almost every support system in modern 
industrial society’.4 Infrastructure might therefore include physical 
assets such as roads, the political/administrative processes that plan 
and finance them, and even the road workers that maintain them. The 
term ‘infrastructure’ by itself has become almost too broad, and is 
more often preceded by a qualifying term such as ‘energy’, 
‘administrative’, or ‘public’. 
Public infrastructure 
             The successor term to Rostow’s social overhead capital, ‘public 
infrastructure’ narrows the definition of infrastructure to exclude those 
that do not count as capital spending. ‘Public infrastructure’ does not 
imply public ownership, or free use. Hirofumi Uzawa adds hospitals, 
schools, judicial systems and public administrative services in order to 
give a definition of social common capital.5 But his use of the term 
‘systems’ implies the inclusion of non-capital and non-structural 
elements. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus is on buildings and 
                                            
1
 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations ed. Kathryn 
Sunderland (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 414. 
2
 W. W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1960).  
3
 David C. Perry, Ed. Building the Public City: The Politics, Governance, and Finance of Public 
Infrastructure (London, Sage, 1995), p. 6. 
4
 Bruce Seeley, ‘The Saga of American Infrastructure’. Wilson Quarterly, Winter 1993 pp. 18-39. 
5
 Hirofumi Uzawa, Economic Analysis of Social Common Capital (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), pp. vii, 4.  
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other constructed assets, and not on the provision of education, 
welfare or judicial services. Public infrastructure is therefore defined as 
roads, bridges and other transport structures; public utility assets; 
educational, health, welfare and judicial buildings; and other public 
buildings.  
Capital formation 
Capital formation is an economist’s definition of net additions to the 
capital stock. The term therefore excludes capital replacements. C. H. 
Feinstein and Sidney Pollard concentrate on making estimates of 
capital formation.6 
Monetary values 
Nineteenth century monetary values were very different to those of 2014. 
Quantifying the difference is not clear cut. The Bank of England historic 
inflation site says that between 1847 and 2012, prices rose nearly 90 fold.7 Yet 
a large primary school cost £5,000 to build in the 1870s, and £6.9m in 2014. 
This is an increase of 1370 fold. (See footnote 33 in chapter 6) Adjusting for 
the more generous modern space standards, the cost inflation is close to 300 
fold. Between 1855 and 2012, per capita GDP rose by nearly 1,100 fold.8 A 
middle ground is provided by the 500 fold increase in the average annual pay 
between £55 a year in 1867 and £27,000 in 2013.9 This 500 fold increase is 
the multiplier preferred in this thesis. 
On this basis, a £2,000 turnpike road scheme would cost £1m now; a £5,000 
workhouse would cost £2.5m; a £100 loan to a turnpike trust or a £100 
contribution towards the building of a voluntary school would be worth £50,000. 
At the other end of the scale, the £13.9m invested in school building between 
1870 and 1876 would be the equivalent of £7 billion in 2014, and the £42m 
loaned by the PWLB over the 60 years covered by this thesis would be 
equivalent to £21billion in 2014 money. The purpose of these figures is simply 
to give a better sense of scale to the sums mentioned throughout the thesis. 
                                            
6
 C. H. Feinstein and Sidney Pollard, Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom 1750-1920 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988) 
7
 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/pages/inflation/calculator/flash/default.aspx accessed 26 
March 2014 
8
 B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1971), p. 367; World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
accessed 26 March 2014 
9
 A. L. Bowley, Wages in the United Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1900), p. 70, and http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/ashe/annual-survey-of-hours-and-
earnings/2013-provisional-results/info-ashe-2013.html accessed 26 March 2014 
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Chapter 1, Introduction: the origins of the Public Works 
Loan Board, 1793-1817. 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Most public 
infrastructure before 1817 
was financed privately by a 
mixture of share issues and 
mortgages, after the 
passing of a local Act of 
Parliament. Chesterfield 
canal was typical, and was 
mostly financed locally. 
Completed in 1777, it ran 
between Chesterfield and 
the River Trent. It is 
currently being restored as 
a leisure facility with the aid 
of public money. 
Figure 1.2. The 1790s local Act approving the building of the West India Dock complex also 
allowed the building of the Isle of Dogs Canal. The dock complex was commercially 
financed, and successful. In the absence of commercial support for the canal, the 
government agreed to lend the promoters the £327,000 needed. The canal was not a 
success, and the government forced its sale in1829 to the dock company for £120,000. 
The canal still exists, but is part of Canary Wharf. 
2 
 
The Public Works Loan Board was created in 1817. Its aims were to lend money 
to finance public works, support mines and fisheries, and increase employment in 
a period of acute economic and social distress.1 Between 1817 and 1876, the 
PWLB made 8,000 loans worth £42m, with nearly all being to finance public 
infrastructure.2 More than half of these loans were for the building of workhouses, 
provision of water supply and sewer infrastructure and the building of elementary 
schools. Much of the infrastructure built with PWLB loans in this period is still in 
use today. The PWLB still exists in 2014 and provides 75 per cent of the loans 
local government needs to finance its capital investment.3 
There are four sections to this chapter. The first covers the scope, aims, sources 
and methodology of the thesis. The second reviews the changing context in which 
the PWLB operated. The third examines the PWLB’s predecessor bodies in the 
years 1793 to 1811. These earlier commissions established many of the hallmarks 
of the PWLB’s later success. The final section considers the pressures on the 
government that led to the creation of a permanent PWLB in 1817, and the 
background of the commissioners appointed to the PWLB. This section also 
considers why the objectives of the 1817 Act were so confused. 
1.1 Scope, aims, sources and methodology  
The thesis deals with the first 60 years of the PWLB’s life, from 1817 to 1876, and 
concentrates on five case studies of the PWLB’s lending, with a chapter for each. 
The five case studies are lending to: mine owners and turnpike trusts in 1817-26; 
poor law unions in 1835-44 to build workhouses; local boards of health in 1848-76 
to provide water and sewer facilities; and school boards in 1870-76 to build 
elementary schools. These five were chosen because they illustrate the nature of 
the PWLB’s lending at the beginning, middle and end of the 60 year period. They 
also account for well over half of all the PWLB’s lending, and show how the PWLB 
developed over the 60 years. The first two areas show how the PWLB interpreted 
its objectives as set out in the 1817 Act, and how the PWLB developed its 
                                            
1
 Since 1842, the body has called itself the ‘Public Works Loan Board’, and the initials ‘PWLB’ are 
used throughout this thesis. From 1817 to 1842 it was called the ‘Exchequer Bill Loan Office’. 
2
 National Archives, PWLB 6/1-6, PWLB application ledgers. See appendix 1.A. 
3
 Local government has outstanding loans of £84bn. Of this, £63bn is repayable to the PWLB. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-local-government-finance accessed 
21 August 2014. 
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approach to lending. In contrast, in the last three areas the PWLB was lending as 
the result of major pieces of public legislation, which involved large scale changes 
in the role of the government and the PWLB.4 
In 1817 the term ‘public infrastructure’ was unknown, and the terms ‘public works’ 
or ‘internal improvements’ were used instead. Adam Smith used ‘public works’ to 
cover roads, bridges, canals and harbours that ‘facilitate the commerce of any 
country’.5 Updating this definition, public utilities such as water, electricity and gas 
would now be included. Hirofumi Uzawa adds hospitals, schools, judicial systems 
and public administrative services in order to give a definition of social common 
capital.6 For the purpose of this thesis, the focus is on the capital costs of 
buildings and other constructed assets, and not on the current costs of the 
provision of education, welfare or judicial services. Public infrastructure is 
therefore defined as roads, bridges and other transport structures; public utility 
assets; educational, health, welfare and judicial buildings; and other public 
buildings. According to this definition, only PWLB loans for mines and fisheries fail 
to count as financing public infrastructure. This chapter shows that there was no 
obvious reason for including mines and fisheries in the 1817 Act. Even so, chapter 
2 shows that an examination of this group of loans explains a lot about the PWLB 
commissioners’ views of their role, and is therefore worthy of inclusion.    
There are a number of reasons for seeing 1876 as the end of the period covered 
by the thesis. First, before 1876 there was very little collected information about 
the capital spending of local bodies. After 1876, much more information was 
available because the PWLB, the Local Government Board and the Education 
Department were all providing annual reports to Parliament. In the 1870s, local 
government was beginning to provide annual local taxation returns to Parliament, 
and by the 1880s these became very useful. The PWLB also changed in 1876, 
with the introduction of a new legal framework under the 1875 Public Works Loans 
Act. In addition, the PWLB had a new chairman, after the retirement of John 
                                            
4
 See appendix 1.A for a summary of all PWLB lending over the period 1817 to 1876. 
5
 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations ed. Kathryn 
Sunderland (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 414. 
6
 Hirofumi Uzawa, Economic Analysis of Social Common Capital (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), pp. vii, 4.  
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Gellibrand Hubbard, who had been chairman for 20 years. These reasons make 
1876 a natural break point. 
One of the two reasons for undertaking this study was that the PWLB is an 
important financial institution, and its history ought to be told. This is particularly 
true because the financing of public infrastructure is still controversial today. The 
other reason was a conviction that the history of the PWLB’s lending would shed 
new light on the changing nature of government in the nineteenth century. These 
reasons are reflected in the five aims of the thesis. The first is to determine the 
objectives the government and Parliament set for the PWLB, and how these 
objectives changed over time. The second aim is to evaluate the importance of 
PWLB lending to the financing of capital investment in each of the five case 
studies. The third aim is to analyse the PWLB’s lending activity in each of the five 
areas. The fourth aim is to determine which factors dictated whether the PWLB’s 
lending in each area was successful. The final aim is to use the PWLB case 
studies to demonstrate how central and local government relationships changed 
over time.  
This thesis rests heavily on the unused archive of 60 volumes of PWLB minutes 
and the six ledgers listing loan applications to the PWLB for the years 1817 to 
1876.7 The ledgers listing the 10,000 applications provide an enormous amount of 
quantitative information about the value and number of applications; the purpose 
of applications; the outcome of each application; and applicants’ names and 
geographic locations. The 60 minute books include much of the correspondence 
with applicants, giving a good indication of how the PWLB made its decisions. 
They also include a good deal of the PWLB’s written exchanges with the 
government and bodies like the Local Government Board. Careful analysis of the 
qualitative information in the minute books can yield a good deal of quantitative 
information about the outcome of applications. These primary sources provide a 
robust empirical base for the study of the PWLB and its activities. 
Extensive use is also made of the annual returns to Parliament from turnpike 
trusts, and the annual reports of the Poor Law Commission, the Local 
                                            
7
 National Archives. PWLB 2/1-60 PWLB minute books 1817 to 1876. PWLB 6/1-6 PWLB application 
ledgers. 
5 
 
Government Board and the Education Department. Many of these have a wealth 
of statistical material about the borrowing of individual bodies – material that 
appears to have been little used. The National Archives files were also consulted 
to examine the correspondence between the PWLB, the Treasury and the Local 
Government Board. National Archives also hold files for each poor law union and 
school board. A sample of these and the corresponding Derbyshire local record 
office files were also consulted to verify the PWLB records. The record office files 
also provide a local perspective of how turnpike trusts, poor law unions, local 
boards of health and school boards went about their tasks. The challenge of 
dealing with this large volume of primary source material is covered in the next 
paragraphs on the methodology used in the thesis. 
There are four stages to the methodology adopted. The first was to convert the 
PWLB applications ledgers into an electronic format that could be analysed. The 
decision was made to record the whole of the data, and to enter it at the most 
detailed level possible. Not relying on a sample of entries reduced the risk of a 
misleading picture emerging, and avoided the need for an interim statistical step 
of demonstrating that any sample was large enough to ensure a high degree of 
confidence. Recording and analysing all of the data also meant that data outside 
the case studies could be used in a supporting role. Classifying the applications 
across 35 groups, rather than over the ten or so major Acts authorising loans, was 
also important. It meant that later analysis could be undertaken at the lower level 
of, say, water supply loans, rather than at the higher level of loans under the 
public health Acts. The outcome of this first stage was a clear view of the scale of 
PWLB lending in each of the major and minor areas, and this informed the choice 
of case studies.8 
The second stage was to review, and, if necessary, revise existing estimates of 
fixed capital formation for the five case study areas, or, where they did not exist, 
construct them. This made it possible to compare the total level of investment in a 
particular area: such as, school building, and the level of PWLB lending to school 
boards. It was then possible to reach a conclusion about the relative importance of 
PWLB lending in financing investment in schools. Repeating the process for each 
                                            
8
 See appendix 1.A. 
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case study area satisfies the second thesis aim of determining the importance of 
PWLB loans in each of the five areas. 
The third stage was a more detailed analysis of the PWLB loan data in the five 
case study areas. This stage was exploratory, looking for patterns in the data. The 
applications data were therefore tested against all the variables that might affect 
the level of applications to the PWLB: time; geography; economic conditions; 
changes in interest rates; size of the body applying; size of application; and 
changes of government. In a second series of searches for patterns, the outcome 
of applications was examined against the variables that might affect the PWLB’s 
decision making. This stage forms the core of chapters 2 to 6, and meets the 
needs of the third aim of the thesis, of analysing PWLB activity in each case study 
area. 
Stage four was a concurrent review of the PWLB minute books for information 
about the PWLB’s decisions, or significant correspondence on them. The outcome 
of this review guided, supported or challenged the quantitative analysis of stage 
three. Together with the Acts of Parliament themselves, the PWLB minutes 
charted the changing relationship between central and local government, and 
changes in the government’s objectives for the PWLB. This meets the 
requirements of the first thesis aim. Once this analysis was completed, it was 
clear which of the case studies involved successful PWLB lending, and which had 
not been successful. It then simply remained to identify which factors determined 
success or failure, in order to satisfy thesis aim four. 
This thesis is the first academic analysis of the PWLB’s first 60 years. It also 
makes the first use of the PWLB archive of minutes and ledgers. In some of the 
case studies, the thesis provides the first quantification of the scale of investment 
in public infrastructure before 1876. In all five cases, it gives an original picture of 
the sources of the financing of public infrastructure. Above all, the attempt to set 
out the essential conditions for the successful public financing of infrastructure for 
this period is original. Much has, of course, been written about the development of 
the government’s role as a service provider, and about the changing relationship 
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between central and local government.9 This thesis highlights the financial 
aspects of these changes after 1817. 
The structure of the thesis is broadly chronological, with the rest of this chapter 
investigating the period up to the creation of the PWLB in 1817. Chapters 2 and 3 
examine the PWLB’s first ten years. Chapter 2 covers PWLB loans to mines, 
showing them to be an atypical example of PWLB lending. It also shows the 
PWLB’s developing approach to lending. Chapter 3 concentrates on loans to 
turnpike trusts, a typical example of the PWLB’s early lending to support transport 
related public works. The chapter highlights some of the parliamentary challenges 
to the PWLB’s independence of decision making. Chapter 4 considers loans for 
building workhouses in the ten years from the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act. 
This period saw a major change in the PWLB’s objectives, and a fundamental 
change in central and local government relationships. Chapter 5 charts the 
changes in the approach to the financing of water supply and sewer infrastructure 
in the 29 years after the passing of the 1848 Public Health Act. The initial failure of 
PWLB lending before 1872 is contrasted with the major role played by the PWLB 
after 1872. Chapter 6 focuses on the financing of school building after the 1870 
Elementary Education Act, when the PWLB’s lending grew to levels that caused 
problems for the Treasury. Chapter 7 is devoted to assessing the factors that 
made some of the PWLB’s lending successful, and some a relative failure. 
1.2     The changing context in which the PWLB operated 
The Public Works Loan Board was formed and developed in an environment that 
changed substantially between 1817 and 1876. This section examines that 
changing environment. The key changes were in the social and economic 
environment, and these led to a clear need for increased public infrastructure 
investment. The improvements were intended to raise the living conditions in cities 
and large towns, and to improve the transport infrastructure. To finance this 
spending, it was necessary for the money market to develop new capacity, and 
where the market was still unable to meet the need, the PWLB was needed. It 
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was also necessary for other government agencies to be created, and for the role 
of local government to change. In turn, central government had to develop new 
ways to hold these agencies and bodies accountable. In particular, the PWLB also 
had to develop an approach to decision making and defining its role. This section 
looks at how the PWLB fitted into this changing environment.  
The population of England more than doubled between 1817 and 1876. Phyllis 
Deane and W. A. Cole wrote that industrialisation changed the distribution of the 
population, with a movement from agricultural to industrial areas.10 In the 1811 
census, 55 per cent of the population lived in counties that were predominantly 
agricultural and mixed. In contrast, the 1881 census showed that 59 per cent of 
the population lived in counties that were predominantly industrial and 
commercial.11 B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane’s statistics indicate that this 
population change was matched by a change in patterns of employment. In 1821, 
33 per cent were employed in agriculture, but by 1881, this had virtually halved to 
17 per cent.12 Jeffrey Williamson argues that the rapid growth in cities 
demonstrated a major backlog in public infrastructure investment.13 It was this 
backlog that created much of the demand for the investment in public health 
improvements and schools.  
These population changes were mirrored by economic changes. Mitchell and 
Deane’s figures show that the agricultural sector shrank from being 36 per cent of 
the national economy in 1811, to just 10 per cent in 1881. Over the same period, 
manufacturing grew from 21 per cent of the economy to 38 per cent.14 The 
change was even more pronounced when comparing the value of the capital stock 
by sector. In 1812, land accounted for more than half the national stock of capital, 
yet by 1885, it had fallen to under a fifth of capital values.15 The reverse had 
happened to the value of industrial, financial and commercial assets, growing from 
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a fifth to half of the national total. Boyd Hilton argues that the impact of these 
changes meant that the ‘business cycle came to displace the harvest as the most 
portentous variable in the eyes of nineteenth century policy-makers’.16 With 
industry as the largest part of the economy, and drawing people into fast growing 
cities, solutions were needed to improving the public infrastructure.  
These social and economic changes caused the outlook of governments to 
change between 1817 and 1876. Before 1817, the outlook of the government can 
be seen in its financial arrangements, with an income tax on the better off only 
tolerated in wartime. Otherwise, the majority of income came from indirect taxes, 
mostly paid by the much larger poorer section of the population. In this 
environment, government spending other than debt service and military costs was 
miniscule. Equally, government investment was very modest unless it was for 
military purposes.17 This outlook was not sustainable in the changing social and 
economic environment. 
There was a decisive shift in the outlook of governments in the 1820s, 1830s and 
1840s. Philip Harling in particular argues that in these years governments 
increasingly adopted a ‘disinterested’ or ‘neutral’ view.18 By this he means that 
successive governments sought to promote social fairness between the different 
sections of the population, rather than governing in the sole interests of a narrow 
minority. Whatever governments’ motivations, K. Theodore Hoppen recognises 
that much of governments’ legislative activity ‘marked a symbolic acceptance of 
change’ in the role of a government.19 This change included a growing willingness 
to intervene legislatively to ‘strengthen individual liberties … and remove abuses 
… to allow the free market to work miracles of growth’.20 Harling went further, 
seeing governments promoting social fairness by ‘acting negatively’ to reduce 
indirect taxes and duties.21 He also sees governments ‘acting positively’ to 
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legislate to increase social fairness. In doing so, this period saw the passage of 
the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act, the 1848 Public Health Act, and the 1830s 
interventions in the provision of education.  
Even so, these changes did not lead to a growth is the share of national income 
taken by government spending. Hoppen notes that ‘as a direct operator the state 
was doing little more in 1865 than in 1790, and still confined itself largely to the 
Post Office, the Ordnance and naval shipbuilding.’22 Indeed, as a share of national 
income, government spending actually shrank between 1817 and 1876. In 1817, it 
was 24 per cent of national income, and just 7 per cent in 1876.23 The explanation 
is not that government spending shrank, rather that it grew more slowly than 
national income until the 1860s. Even if local spending is included, what might 
now be called public spending still fell from 29 per cent to 10 per cent of national 
income.24  
The fast growing urban areas, and the growing share of the economy taken by 
industry, led to changes in the size and make up of fixed capital formation. C. H. 
Feinstein and Sidney Pollard show that annual fixed capital formation rose from 
around £25m in 1820s to around £130m in the 1870s.25 In order to judge the 
relative importance of the PWLB, it will be necessary to form estimates of the total 
investment in each of the case study areas. Of the sectorial studies in Feinstein 
and Pollard, only those on coal and iron, and turnpike trusts are suitable as 
starting points for this thesis. Even then, the turnpike trust estimate of capital 
formation proves to be fatally flawed. Feinstein’s estimate of investments in 
workhouses was much improved on by Felix Driver, in Power and Pauperism, 
using Poor Law Commission records, and Driver’s figures need no further 
amendment.26 Feinstein’s estimates of investment in water and sewers and 
schools are too ‘top down’ to be a good starting point for chapters 5 and 6. Instead 
a different, ‘bottom up’ approach will be used. This will lead to more narrowly 
defined estimates that are better supported and more detailed. 
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The five-fold increase in the scale of fixed capital formation between 1817 and 
1876 meant that there was a need for a much higher level of savings to finance 
the increase. Financial markets therefore needed to change and develop. By 
1876, the savings of the population as measured by the value of bank deposits 
and the assets of trustee savings banks had grown substantially.27 In addition, 
there was a growth in both the number of insurance companies, and the 
investable funds that they held. Even so, these new and enlarged institutions were 
not always willing to offer loans to new untested public sector bodies. Even if they 
were willing to offer loans, their interest rates were often at a level that the local 
bodies felt unable to accept. The PWLB therefore developed as a last resort 
financer of public infrastructure to fill in the gaps left by the private sector. 
Historians have taken three approaches to investigations of how fixed capital 
formation was financed. The most common approach is to ignore the financing of 
capital in the studies of individual businesses. Michael Collins and Mae Baker 
report that of 137 surveys by business historians, over 80 per cent did not 
comment on how the businesses satisfied their financing needs.28 The second 
approach is based on the study of either individual firms or industries, and 
generally led to a common conclusion. This was that ‘long term financing was 
essentially privately generated’ and that financing provided by banks was 
essentially for short term working capital.29  
The third approach is to study the loan records of individual banks in order to test 
the purpose of banks’ lending. In a study of four banks, Peter Cottrell reached a 
very similar conclusion, based on the late 1870s balance sheets of two banks. 
More generally, Cottrell concludes that: ‘English joint stock banks … were not 
accustomed to lend long on a regular basis to industrial clients, but they did 
provide overdrafts’ on an extended basis. Collins and Baker undertook a wider 
study of over 3,000 loans between 1880 and 1914. They produce some very good 
statistics on the purposes for which banks made loans; the reasons they might 
reject applications; and the types of security they sought against a failure to repay 
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loans.30 This evidence allows the PWLB’s decision making on loans in chapters 2 
and 3 to be compared with that of banks. In a similar way, the role of insurance 
companies in lending to poor law unions in chapter 4 allows comparisons to be 
made with the PWLB working practices.  
However, Jonathan Baskin and Paul Miranti offer a more nuanced view of the 
financing of capital spending. They recognise that the picture changes over time, 
and as the scale of the firm and its capital needs grow.31 Baskin and Miranti argue 
that there is a three stage process:  
businesses initially seek to finance their operations by retaining 
earnings; when this source proves insufficient, managements turn to 
debt financing; the sale of additional equity will occur only under the 
most pressing of circumstances  
This approach implies that raising new equity will also be reserved for the larger 
examples of capital raising. Chapters 2 to 6 of this thesis will show that this view 
also fits the experience of public sector bodies. The exception is that public bodies 
will not be able to seek new equity, but will instead borrow on the security markets 
when their needs are very large. If banks were not long term financers of capital 
spending, and insurance companies had yet to grow sufficiently, then only 
individuals could be relied on to finance infrastructure development. Chapter 3 
shows that individuals financed turnpike trusts, and that many of these individuals 
lost substantial sums in the process. This evidence begins to show why a body 
such as the PWLB was needed in 1817 to finance infrastructure. 
If there is little information on how private sector capital investment was financed, 
there is even less on how public infrastructure was financed. In none of the many 
books and articles on turnpike trusts, workhouses, water and sewerage, or school 
building, are there any estimates of how total investment in these areas was 
financed. The references which do exist mostly refer to the loans of individual 
trusts, unions, or local boards, and the individual examples are too few to draw 
well founded general conclusions from.  Chapters 2 to 6 of this thesis take the 
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capital investment totals for each of the case study areas, and show how the total 
sum was financed. This allows judgements to be made about the relative 
importance of loans from the PWLB. There is also a trend over time and scale 
very similar to that noted by Baskin and Miranti. In chapters 2 and 3, most mining 
investment is financed from profits, and most turnpike trusts were financed by 
small loans from individuals. In the middle period, there are larger loans from 
insurance companies. In the 1870s and 1880s, there are much larger (and 
tradable) loans raised on the security markets.  
The government need to ensure that adequate finance was available to fund 
public works led it to establish the PWLB. Once it was clear that the PWLB had a 
long term role, it needed to be part of general improvements in the accountability 
to Parliament and governance of public agencies. Better accountability demanded 
changes to the models governments had used to hold its three oldest agencies – 
the Ordnance, the naval dockyards and the Post Office to account. The origins of 
the Ordnance, naval dockyards and the Post Office were in medieval times, and 
their accountabilities had changed little by the early nineteenth century. 
Financially, Parliament approved an annual vote for each, and all three were 
subject to review by parliamentary select committees.32 However, none of the 
three produced an annual report to Parliament, and none produced timely annual 
audited accounts, in spite of the fact that each spent in excess of £1m a year. 
Their accountability was therefore very weak. Chapters 2 to 6 will chart the 
changes in the accountability of government agencies. By 1876, it had become 
normal for these agencies to produce annual reports to Parliament. In the 1880s 
this reporting also included independently audited accounts.33 
The governance of all three agencies was also weak. They had strong central 
organisations, but many distant local operations, and effective central control over 
these was troublesome.34 All three operated largely outside Treasury financial 
control, and there were delays of years in the production of accounts. This meant 
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that governance and management decision making was poor, and relied on 
incomplete financial information.35 The PWLB did not suffer from any of these 
governance shortcomings. It had few staff, all based in the same office, had a 
Board which took all the decisions, and had a clear view of the role of the PWLB. 
The government’s need to tackle the backlog of public infrastructure investment 
led to changes in the relationship between central and local government between 
1817 and 1876. In turn, this led to changes in the accountability of local 
government to central government. At the start of the period, parish councils had 
substantial freedoms of action, and had very little accountability to Parliament.36 
They were also individually so small that the quality of their governance must have 
been questionable. The same pattern of local discretion and weak accountability 
was also seen in the 300 or so improvement commissions. Their role was to 
improve the public infrastructure by promoting: street ‘lighting, the supply of water, 
street cleaning and paving … and many other matters’.37 In addition, the 
governance of the municipal corporations was widely regarded as inefficient and 
often corrupt before 1835.38 The Webbs felt that the 1,000 turnpike trusts were 
also poorly governed, and they certainly shared the weak accountability to 
Parliament.39 
Chapter 3 will show that this pattern of local discretion, poor governance and 
weak accountability changed dramatically as a result of the 1834 Poor Law 
Amendment Act. Poor law unions were directly accountable to the Poor Law 
Commission and the local electorate. Their governance was directed by the 1834 
Act and by instructions from the PLC. In practice, local unions had little discretion, 
while the central PLC was very strong. Importantly the Poor Law Commission 
produced an annual report to Parliament, and this set new standards for 
accountability. Chapter 6 will show that this model of a strong central government 
and weak local bodies became the long term trend in local and central 
relationships. By 1876, the practice of government agencies producing annual 
reports to Parliament had become the norm. 
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This section has covered the environment in which the PWLB was formed and 
developed, and it now needs to turn to the PWLB itself. Tthe academic literature 
on the PWLB is limited to a single article written in 1961 by M. W. Flinn.40 While 
Flinn writes mainly about the PWLB’s early years, and does not cover any of the 
case studies in this thesis, his main conclusions are two-fold. First, he argues that 
the establishment of the PWLB showed that there was ‘a significant change in the 
development of economic policy’.41 The later part of this chapter will challenge 
that view. David Green, in Pauper Capital, argued that the Act creating the PWLB 
‘provided public money from the exchequer for the employment of the poor on 
public works’.42 Richard Brown in Church and the State in Modern Britain: 1700-
1850 repeated this view, saying that the Act ‘offered government loans for public 
works to alleviate unemployment’.43 Chapter 2 will show that both these views 
were to confuse theoretical intention with practical outcome.  
Flinn’s second conclusion was that the PWLB ‘deserved a more prominent place 
in history than it has so far been accorded’.44 Thirty years later, John Prest took 
the same view, writing that the PWLB ‘was a body whose history needs to be 
written’.45 Since 1961, no one has accepted Flinn’s challenge to raise the profile of 
the PWLB. So little regarded is the PWLB that its history has not even been told 
by those who served as its commissioners. Of the 21 original commissioners in 
1817, at least six had had biographies written about their lives, have left journals, 
or have featured heavily in books about their families of workplaces, but none 
mentions the PWLB once. The PWLB does gain a few entries in the indexes of 
the literature on public health and schools, but these are invariably very short. 
Martin Daunton devotes four pages of Trusting Leviathan to the PWLB, but 
misleadingly says that ‘in 1875 the Treasury succeeded in restoring a fixed rate of 
5 per cent’ for loans.46 Chapters 5 and 6 will show that on the contrary, 85 per 
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cent of PWLB lending was made at 3.5 per cent between 1872 and 1876.47 
(Daunton also erroneously writes that Hubbard served as PWLB chairman until 
1889.48 Hubbard actually retired in 1876.49)The PWLB has been poorly served by 
historians, and this thesis aims to fill this gap. 
The conclusion from this review of the context in which the PWLB was formed and 
developed, is that there are many gaps in the existing literature. They range from 
the obvious lack of academic work on the PWLB; to the need to refine many of the 
estimates of fixed capital formation in the case study areas; to the complete 
absence of any literature on how public infrastructure was financed. The thesis will 
also add to the debate about the role of banks in financing improvements, and 
charts the development of higher standards of accountability and governance. 
There were a great many changes between 1817 and 1876, and the history of the 
PWLB illustrates many of these.  Above all, the PWLB made a major contribution 
to reducing the backlog of public infrastructure, particularly in the 1870s, when it 
provided half of the finance for improvements in sanitation and education. 
1.3    Developing the ‘PWLB mechanism’  
This section assesses how the main features of a permanent PWLB were 
established between 1793 and 1811. Before 1793, 87 per cent of the 
government’s annual expenditure went on military spending and servicing the 
national debt.50 The rest met the cost of running government and the civil list, 
meaning that the government spent virtually nothing on service provision. The 
only infrastructure the government provided was for military purposes. Canals, 
docks and harbours were privately financed, while local ratepayers financed 
parish roads and some bridges. The government did not see that it had any role to 
play in economic management, either. As a result, it did not intervene to reduce 
the impact of downturns in the trade cycle, or financial market crises. 
The credit crisis of 1793 saw the beginnings of intervention by the government to 
respond to the financial crisis. J. H. Clapham observed that ‘between February 
and July the country had come through the worst financial and commercial crisis it 
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had known’.51 L. S. Pressnell states that the crisis ‘was marked by a widespread 
flight to liquidity’ as bank depositors withdrew their money because they were 
afraid the banks would fail.52 The withdrawals dramatically reduced the credit 
available to merchants, and led over 100 country banks to fail.53 In response, 
Scottish MP Sir John Sinclair brought together a group of merchants and bankers, 
who met Prime Minister William Pitt in April. They argued that this was a crisis of 
confidence, and that the government should lend sufficient money to merchants 
and bankers to make up for the lack of credit.54 In effect, the group was asking the 
government to act as lender of last resort by lending to banks and others in order 
to prevent further bank collapses and merchant bankruptcies.55 Pitt accepted their 
analysis, and their proposed solution, and within two weeks an Act had been 
passed to issue exchequer bills worth £5m.56  
The Act created a group of commissioners to receive applications for loans, 
decide on the terms, security and scale of individual loans and ensure repayment 
of the loans. Sir John Sinclair was appointed as chairman of the commission. 
Although a sum of £5m was set aside, only 238 loans, worth £2.2m in total, were 
made during 1793, at an average of under £10,000 each.57 All of their loans were 
repaid within 12 months, even though two firms had become bankrupt and these 
loans had to be recovered from the sureties. Writing 12 years later, historian 
David Macpherson reported that the solution ‘worked like a charm’.58 The 
operation actually made a profit, because the government borrowed at 3.8 per 
cent but lent to the merchants at 5 per cent. The surplus generated by this 
difference was more than enough to cover the office costs of £8,000. This 
approach had so many of the features that became central to the operation of the 
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Public Works Loan Board in 1817 that this chapter can define it as the ‘PWLB 
mechanism’.       
There were three further uses of the ‘PWLB mechanism’ between 1795 and 1811. 
The first was in 1795, when £1.4m was lent to merchants and plantation owners in 
Grenada and St Vincents after an insurrection.59 Then, in 1799, a series of loans 
worth £260,000 were made to Liverpool and Lancaster merchants who had 
unsalable quantities of coffee and sugar.60 Both these episodes used all the 
elements of the 1793 ‘PWLB mechanism’. The 1795 commission also shared 
seven of the 1793 commissioners, including Sir John Sinclair and Charles Grant. 
The 1799 commission, though, was run from Liverpool, with local commissioners. 
The final use of the ‘PWLB mechanism’ occurred in 1811. Many merchants had 
been building up inventories of goods to take advantage of an expected major 
growth of trade with South America.61 The growth did not come, and merchants 
could not sell their goods. The merchants found themselves unable to repay their 
loans to bankers, and together they persuaded the government to step in with 
short term loans of up to £6m, using the ‘PWLB mechanism’. However, this time 
there were deeper underlying economic problems that went far beyond this group 
of merchants.62 Even so, the government went ahead with the loans. The ‘PWLB 
mechanism’ worked well: all the loans were quickly recovered, and a profit made, 
even after meeting office costs. But the underlying economic problems were left 
unaddressed, and Clapham argued that the 1811 operation was ‘ill judged’.63  
At the same time that the ‘PWLB mechanism’ had been developed, the 
government was coming under pressure to support occasional infrastructure 
projects. Two examples show the consequences of Parliament responding to 
these pressures in the pre-PWLB era. In 1799, the promoters of the Isle of Dogs 
canal in the West India dock complex in London asked the government for a loan 
to complete the canal, and eventually borrowed £327,000.64 The completed canal 
was a commercial failure, and the government disposed of it for just £120,000 in 
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1829. In a second example, in 1802 the government was persuaded to support 
the building of the Caledonian canal with loans that eventually rose to £1.3m.65 
Bruce Lenman argues that it ‘was virtually a complete waste of public money’.66 
Neither scheme displayed the essential characteristics of the ‘PWLB mechanism’: 
there was no independent decision making, security against loss was poor, and 
these were large, long term loans. Both were commercial failures, with the 
government failing to recover its investment and incurring large losses. 
The 1790s examples of the ‘PWLB mechanism’ showed that the government was 
able to act successfully as a lender of last resort. However, the ‘PWLB 
mechanism’ would not solve deeper economic problems. Even so, the 
government had shown that it accepted some responsibility for mitigating the 
impact of bad economic conditions.67 The Caledonian canal and the Isle of Dogs 
canal loans indicated that leaving lending decisions to Parliament involved a much 
higher degree of risk than having decisions made by independent commissioners. 
More positively, these two loans demonstrated that the government accepted a 
role in encouraging transport and trade related infrastructure investment. The two 
threads came together in 1817. 
1.4    The aims of the 1817 Act 
In 1815, the costs of over 20 years of war had resulted in government spending 
rising to £113m a year, while its income was only £78m a year.68 To make matters 
worse, Lord Liverpool’s government had little choice but to end income tax in 
1816, sacrificing £14m of income. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, the 
desire to bring the budget back to the broad balance of pre-war years was 
powerful.69 This desire forced the government to demobilise 300,000 men from 
the military in order to reduce spending. The mass demobilisation and the ending 
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of military supply contracts led to a 40 per cent increase in poor relief spending as 
unemployment rose.70  
The government came under pressure to act to reduce distress and increase the 
level of economic activity. The first pressure for more spending came in 1816, 
from Charles Western MP, the leading spokesman for agricultural interests in the 
House of Commons. Western wanted the government to pay bounties to 
encourage agricultural exports, expecting that these would raise both demand for 
and prices of agricultural products.71 At the same time, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Nicholas Vansittart, was considering an ‘Exchequer Loan Plan’ to lend 
money to landowners against mortgages on their estates.72 The second source of 
pressure came in early 1817, in the form of a petition to the House of Commons 
signed by 11,000 Birmingham labourers. They were pleading for help to replace 
the jobs lost when £3m of military ordinance contracts ended in 1815.73 Henry 
Beeke, who was Vansittart’s ‘economic mentor’, wrote four letters to the 
Chancellor between December 1816 and March 1817. The first spoke warmly of 
the Exchequer Loan Plan as ‘making the obtaining of capital easy for the purpose 
of commercial and agricultural speculation’.74 The second letter cooled towards 
the idea, claiming that ‘assistance is certainly not wanted by that part of the trade 
to which it can be safely given’. Beeke concluded by writing, ‘the more I think of 
the question the more I incline to doubt its extensive success’. In the third and 
fourth letters, Beeke withdrew support for any loan plan, writing, ‘I am more than 
ever convinced that the worst is past’. However, Vansittart did not entirely drop the 
Exchequer Loan Plan.   
Instead of providing current subsidies to agriculture or loans to landowners, 
Vansittart’s thoughts turned to providing loans to support capital investment in 
public works. This new focus reflected the result of pressure from two sets of 
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canal promoters: of the partially completed Regent’s canal and the proposed 
Ardrossan canal in Scotland.75 Both promoters said that they were unable to raise 
more finance from individuals, and asked for government loans for their projects. 
John Christian Curwen MP, a Cumberland landowner and future PWLB 
commissioner, urged a different kind of response. He suggested that the 
government should borrow £5-6m, and take shares in ‘every canal or similar work, 
and advance money …. for the building of bridges, making of new roads etc’. 
Curwen argued that this would generate ‘little short of 100,000 jobs’ in six 
months.76 Vansittart therefore refocused his Exchequer Loan Plan away from 
agriculture and onto public works, and this became his first draft of the Bill to 
create the PWLB. Vansittart introduced it in the House of Commons on 28 April 
1817. It would provide up to £500,000 of loans for the ‘completion of public works 
now in progress, or about to be commenced; to encourage fisheries; to employ 
the poor in different parishes’. At the same time, the Bill would provide £250,000 
to Ireland for similar purposes.77  
The response in the first House of Commons debate on 28 April 1817 was mixed, 
with 18 members speaking; of these, six supported the Bill and three opposed it.78 
Four members – Henry Brougham, William Littleton, Lord Milton and William 
Lamb – considered that they did not see the problem facing the country as a ‘want 
of capital’. Rather, they saw the problem as a ‘want of a market for goods’. Lord 
Cochrane thought the Bill was misconceived, saying that a ‘radical remedy should 
be applied (and that) great general retrenchments and reductions’ were needed. 
George Philips took a similar view, saying that ‘there should be reductions to 
public establishments and rigid economy in every branch of public expenditure’. 
Support for Vansittart’s Bill seemed lukewarm; nearly half the speakers were 
either opposed, or intent on arguing that the Bill was not the solution to the 
economic problems of the day. 
The Bill returned to the Commons on 14 May, when the sum available had 
increased to £1.5m to reflect the earlier debate, plus an unchanged £250,000 for 
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Ireland.79 Support for mines had been added to the Bill, although there had been 
no mention of mines in the earlier debates. One possible explanation is given in a 
letter to the PWLB in August 1817.80 Challenging the PWLB’s rejection of his 
application for a loan for a coalmine, an unidentified John Scott claimed that he 
had: ‘been personally the means for introducing the clause for the relief of 
collieries in the Bill … through an amendment moved by Mr Wilberforce’. There is 
no Hansard record of such an amendment. However, John Scott was the name of 
the long standing Lord Chancellor, and his family were still coal merchants in the 
North East.81 He, or more likely a member of his family, may well have sought a 
PWLB loan. The relative may also have encouraged the Lord Chancellor to 
persuade his cabinet colleague Vansittart to add support for mines to the draft Bill. 
But the evidence is no more than circumstantial. What is more relevant is that 
there was no debate in the Commons about the inclusion of mining, and, of the 
eleven members who spoke in the 14 and 21 May debates, supporters of the Bill 
were in a clear minority.82 
The three House of Commons debates failed to give a rationale for the Bill to 
create the PWLB. Lord Liverpool was much clearer when he introduced the third 
reading of the amended Bill in the House of Lords on 10 June 1817. Liverpool said 
that the ‘two objects of the Bill were to advance money for … public works, and 
also to parishes to … relieve the pressure of the poor rates’.83  Liverpool followed 
Vansittart’s line, and did not mention support for mines or fisheries in his speech. 
Liverpool dismissed any help for agriculture, saying that land values were rising; 
he also dismissed support for manufacturing because ‘manufacturing had been 
guilty of over trading and speculation on rising export volumes’. Liverpool began 
his speech by reporting that he was ‘generally against measures of this sort’, and 
thought that public works should be financed by ‘commercial speculation with a 
view to profit’. However, Liverpool accepted that special circumstances prevailed, 
as they had in 1793 and 1811. Liverpool concluded that ‘time was the only 
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effectual remedy’ to current problems, and the measure was a ‘temporary relief’ 
only. After just one other speech, the Bill was passed. 
Liverpool had doubts about whether the Act would produce any real benefit. He 
‘did not anticipate that there would be many calls for money’ from parishes. This 
turned out to be right: only three loans were made to parishes, and they totalled 
less than £3,000.84 In part this was because, in order to qualify for a loan, a parish 
had to have experienced a 50 per cent increase in its poor rate in the previous 
three years.85 If good public works schemes were able to attract credit, then the 
PWLB would be left with applications from those who could not get private credit 
because they had inadequate security. The risk was that the PWLB would make 
the same judgement, and would also refuse them credit. This same reservation 
applied to loans to mines and fisheries. Liverpool’s hope that loans for public 
works would ‘give employment to a number of persons’, was reasonable, but the 
potential scale of employment creation was modest. If the £1.5m were spent in 
one year, it would raise national output by 0.5 per cent and provide maybe 15,000 
jobs.86 At best, this might find jobs for 5 per cent of the 300,000 demobilised from 
the military. Even at this stage, the Act looked to be of limited economic benefit. 
It is much more convincing to see the 1817 Act as a mainly political response to 
pressure from influential lobbyists in a crisis. This was the conclusion of Sir 
William Burroughs MP when he observed that the government ‘would never have 
adopted this measure had they not been driven to it’.87 The government had been 
under pressure from landowners, manufacturers and labourers, and from MPs 
who wanted the distress in their constituencies to be relieved. All of these groups 
expected the government to ‘do something’, even if the exact nature of the 
‘something’ was unclear. Vansittart was not an innovative chancellor; he ‘failed to 
associate his name with one single measure of importance’.88 The best Vansittart 
could manage was to argue that the problem was a shortage of credit, and to 
promote a Bill based on the tried and tested ‘PWLB mechanism’ for lending 
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money. To this he added a very limited proposal for support to parishes to provide 
work for the labouring poor. Neither he nor Liverpool had any great hopes for 
major economic benefits. However, they had responded to the representations 
made to them, and they had ‘done something’, and relieved the immediate 
pressure on the government. 
If Vansittart lacked originality in drafting the 1817 Act, he was on firmer ground 
when choosing PWLB commissioners. Vansittart recognised that commissioners 
needed to represent two different interests. First, commissioners needed sufficient 
financial knowledge to be able to make lending decisions. Second, they needed to 
retain the confidence of Parliament if the PWLB was to act as an independent 
body. Table 1.1 demonstrates that just under 30 per cent of the 1817 appointees 
had experience in the city of London and were MPs.89 A further 60 per cent had 
either city experience or were MPs; and just 10 per cent were neither. No more 
than four of the 21 commissioners appear to have been from large scale 
landowning families. The appointments therefore marked a clear shift: from a 
predominance of landowning MPs as decision makers to a predominance of city 
gentlemen. John Singleton reports that the Bank of England was ‘culturally … one 
of the pillars of gentlemanly capitalism’.90 The same might apply equally to the 
PWLB, and over the years, many commissioners had indeed been Bank directors 
or governors. 
  
At first glance it is a surprise to see that a third of the appointments in 1817 were 
either evangelical Christians or members of evangelical families. Indeed, the 1817 
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Total City City MP Non city Evange
number and MP only only non MP lical
Pre 1817 bodies 46 19 15 9 3 15
1817  PWLB 21 6 4 9 2 7
1821-66 appointments 47 12 15 10 10 7
All appointments  No. 114 37 34 28 15 29
                                 %age 32% 30% 25% 13% 25%
Source: See appendix 1.B.
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chairman, Charles Grant, and the next but one chairman, Benjamin Harrison, 
were both members of the evangelical Clapham Sect. The sect was formed 
around William Wilberforce, and sought to ‘change society, and the world, for the 
better’.91 The reason for this pattern is that Vansittart himself was an evangelical. 
Nearly half of the 1811 commission were also evangelicals and had been 
appointed by Spencer Perceval, who was also a noted evangelical.92 In fact, four, 
or 29 per cent, of Liverpool’s 1822 cabinet of 14 either were evangelicals or were 
strongly religious by nature.93 In this environment, the presence of so many 
evangelicals as PWLB commissioners is not so surprising. 
Vansittart was wise to opt for continuity, with nine of the 21 1817 appointments 
having been commissioners of one of the PWLB’s predecessor bodies. Charles 
Grant was an almost automatic choice to become PWLB chairman in 1817. Grant 
had been deputy chairman of the 1811 commissions, and was the only surviving 
member of the 1793 and 1795 commissions. He had all of the relevant qualities: 
he was an MP, and had been a minister; he had been a three time chairman of 
the East India Company; and, as member of the Clapham Sect, he shared the 
religious outlook of Vansittart. In addition, Grant’s son was at this time a Treasury 
commissioner, so he also had a family link to Vansittart.94 In effect, then, the 
government had appointed a group of experienced city men to bring financial 
experience and a group of MPs to reassure Parliament, and had appointed from a 
group of people they knew, and whose professional and personal views they 
shared.  
Conclusions 
The government faced a number of problems in 1817. Cutting government 
spending by more than 35 per cent eliminated the 1815 budget deficit. But this 
action caused poor relief spending to rise by 40 per cent between 1815 and 
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1818.95 Second, even if Vansittart had accepted the judgement of MPs that the 
problem was a shortage of demand, not a shortage of credit, he had no available 
solutions. Vansittart recognised the need to be seen to do something, so he 
adapted the proven ‘PWLB mechanism’ – offering longer term loans, and targeting 
the loans at mine owners and providers of ‘public works’. He also added the 
provision for loans to parishes to help the unemployed labouring poor. However, 
the government lacked conviction in the 1817 Act; it believed that the best solution 
was to wait for the trade cycle to turn. Even if its analysis of the problem had been 
correct, and PWLB loans had been the ideal solution, then the PWLB’s £1.5m 
injection of credit was unlikely to give the economy much of a boost.    
For all these shortcomings, the passing of the 1817 Act demonstrated three major 
gains. First, the Act succeeded in creating a breathing space for the government. 
By the time the £1.5m financing was running out in the early 1820s, the economy 
was improving.96 Second, the Act showed that the government recognised the 
difference between current and capital expenditure. The government wanted to 
reduce current spending, and so avoided the temptation to offer subsidies to, say, 
agriculture. Instead, it focused the extra £1.5m on the longer term benefits from 
capital spending. Third, the Act turned the ‘PWLB mechanism’ into a means of 
financing public infrastructure. The PWLB has fulfilled this role for the last 200 
years. The next five chapters examine five case studies of PWLB lending over the 
first 60 years of the PWLB’s life.
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Chapter 2, A PWLB philosophy of lending: mining loans, 
1817-26 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Minera lead 
mine, near Wrexham. The 
PWLB lent the mine 
owners £7,000 to buy an 
engine and build the 
engine house (left), to 
pump water out of the 
mine and allow it to 
resume work. The partners 
were unable to repay the 
loan, so the PWLB and the 
landowner jointly seized 
and then sold the assets. 
The mine continued 
profitably under new 
owners until 1914. 
Figure 2.2 Bersham 
ironworks, 2 miles south 
of Minera mine is all that 
is left of the huge iron 
and coal business of 
John Wilkinson. His 
legacy was ruined by his 
executor John Adams, 
who borrowed £40,000 
from the PWLB. The 
PWLB was left with a 
loss on the loan. This 
building dates from the 
1750s, when it was a 
foundry specialising in 
casting cannon for the 
military. 
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Dealing with loan applications from mine owners provided more challenges to the 
PWLB commissioners than any other group of applications. In resolving these 
challenges, the PWLB developed its own philosophy of lending, and this governed 
all of their lending decisions until 1835. In particular, the chapter illustrates the 
clear limits to the Board’s willingness to lend to private firms, its restricted view of 
its legal powers, and its view that the PWLB should not lend on anything other 
than a strictly commercial basis. The case study shows that the PWLB came to 
act like a cautious bank manager wanting to avoid incurring bad debts. It also 
makes clear that the PWLB did not see itself as having a primary responsibility for 
creating employment or the expansion of economic activity. 
A study of loans to mine owners also makes clear why two of the 1817 Act 
objectives of supporting mines and fisheries, and supporting ‘employment of the 
poor in parishes’ quickly fell by the wayside.1 By 1826, PWLB lending was 
effectively entirely directed towards financing public works. Loans to mine owners 
were therefore atypical of PWLB’s long term activity. Together, chapters 2 and 3 
chart PWLB’s first ten years, and show how the Board arrived in 1826 with just a 
single objective: lending to support public works, and a clear philosophy of 
lending.  
There are five sections to the chapter. The first examines the level of capital 
formation in the mining sector, and then shows what proportion of this was 
financed by PWLB loans. The second section indicates how the PWLB began to 
develop its working methods, and determines what dictated the number, timing, 
and purpose of mining applications to the PWLB. The third section describes how 
the PWLB made decisions about which applications to grant, and shows how its 
approach to lending developed. The fourth section explores the challenges the 
PWLB faced in recovering its loans. The final section assesses the influences that 
led the PWLB to cease lending to mine owners after 1826, and become a different 
kind of lender.   
 
                                            
1
 Public Works Loan Act 1817 (the Act creating the PWLB), 57 George III c34 s1 
29 
 
2.1 Financing capital formation in mines 
There are two main elements to determining the importance of the PWLB’s 
lending to mine owners. The first is to make an estimate of fixed capital formation 
in the mining sector between 1817 and 1826. This includes coal, iron, lead, tin and 
copper mines, and the quarrying industries. The second is to determine how the 
capital spending was financed, showing the scale and impact of the PWLB’s 
lending to mine owners. 
C. H. Feinstein and Sidney Pollard estimate that capital formation in all sectors of 
the economy was around £25m a year in 1811-20, and nearly £28m a year in 
1821-30.2 For the latter period, just 1 per cent of this total was invested in mining. 
(30 per cent of the total was in providing dwellings; 26 per cent in distribution and 
transport; 20 per cent in manufacturing; 16 per cent in agriculture; and 7 per cent 
in public and social services, including utilities). In the first half of the book, Pollard 
provides a chapter on capital formation in the coal industry.3 Published in 1988, 
Pollard’s estimate of capital formation of £1.3m a year between 1821 and 1830 is 
at least five times larger than the separate estimates of Feinstein, B. R. Mitchell 
and M. W. Flinn made between 1978 and 1984.4 All four estimates are shown in 
table 2.1, together with their much more similar estimates of coal output. Pollard’s 
estimate of £1.3m is so much larger because he estimated capital investment of 
£65,000 for every million tons of coal produced. In contrast, the earlier estimates 
were that capital investment was only £6,900-10,400 for every million tons of coal 
produced. However, Pollard’s estimate is based on more research into the higher 
costs of opening new, large pits, and on the costs of major pit extensions. Pollard 
also discounts development costs of smaller pits by a third, to avoid counting 
repairs and maintenance costs as capital. The greater sophistication of Pollard’s 
estimate of fixed capital formation between 1821 and 1830 makes it more 
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convincing than the earlier, lower estimates. Combining this with his estimate of 
£980,000 for the period 1811 to 1820, Pollard’s estimate of the capital formation in 
the coal industry becomes an average of £1.2m a year for the period 1817 to 
1826.  
           
  
Thirty five per cent of the PWLB’s mining loans went to coal mine owners who 
were also ironmasters, mining coal to feed their iron works, as well as for sale. An 
estimate of capital formation in the iron industry therefore needs to be added to 
Pollard’s estimate of coal capital formation. In Feinstein and Pollard’s volume, R. 
S. W. Davies and Pollard provide a chapter on capital formation in the iron 
industry.5 As with the coal industry, their estimate is based on a calculation of 
capital investment for each ton of output, less repair and maintenance costs. They 
estimate that fixed capital formation was £250,000 a year for the ten years to 
1820, and £580,000 a year for the ten years to 1830. Combining these figures 
creates an estimate of £448,000 a year for fixed capital formation in the period 
1817-26.  
A further 5 per cent of the PWLB’s mining loans went to the operators of lead, tin 
and copper mines. In 1962, B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane published a run of 
output volumes and values for tin and copper mines.6 Combining data from 
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Table 2.1 Estimates of capital formation and output for coal
Feinstein Mitchell Flinn Pollard
Year published 1978 1984 1984 1988
Coal output
1816 1815 1816-25
million tons p.a. 17.4 22.3 19.9
Capital formation
1820s 1817-25 1821-5 1821-30
£/million tons p.a. 6,900 10,400 65,300
£000 256 120 232 1,300
Sources: Feinstein, Cambridge Economic History , p. 41,
                  Mitchell, Economic Development of Coal , p. 48, 
                  Flinn, History of the British Coal Industry  p. 36, 
                  Pollard, Coal Mining , p. 62 and table 2.2, p. 39.
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Pollard with that from Mitchell and Deane, it is possible to discern that the capital 
costs of coal production were roughly an eighth of the output value of coal in 
1850.7 Using this one eighth relationship as a proxy, it can be estimated that the 
annual average capital investment in the tin and copper industries was around 
£100,000 a year for 1817-26. Mitchell and Deane also provide a run of lead 
mining output volume and value figures, starting in 1845.8 Deflating these output 
numbers back to 1817-26, and using the one eighth relationship again, this would 
indicate a capital investment level of £75,000 a year for lead mining. Together, 
fixed capital formation for lead, tin, and copper mining in 1817-26 is therefore 
estimated to have been £175,000 a year. There is no readily available estimate of 
fixed capital formation in the quarrying industry. For the current purposes it is 
assumed to have been minimal.9 
   
There are three significant reservations about these estimates. As Feinstein 
acknowledges, his own estimates are subject to a degree of error of plus or minus 
20 per cent for the 1810-30 period.10 The second is that Pollard’s coal estimate is 
so much larger than earlier estimates. The third is that the lead, tin and copper 
estimates are much less well founded than the coal and iron estimates. Given 
these reservations, it makes sense to consider a series of high and low estimates 
for capital formation in each of the mining sub sectors. On the assumption that 
Pollard’s coal estimate is potentially too high, and the lead, tin and copper 
estimates too low, these can be considered to vary by Feinstein’s maximum error 
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Table 2.2 Annual mining sector capital formation 1817-26
Best 
estimate 
High 
estimate
Low 
estimate
£000 £000 £000
Coal 938          1,172      938          
Iron 448          448          358          
Lead, tin and copper 210          210          175          
Total fixed capital formation 1,596      1,830      1,471      
Source. Estimates based on: Coal: Pollard; Iron: Davies and
Pollard; Lead, tin and copper: Mitchell and Deane. 
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of 20 per cent. Table 2.2 shows that this gives a range of £1.5-1.8m a year for 
capital formation in the mining industry, with a best estimate of £1.6m a year.  
It is now necessary to determine how this £1.6m of mining investment was 
financed. There is agreement that the largest share of capital investment in coal 
mining in the early nineteenth century was financed from retained profits, with 
smaller shares provided from commercial and personal borrowing and from 
ironmasters.11 However, there is no research that quantifies the scale of each 
source of finance. Yet there are well documented examples of large landowners 
borrowing to finance coal mining activities. There are also examples of 
loans/equity investments by owners and/or partners. Although these examples are 
patchy, they can be used to form a broad picture of the scale of financing 
available from these sources. After adding the PWLB loan financing and 
contributions from ironmasters, it is then assumed that the remainder of mining 
fixed capital formation was financed from retained coal mining profits. This picture 
of the sources of mining capital finance allows the PWLB’s lending to be put into 
context.  
There are six examples of large scale borrowing to finance mining investments 
between 1817 and 1826. Flinn reports that John Lambton borrowed £54,000 in 
1826 from his London bankers to finance a major expansion of his coalfields.12 In 
addition, John Christian Curwen is said to have borrowed £120,000 to invest in his 
Cumberland mines after 1819.13 The next example is when Lord Londonderry 
borrowed £118,000 in the early 1820s, to extend his coalfields. Of this, £67,000 
was lent by his bankers, with £51,000 coming from individuals.14 There is only one 
other documented large scale example of a bank lending money to mine owners. 
This was a series of loans from Reed’s Bank of Newcastle between 1817 and 
1819, to a small number of north eastern collieries.15 These mines then got into 
                                            
11
 Flinn, History of the British Coal Industry, pp. 206, 210, 211;  Mitchell, Economic Development of 
the British Coal Industry, p. 61. 
12
 Flinn, History, p. 207. 
13
 J. V. Beckett, ‘Curwen, John Christian (1756–1828)’ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004. Online edition (revised) at 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/37334, accessed 27 May 2012.  
14
 Durham Record Office files, D/Lo/E/79, 95, 104, 97. Londonderry estate papers.  
15
 National Archives, PWLB 6/1, PWLB applications ledger, and Maberly Phillips, History of Banks, 
Bankers and Banking in Northumberland, Durham and North Yorkshire (London, Wilson, 1894) pp. 
163-173.  
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trouble, and in 1819 the bank asked the PWLB for a loan of £80,000. The story of 
these Reed’s Bank loans is continued later in this chapter. Finally, between 1824 
and 1826, the Hetton Coal Company raised £145,000 from a small number of 
partners. This new form of capital raising came after Hetton had made two 
unsuccessful applications to the PWLB, for a total of £117,000. An examination of 
60 sets of mining accounts in five record offices found no other examples of 
significant levels of capital injection between 1817 and 1826.16 Banks and other 
commercial lenders therefore financed investments of £320,000, and 
partners/individuals lent nearly £200,000 from profits of other ventures in this ten 
year period. 
   
A third source of capital was from ironmasters. Mitchell shows that 18-20 per cent 
of coal production went into iron works.17 Table 2.3 uses the mid-point of 19 per 
cent to estimate that £303,000 of total capital formation of £1.6m came from 
ironmasters, and most likely from retained profits in the iron industry. Beside these 
sums, the loans provided by the PWLB of £272,000 over ten years, or just 
£27,000 a year on average, financed no more than 2 per cent of mining capital 
formation.18 Even if Pollard’s coal estimate is too high by a factor of two, the 
PWLB’s share of capital formation would not rise above 2.5 per cent.19 The 
                                            
16
 Durham, Newcastle, Staffordshire, Leeds and Matlock record offices. Even assessed over a longer 
period, 1790-1840, there are very few example of external funding, totalling no more than £50,000. 
17
 Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, p. 16. 
18
 National Archives, PWLB 6/1, PWLB applications ledger. 
19
 1596-(938/2)=1126. 27/1126=2.4%. 
Table 2.3 Financing of mining capital formation 1817-26
Annual Ten year
averages totals share
£000 £m
Fixed capital formation 1,596 16.0 100%
Sources of finance
Borrowing from banks/insurance co's 32 0.3 2%
partners/individuals 20 0.2 1%
Ironmasters financing 303 3.0 19%
PWLB lending 27 0.3 2%
Retained mining profits 1,214 12.2 76%
Total sources of capital finance 1,596 16.0 100%
Sources: Fixed capital formation annual averages, see table 2.2
                  Sources of finance: See text and footnotes 14 to 17.
Note:      Retained mining profits is a balancing figure.
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evidence can therefore be summarised as showing that three quarters of mining 
capital formation was financed from retained profits; 2 per cent from commercial 
lending; 20 per cent from profits from related businesses (partners, individuals and 
ironmasters); and just 2 per cent from the PWLB. The contribution of the PWLB 
loans was therefore on a minimal scale, and had negligible impact on the output of 
the mining sector between 1817 and 1826.  
The impact of the PWLB loans on employment in the mining sector was similarly 
modest. There is evidence to suggest that around 121,000 were employed in 
mining in the 1820s, with average wages of £60 a year, and that about half of 
mining costs were pay related.20 Based on these assumptions, the PWLB’s loans 
of £272,000 would have created fewer than 2,300 jobs, less than 2 per cent of the 
industry’s total. Measured against the 300,000 demobbed servicemen in the 1815-
7 period, 2,300 jobs in mining was an insignificant number. The next section 
examines why there was so little demand for the PWLB loans. Section 2.3 then 
explores why so few applications to the PWLB were successful. 
2.2   PWLB working methods and mining applications 
The PWLB commissioners established a pattern of work within their first few 
weeks. Although there were 21 commissioners, only a third of them attended the 
almost weekly board meetings during the first six months. Charles Grant, Charles 
Bosanquet, Sir James Shaw, Thomas Reid, Henry Swann, John Thornton, and 
Benjamin Harrison attended more than half of these 22 meetings, and can be 
described as the ‘first team’. A group of four commissioners, (who can be called 
the ‘substitutes’) attended more than a quarter but less than half, of the meetings: 
John Julius Angerstein, Joseph Berens, Robert Casberd and John Smith. Four 
other commissioners attended less than a quarter of the meetings. Therefore, six 
commissioners attended no board meetings at all. This approach, involving a 
small board of leading commissioners, must be assumed to have been deliberate, 
and was a constant in the PWLB’s first 60 years. The Board would look at all 
                                            
20
 Mitchell and Deane, p. 60, give 225,000 mining and quarrying jobs in 1841. Factoring this down for 
lower output in the 1820s, this gives 121,000. Flinn, History, table 11.1, p. 388 gives average pay of 
£60 a year. Roy Church, History of the British Coal Industry, Vol 3 1830-1913,Victorian Pre-eminence, 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986) p. 175 gives details on the breakdown of mining costs. 
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applications, and would make all decisions on loans. Effectively, then, decisions 
were made by no more than seven commissioners sitting together.  
Four of the ‘first team’ commissioners had substantial financial experience. Grant, 
Reid and Bosanquet all had City of London backgrounds.21 The first two had 
served multiple terms as chairmen of the East India Company, while Reid and 
Bosanquet had also been West Indies merchants. Harrison’s financial experience 
was rather different; he had taken over from his father as treasurer of Guy’s 
Hospital, and continued in that role for 40 years. These four provided the Board 
with their chairmen and deputy chairmen between 1817 and 1855. Of the ‘first 
team’ and the ‘substitutes’, only Casberd appears to have had no financial 
experience – he was an MP and a lawyer.22 Critically, three of the four 
commissioners with acknowledged experience of coal mining were in the group of 
six commissioners who did not attend a single PWLB board meeting in the initial 
six month period; and the fourth only attended one of the 22 meetings.23 The 
almost exclusively financial or trading background of the most important PWLB 
commissioners does a lot to explain the philosophy the Board adopted. 
A small group of commissioners met the day after the 1817 Act received royal 
assent. They immediately placed notices in national and local newspapers inviting 
applications for loans. The first 100 applications were received within six weeks, 
suggesting that there was a surge of applications for this new source of finance. 
During the PWLB’s first ten years, 777 applications, worth nearly £9m, were 
received by the commissioners. Table 2.4 shows the breakdown of the 777 
applications, demonstrating that, overall, 40 per cent of these applications were 
granted. In contrast, only 23 per cent of the 79 mining applications were granted 
by the Board. 
                                            
21
 Andrew J. O'Shaughnessy, ‘Bosanquet, Charles (1769-1850)’. Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004. Online edition at 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2927 accessed 15 May 2012. C. H. and D. Philips, 
‘Alphabetical List of Directors of the East India Company from 1758 to 1858’, Journal of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, October 1941. Amalie M. Kass, ‘Harrison, Benjamin (1771-1856)’. Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004. Online edition 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12431 accessed 15 May 2012. 
22
 www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1790-1820/member accessed 15 May 2012. 
23
 Thomas Estcourt MP, Thomas Gooch MP, Edward Littleton MP, and John Curwen MP all had 
substantial incomes from coal mining on their land holdings. Source, entries for each at 
www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1790-1820/member accessed 15 May 2012.  
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Table 2.5 shows that the 79 applications from mine owners were worth a total of 
£1.2m over the 10 years 1817 to 1826. Just over half of the applications were 
from owners of coal mines, with the balance from coal and iron operators, lead, tin 
and copper mine owners, and from quarry owners. The size of the applications, 
and the success rates, were very similar for the different types of mine or quarry. 
The remainder of this chapter therefore treats them as a single group. To provide 
further detail, analyses of mining applications by year of application and reason 
given for the application illustrates why mine owners made applications to the 
PWLB for loans. An examination of the financing of capital formation also points to 
reasons why the majority of mine owners did not need PWLB loans. 
Fixed capital formation in the mining sector was £16m between 1817 and 1826, 
and was rising over time. Mine output was also rising consistently in the early part 
Table 2.4 PWLB applications 1817-26
Granted Success
Numbers £m Size £000 £m rate
Mining 79 1.2 13.2 0.27 23%
Other businesses 94 0.7 7.2 0.03 26%
Roads 263 1.0 3.9 0.43 43%
Canals/rail 61 2.4 39.3 0.80 39%
Drainage/land/water 33 0.4 12.1 0.31 27%
Harbours/bridges 77 1.4 18.2 0.45 42%
All others 170 1.6 9.4 0.89 52%
Totals 777 8.7 11.2 3.2 40%
Source: Analysis of PWLB loan application ledger PWLB 6/1
Note:    Success rate reflects the number of successful applications,
                not the value of successful applications.
                See appendix 1A for more detail.
Applications
Table 2.5 All mining applications 1817-26
Number Value £000 £000 Number %age
Coal 42 750              131 10 23%
Coal & iron 17 236              98 4 24%
Lead, tin & copper 15 152              13 3 20%
Quarries 4 40                30 1 25%
All mining apps 79 1,178          272 18 23%
Source: Analysis of PWLB 6/1 applications ledger. Detail in appendix 2.A.
Applications Applications granted
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of the nineteenth century.24 It is therefore likely that mining sector profits were 
rising steadily on the back of increasing demand. In this environment, mine 
owners would be investing in order to increase output to meet this demand, and 
would be able to finance the majority of their investment spending from rising 
retained profits. Mine owners would therefore have little need to borrow from 
banks or the PWLB. Support for this hypothesis is provided by table 2.3, showing 
that only 4 per cent of capital formation was financed by borrowing from banks 
and the PWLB. Table 2.7 also supports this hypothesis by showing that 63 per 
cent of mining applications to the PWLB were made in order to develop 
applicants’ mines. A key reason for the low level of mining applications to the 
Board is therefore that mine owners were able to use the increasing volume of 
retained profits to finance mine development, and did not need PWLB loans. 
                 
One of Lord Liverpool’s three stated reasons for the passage of the 1817 Act was 
to ease a credit shortage.25 At the time, a number of MPs doubted that there was 
a credit shortage. Table 2.6 and figure 2.3 help in making an assessment of 
whether there was a credit shortage or not. Table 2.6 shows that over 70 per cent 
of the mining applications were received in just three peak periods lasting about a 
year each – 1817, 1826, and mid-1822 to mid-1823. The remaining seven years 
saw an average of only three mining applications a year. It is assumed here that a 
rise in bankruptcy numbers was linked to a shortage of credit. Figure 2.3 shows 
that only the 1826 peak in mining applications was associated with rising 
                                            
24
 Pollard, ‘Coal Mining’, table 2.1, p. 36, shows coal output rising in each five year period between 
1750 and 1850. 
25
 House of Lords debates, 10 June 1817, Vol 36, cc. 928-32. 
Table 2.6 Peak years for mining applications
Period
Months 
in period
1817 6.5 24 44 30%
1826 9 13 17 17%
1822/3 12 19 19 24%
All others 87 23 3 29%
1817-26 114.5 79 8 100%
Source: Analysis of PWLB 6/1 PWLB applications ledger.
'1822/3' refers to a 12 month period from mid 1822.
%age of 
apps 
each 
Number 
of mining  
apps
Applicati
ons a 
year
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bankruptcy levels, and thus with a credit shortage.26 In contrast, figure 2.3 shows 
that the peaks in 1817 and 1822/3 were periods when bankruptcy numbers were 
falling. It therefore appears that there was no credit shortage to generate the 
peaks in mining applications in 1817 and 1822/3. Even the 1826 credit shortage 
only produced 13 loan applications to the PWLB. On balance then, there was no 
long-lasting credit shortage to produce high volumes of applications to the Board. 
       
This conclusion about a general absence of a credit shortage can be supported by 
examining the reasons applicants gave for their applications. Table 2.7 shows that 
only 20 per cent of applications were made because applicants were short of 
working capital. The largest number of these applications were in 1826, confirming 
that the short term shortage of credit did affect mine owners. Table 2.7 also shows 
that a much larger proportion – 63 per cent – of all applications were made 
because applicants wished to develop their mines. The majority of these 
applications were in the peak years of 1817 and 1822/3: years when bankruptcy 
numbers were falling, and so when the economy was growing. The reason for the 
remaining 17 per cent of applications is unknown. It is clear from this that only a 
minority of applications were made because of a shortage of cash. A much more 
                                            
26
 C. P. Kindleberger and R. Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. 6th 
ed. (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) pp. 304-5 shows 1826 as a world scale financial crisis, 
with a rapid credit expansion preceding a credit shortage. 
Figure 2.3
Sources: Applications, Analysis of PWLB 6/1 applications ledger.
                  Bankruptcies from London Gazette  summaries.
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important reason for applications was that mine owners wished to expand their 
businesses during times of rising demand. 
   
The last cause of the low number of mining applications is that only 23 per cent of 
mining applications were successful, compared to a 40 per cent success rate for 
all applications to the PWLB. Such a low success rate was bound to discourage 
mine owners from applying. Figure 2.3 does indeed show that, after the initial 
surge in applications in 1817, applications fell sharply over the next four years, 
and fell again in the three years after the 1822 surge. Although the Board did not 
publish statistics about loans made, it is highly likely that the lack of success was 
well known within the networks of mine owners. 
There are therefore three main causes of the low number of mining applications to 
the PWLB. First, there was no obvious demand amongst mine owners for a new 
source of capital finance. Profits from mining and associated businesses appear 
to have been more than adequate to meet rising capital formation spending. 
Second, with the exception of 1826, there was no general credit shortage in the 
economy between 1817 and 1826. This is confirmed because only 20 per cent of 
applicants to the Board gave cash shortages as the reason for their application. 
Finally, the lack of success of mining applications will have discouraged potential 
new applicants towards the end of the ten year period.  The next section looks at 
the reasons for this lack of success. 
2.3 How the PWLB made lending decisions  
 The PWLB developed a philosophy of lending that led it to reject the majority of 
mining applications. The first element of its philosophy was a narrow, legalistic 
Table 2.7 Reasons given for mining applications
Peak periods Other
1817  1822/3 1826 years
Share
Shortage of cash 4 1 6 5 16 20%
Mine development 16 14 7 13 50 63%
Unknown reasons 4 4 0 5 13 17%
All applications 24 19 13 23 79 100%
Source: Analysis of PWLB 6/1 applications ledger and PWLB 2/1-7 
                minute books. See appendix 2.A for all applications data.
1817-26
Number of applications
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interpretation of the 1817 Act. The Board felt that it had no legal powers to lend to 
profitable mines that wished to increase their output, nor to mine owners who 
wished to repay long term debts. The PWLB’s philosophy placed the highest 
priority on the recovery of loans. The Board consistently declined to lend to those 
applicants who represented any material risk that a loan would not be repaid. 
These two principles accounted for 90 per cent of the unsuccessful mining 
applications. Once the principles were established, they were applied to all future 
mining and non-mining applications. The evidence for the Board’s emerging 
philosophy of lending is contained in the discussions of individual applications in 
the minute books, and in analyses of the results of the Board’s decision making. 
These form the focus of this section. 
    
The first question to arise was whether the PWLB would offer loans to allow 
applicants to repay longer term debts. Table 2.8 shows that 20 per cent of mining 
applications were made because applicants needed a cash injection. However, 
these 16 applications fall into two sub-groups. Five of the sixteen applications 
sought loans to provide working capital, to allow applicants to pay staff and 
suppliers. Three of these were granted, and two were withdrawn by applicants 
who were unable to offer sufficient security for the loan.27 These loans for working 
capital were of course consistent with Vansittart’s view that the PWLB was 
                                            
27
 See appendix 2.A for a list of all mining applications, and column headed ‘reason for app’ 
Table 2.8 Outcome of mining applications 1817-26
Reasons for application
Numb
ers
Share of 
total
Grant 
ed
Success 
rates
Rejec
ted
With   
drawn
Shortage of cash
5 3 0 2
11 5 4 2
To increase mine output 0
7 5 2 0
33 0 21 12
10 0 10 0
Employment 0 0 0 0
Unclear reason 13 5 2 6
All mining applications 79 100% 18 23% 39 22
Source: Analysis of PWLB 6/1 applications ledger and PWLB 2/1-7 minute books.
Applications Outcomes
To provide working capital
20% 50%
To repay longer term debts
Combat flooding etc
63% 10%Develop new capacity
Open new mine etc
17% 38%
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created to combat a credit shortage. The other 11 applicants sought loans to 
repay long-term debt, and these presented the Board with a difficulty.  
The best example of this difficulty was an application made on 5 August 1817. 
Benjamin Fayle asked for a £30,000 loan to support his clay mine in Dorset, 
saying that without the loan he would have to dismiss all his employees.28 Under 
questioning it emerged that £25,000 of the loan would be used to repay debt. 
Thomas Reid, who had questioned Fayle, suggested that the loan could be made, 
and the board agreed. John Phelps then took the very unusual step of registering 
his dissent, and Henry Swann supported Phelps’s view when the minutes were 
read at the start of the next meeting, on 8 August.29 Phelps and Swann took the 
view that the 1817 Act only gave power to grant loans that supported mines. To 
Phelps and Swann, the Act gave no power to lend in order to repay debt, meaning 
that only £5,000 could be lent in total. The majority of the commissioners 
attending took the view that the 1817 Act’s power to provide employment to the 
labouring poor was a wide-reaching one. They argued that because the loan 
would allow the quarry to continue to provide employment for the workers, it could 
be made. The application was therefore granted, and £30,000 was lent to Fayle; 
later, four similar applications to repay debt were also granted. However, this 
willingness to lend to repay debts did not remain a settled view. 
In January 1823, the PWLB’s solicitor wrote to the Board indicating that he now 
believed that the Board had no legal power to make loans to allow applicants to 
repay debt, since the 1817 Act made no mention of debt.30 The Board’s solicitor 
was instructed to write to the Attorney General to get a ruling on the PWLB’s 
powers in relation to debt. The Attorney General replied that, in his view, the Act 
granted no power to lend in order to repay debt.31 He went on to say that lending 
to allow the repayment of debt would be to ‘replace private debt with public debt’. 
But he also took the pragmatic view that, where only a small proportion of a loan 
                                            
28
 Fayle was a London merchant who had bought the quarry in 1795 and invested in railways to 
transport the clay in 1806. After his death in 1837, his daughter ran the firm for many years. The 
Purbeck ball clay they quarried was supplied to Staffordshire potteries. Dorset Life article, February 
2012, at www.dorsetlife.co.uk/2012/2/fateofclay/ accessed 3 May 2012. 
29
 National Archives, PWLB 2/1 minute book June 1817-April 1818, 1, 5 and 7 August 1817 pp. 37 
and 64/5. 
30
 National Archives, PWLB 2/4, minute book March 1822-December 1823, 16 January 1823 p. 135 
31
 National Archives, PWLB 2/4, minute book, 30 January 1823, p. 143.  
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was to be used to repay debt, then the whole of the requested loan could be 
made. The 1817 view of Phelps and Swann that the Board would not make loans 
to repay debt became the accepted view, and remained so for the remainder of 
the period covered by this thesis. 
The PWLB adopted a similarly narrow legal view when considering six 
applications from iron works. The Board was prepared to consider applications 
from combined coal mines and iron masters, but only where coal mining was the 
larger part of the combined operation. In contrast, where the iron works was the 
larger part of the business, the PWLB saw the application as coming from a 
manufacturing business. This also applied where the application was an iron 
works, with no coal element. The Board took the view that, because 
manufacturing was not mentioned in the 1817 Act, it had no legal power to lend to 
manufacturers.32 Thereafter, all applications from manufacturers were routinely 
refused as being outside the powers of the commissioners.  
The PWLB commissioners followed a similar legalistic view when considering the 
50 applications that can broadly be seen as aiming to finance mine development. 
Table 2.8 further divides these into three sub-groups. The largest sub-group 
comprised 33 applicants who wished to develop their mines. Most of these appear 
to have related to the development of an existing seam, or the opening of a new 
seam in an existing mine. The second sub-group comprised ten applications to 
either open a new mine, or reopen a mine that had previously been closed. Not 
one of these 43 applications was granted; the Board rejected 33 and applicants 
withdrew the other 10, presumably because they recognised that the applications 
would be rejected. The PWLB’s thought processes can be seen in two 
applications from North Wales collieries.  
On 26 August 1817, the board considered two applications, one for £70,000 and 
the other for £80,000. Both applicants wanted to extend their already profitable 
mines, expecting annual profits to increase by 50-100 per cent as a result. The 
board resolved unanimously that ‘it was not the intention of the Act … to advance 
money for the purposes of extending collieries already … producing profit’.33 On 
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 National Archives, PWLB 2/1, minute book, 7 August 1817, p. 61. 
33
 National Archives, PWLB 2/1, minute book, 17 August 1817, p. 83. 
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31 May 1818, a very similar view led the Board to reject an application from Rees 
Jones, who sought a loan of £1,400 to open a new pit in North Wales. No debate 
was recorded, just a resolution that, because the application was ‘to aid the 
commencement, and not to support the undertaking’, it was not within their legal 
powers to grant the application.34 ‘Support’ was the word used in section 1 of the 
1817 Act to describe the PWLB’s power in relation to mining loans, and was 
treated as implying support for the continuing operation of a mine. The Board did 
not consider whether ‘support’ could be interpreted as say, support for the 
opening of a new seam or mine. The PWLB applied the limited interpretation of 
‘support’ to all of the 43 applications to develop or open mines, and none of the 
applications were granted. The PWLB’s broader argument was that the spirit of 
the Act was to offer short-term help to distressed mining firms faced with a 
shortage of credit. Making loans to help otherwise successful firms to expand 
would therefore be inconsistent with the spirit of the Act. The commissioners’ 
narrow interpretation of the 1817 Act, and the very limited circumstances in which 
the PWLB was willing to lend to private firms were essential to the Board’s 
approach to lending. Both limitations made the failure of these 43 applications an 
inevitability. 
The remaining seven applications, summarised under the broad heading of ‘to 
increase mine output’ in table 2.8, were mostly from mine owners seeking loans to 
overcome a physical problem, such as flooding in their mines. Five of these 
applications were granted. A good example of these is the application from Henry 
Hunt. In July 1817, the PWLB received an application to buy a pumping engine to 
clear a flooded mine. The application was from Henry Hunt, who was a partner in 
a North Wales lead mine. The commissioners must have felt unable to judge 
whether the case was a good one, so asked Thomas Telford to recommend a 
surveyor with experience of lead mines.35 A suitable man was found; he was 
asked to report on whether the mine could be cleared, and assess the costs of 
renovation and the ability of the mine to produce enough income to repay the 
loan. The surveyor reported positively (although no detail is recorded in the 
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 National Archives, PWLB 2/2, minute book, June 1818-April 1820, 21 May 1818, p. 24. Author’s 
italics.   
35
 Telford acted as a consulting engineer to the PWLB from 1817 until his death in 1834. L. T. C. Rolt, 
Thomas Telford (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1958) pp. 156, 196. 
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minutes), and a £7,000 loan, repayable in 1820, was made to Hunt. The PWLB 
obviously felt that keeping an existing mine open fell within its interpretation of 
‘support’. This loan was one of the Board’s rare errors of judgement, and, as will 
be shown in section 2.4, part of it proved impossible to recover. 
The PWLB’s judgement was much better in another application for another loan to 
buy a pumping engine. The owners of Chacewater copper mine in Cornwall made 
two applications, in October and November 1820 respectively, for £30,000, 
claiming that they needed to buy two large pumping engines to pump water out of 
a mine. Unusually, the Board wanted to study the partnership’s accounts for the 
previous few years. Its investigations revealed that the mine had accumulated 
losses of £100,000.36 The commissioners rejected both applications, believing 
that the partners were likely to use any loan to repay their own investments, rather 
than restarting the mine. The PWLB’s ability to read the accounts had told the 
commissioners that the underlying problem was debt, not flooding. Later events 
showed that this judgement was correct, and the mine eventually restarted under 
new ownership, and produced large quantities of copper until 1867.37 This 
example also demonstrates two aspects of the PWLB’s hard, commercial 
approach to lending. First, the Board preferred to see earlier investors lose their 
money, rather than risk public money in an attempt to rescue these investors. 
Second, the PWLB commissioners were capable of seeing past what was said to 
them, and were able to read a set of accounts. 
There were no applications made with a prime purpose of creating employment 
(see table 2.8). Even so, 20 of the 79 mining applications did mention the creation 
or safeguarding of specific numbers of jobs. In total, these 20 applications 
mentioned 32,000 jobs, and were for loans totalling £450,000, which would have 
priced each job at £14 – less than four months’ pay.38 Many applicants appear to 
have expected that this would be enough to secure a loan. This view is shared by 
Flinn, who argues that the 1817 Act empowered commissioners to make loans to 
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 National Archives, PWLB 2/3, minute book, April 1820-March 1822, 5 October 1820, p. 166. 
37
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anyone ‘who could show that the loan would be used to create employment’.39 But 
this was not the view the PWLB commissioners took. While section one of the Act 
says that it gave powers to support the ‘employment of the poor in the parishes’, 
the body of the Act imposed significant restrictions on this power. Sections 29 to 
31 say that such support would only be given to parishes, not to employers; that 
80 per cent of ratepayers had to support the parish application; that any loan 
could be for no more than half a year’s rate income; and that no loan could be 
made unless poor rate spending in the parish had increased by more than 50 per 
cent in the previous year.40 Given these restrictions, it is not surprising that the 
PWLB only received three applications from parishes for loans, and that these 
totalled less than £3,000. However, the Act did ask the commissioners to ‘have 
regard … (to) the benefit which may arise in affording employment for the 
labouring classes’ when considering applications.41 The PWLB’s decisions on 
mining applications suggest that it fulfilled this requirement. Forty per cent of the 
applications which mentioned specific job numbers were successful, compared to 
only 17 per cent of those that made no mention of specific job numbers. However, 
this requirement to ‘have regard to’ was fundamentally different from making loans 
whose prime purpose was to create employment. 
The reason behind 13 of the applications is unclear, with most merely being 
recorded as ‘to support his mine’ in the PWLB’s minute books. The most likely 
problem was general loss making. Six of these applications were withdrawn or 
abandoned by applicants, suggesting that applicants realised that they would not 
be successful, or would be unable to provide the necessary security.  
Once the Board had decided that it was willing to grant a loan, it then considered 
whether there was adequate security in place in case the applicant could not 
repay the loan from future income. It is here that the Board displayed a 
straightforward commercial approach to its lending. In mining cases, the PWLB 
wanted four levels of security.42 The first was the personal security of the 
applicant, so that if the business could not make the repayments, then the 
                                            
39
 M. W. Flinn, ‘The Poor Employment Act of 1817’, Economic History Review, Vol 14, no. 1, 1961, 
pp. 82-92. 
40
 Public Works Loan Act 1817, 57 George III c34, sections 29-31. 
41
 1817 Act, s13. 
42
 This paragraph reflects the discussions recorded in the PWLB minute books on each of the 18 
successful mining applications. 
46 
 
applicant would. This was a given, since the applicants were invariably owners or 
part owners, with individual and unlimited financial responsibility. Second, a 
mortgage against saleable property was required, but only rarely was this property 
the mine. The problem with accepting the mine (or mine lease) as security was 
that if the venture failed to produce enough income to repay the loan, then the 
value of the mine or lease fell dramatically. More often, it was the estate or home 
of the applicant that was mortgaged. In these cases, the Board would want to take 
possession of the deeds of the property, to ensure the PWLB had ultimate control 
of the asset. The third level of security was to seek sureties from a group of 
individuals prepared to guarantee the applicant’s loan. These individuals would be 
called upon to repay the loan if the applicant was unable to do so after selling the 
mortgaged property. The PWLB would expect sureties to be for twice the value of 
the loan. The fourth level of security was that the Board insisted that, in the event 
of the borrower becoming insolvent, PWLB loans would be repaid before all of the 
applicant’s other debts. The Board also insisted that 80 per cent of an applicant’s 
creditors should agree to this condition.  
An example of how these arrangements worked in practice is clear from the case 
of Reed’s Bank of Newcastle. The bank had lent more than £80,000 to a number 
of collieries in 1818/9 in Northumberland, Durham and Cumberland to help them 
in a difficult period. The PWLB board quickly agreed to lend the bank £80,000. 
The PWLB asked for, and was given, four levels of security. Colonel John Reed 
and the executors of his late partner gave personal securities, agreed mortgages 
of their estates, lodged the deeds with the PWLB and provided a number of 
sureties worth £160,000. The PWLB was also given priority over other creditors. 
Yet there is nothing in the minutes to suggest that the PWLB investigated the 
security that Reed’s Bank had for the £80,000 of loans to mine owners, or that it 
studied the balance sheet and loan book of Reed’s Bank.43  A later section 
describes what happened when the bank failed in 1821 before repaying the loan.  
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Eleven mining applicants were unsuccessful because they were unable, or 
unwilling, to offer the same level of security as Reed’s Bank.44 One such 
application was from Lord Londonderry in 1823. He applied for a loan of £40,000 
to build a railway linking his coalfields to Seaham harbour. After long negotiations 
between John Buddle (Londonderry’s viewer) and the PWLB on security, 
Londonderry declined to allow the PWLB to take a charge on his estates. He then 
withdrew his application for a loan, rather than have the PWLB reject it. Five other 
applicants took a similar view, deciding to abandon their applications because 
they were unable or unwilling to provide the security the Board needed. The 
remaining five of the 11 saw the PWLB reject their applications on the grounds of 
inadequate security. In 1832, Londonderry made a similar application to the 
PWLB for a £35,000 loan in 1832, and this time he accepted exactly the same 
security provisions, and the loan was made.45 It is notable that the 11 mining 
applications rejected on the grounds of inadequate security were more than 
double the five applications made to provide working capital to mine owners. This 
leads to a conclusion that the lack of security was a bigger problem for mine 
owners than a shortage of working capital. The Londonderry case shows that the 
Board regarded the security of its loans as the most important factor. All other 
requirements could have been met, but if one of the four levels of security were 
not available, then no loan would be agreed. 
The decisions the Board made on these mining applications were critical, and 
together they form a coherent lending philosophy. This philosophy had a lasting 
legacy, and was applied to all applications up to 1835, and to many loans after 
then. There were three key elements to the philosophy. First, the PWLB would 
only lend to private businesses in very limited circumstances, and these 
circumstances became even more limited over time.46 Second, the PWLB would 
only lend on commercial terms; it would not therefore lend where it felt the security 
for the loan did not virtually guarantee repayment. This approach ruled out lending 
with the primary purpose of creating employment. Third, the Board took a 
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restricted view of its powers to lend, and chose not to seek any extension to these 
powers. Each of these elements stemmed from the PWLB’s belief that its 
interventions should be minimal, and that it would be judged by its ability to 
recover all of its loans. 
By 1826, this philosophy of lending might be characterised as a ‘bank manager’s 
view’. Like a bank manager, the Board saw its ability to recover its loans, and to 
cover all of its costs as being paramount. This view is also seen in a Michael 
Collins and Mae Baker study of the reasons why banks refused to grant just over 
500 loans to businesses in the period 1855 to 1914.47 Banks’ main reason for 
refusal was that in 47% of cases, the bank felt that there was too large a risk that 
the client would be unable to repay the loan. In a further 38% of cases, the bank 
felt that the client was unable to offer sufficient security for the loan, and again the 
bank risked not being able to recover its loan. The banks’ reasons for rejecting 
loans are very similar to those of the PWLB in rejecting loans to mine owners and 
turnpike trusts.  
Collins and Baker also identify the extent to which banks sought security for their 
loans.48 In 47 per cent of cases, banks sought no security, however, their loans 
had an average size of £2,700 and a duration of 16 months. PWLB loans to mine 
owners were granted for an initial eight years, and were for an average of over 
£13,000, so the risks were much greater, and the PWLB’s greater demands for 
security were understandable. In the 53 per cent of cases where security was 
sought by banks, it was either in the form of personal security or the loan was 
secured against property or a similar realisable assets. The PWLB was therefore 
acting just like a bank manager in being highly risk-averse, and placing prime 
importance on the recovery of its loans. Against this study, the PWLB decisions 
look unexceptional. Equally, like a bank manager, the PWLB did not make lending 
decisions based on wider social concerns about the need for employment 
creation. This ‘bank manager’s’ philosophy of lending would dominate the PWLB’s 
decision making until 1835. 
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 2.4     Recovery of PWLB loans 
A significant element of any judgement about the PWLB’s success must be based 
on its ability to secure the repayment of its loans. All loans carry the risk of non-
recovery, and unrecovered loans mean that the lender makes losses. Section 2.3 
showed that a significant part of the Board’s philosophy of lending was a desire to 
have sufficient security so as to virtually guarantee the repayment of its loans. Yet 
mining in particular was a precarious business, and 20 per cent of the 79 
applicants for PWLB loans became bankrupt within ten years of making their 
applications.49 In the light of this statistic, and the PWLB’s decision not to lend to 
profitable firms, the Board’s insistence on high quality security was essential. This 
section examines the extent to which the PWLB recovered its mining loans, and 
avoided loss-making. 
Only five of the 18 mining loans were repaid on time. The PWLB’s reminders of 
repayment dates brought requests for extensions of time, which the Board granted 
(see table 2.9). These requests led the government to pass amending legislation 
in 1822 to extend the repayment period from three to eight years for all 
borrowers.50 Six of the remaining 13 borrowers then made full repayments within 
the amended period. Of the seven other loans, three borrowers missed instalment 
payments before full recovery was made; in two cases, recovery action had to be 
started before full recovery was made. In two cases, full recovery was not 
achieved, and part of the loans had to be written off. 
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It took less than a year for the PWLB’s security and recovery arrangements to be 
tested. Thomas Pinkerton, for example, was lent £2,000 in 1817 to support his 
colliery in Nuneaton, but he became bankrupt in 1818. His sureties were therefore 
asked to repay the loan, and did so. Reed’s Bank gave the Board’s recovery 
processes a sterner test, when the bank suspended payments in 1821. Maberly 
Phillips suggests that the failure was caused by a loss of confidence in Archibald 
Reed, who had called out the military to deal with a public disturbance in 
November 1820 when he was Mayor of Newcastle.51 This seems unlikely. More 
likely is that the mine owners to whom the bank had lent £80,000 were 
themselves unable to repay their loans. The bank’s two partners, Colonel John 
Reed and the executors of Sir Francis Blake, accepted that they would have to 
sell part of their estates in order to repay total debts of £400,000. Because of the 
Board’s insistence on being repaid before all other creditors, the PWLB was the 
first creditor to be repaid, and in November 1822 received the full £80,000 plus 
interest.  
In two cases, though, small sums had to be written off as uncollectable. Henry 
Hunt had borrowed £7,000 to clear his North Wales lead mine of water. Hunt was 
quickly in financial difficulties. While not actually bankrupt, Hunt had no saleable 
assets; nor, it turned out, did three of his four sureties; and the fourth, who did 
have saleable assets, was unreachable in Portugal.52 The PWLB seized the mine 
and associated assets, which turned out to be worth just £10,000. The Board 
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Table 2.9 Repayment of mining loans 1817-26
No. of Share
When repaid loans
On time 5 28%
After extension 6 33%
Payments missed 3 17%
After legal action 2 11%
Not paid, written off 2 11%
Total loans 18 100%
Source: Analysis of PWLB minute
                 books PWLB 2/1-7. See appendix
                 2.A for loans in each category.
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entered discussions with the landowner (who was owed rather more than the 
Board) to sell the mine lease and split the proceeds. By 1832, the PWLB had 
done all it could, but was still owed £1,500, which it wrote off.53 In this case, the 
Board’s security arrangements failed, probably because commissioners trusted 
the word of Hunt and his sureties. The mine reopened in 1845 and produced lead 
profitably for many years.54 Meanwhile, Hunt applied for another loan from the 
PWLB in 1826, for a South Wales coal and iron works. His application was 
rejected. 
The case of James Adams was the most difficult mining application the Board 
dealt with.55 In 1808, John Wilkinson, an ironmaster, died in his 80s, leaving an 
estate worth over £400,000.56 Most of the estate was in the form of coal mines 
and iron works at Brymbo, near Wrexham, and was left in trust to benefit his 
mistress, Anne Lewis and their three young children. Adams became the 
controlling trustee when the other trustees died. In June 1817, Adams sought a 
PWLB loan of £40,000, claiming that it was needed because of severe pressure 
on both the coal and iron trades in 1816 and 1817, and because an ironmaster 
customer had become bankrupt, owing Adams £40,000. The Board quickly 
agreed to the loan, but getting adequate security for the loan took much longer, 
and perhaps should have been a warning sign of trouble ahead. Adams missed 
the first two instalment payments, and his sureties stepped in with repayments to 
avoid a default. After Adams died in 1823, it was clear that the only route for the 
PWLB to recover its loan was to reach an agreement with the Wilkinson estate to 
sell property to repay the loan. Eventually, the agreement of Anne Lewis, other 
creditors and the Chancery Court was secured. Years of bad management by 
Adams had run down the value of the estate, as had many years of lawyers’ bills, 
and the remains of the estate only fetched £3,000. The PWLB had to accept this 
in full and final settlement, and to write off the remaining debt of £3,832, together 
with £4,000 of outstanding interest. The Brymbo estate continued producing steel 
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until the 1990s, demonstrating that Wilkinson’s coal and iron business could have 
survived if properly managed.57  
The Adams and Hunt loans were therefore exceptions, and PWLB recovered all 
but £5,000 of its £272,000 mining loans made in the ten years to 1826. In addition, 
the PWLB had to forgo £4,000 of interest payments, making their mining losses 
£9,000, or 3 per cent of the total lent. Governments were always concerned to 
demonstrate that the PWLB’s lending had led to surpluses, rather than losses to 
the taxpayer.58 This meant that the interest rate of 5 per cent charged to 
borrowers had to exceed the interest costs to the government, the Board’s staffing 
and office costs, and the costs of any non-recovered loans or interest. Table 2.10 
shows that the PWLB’s mining loans just failed to achieve this target, with a small 
loss of £1,000. However, all loans were initially made at 5 per cent, but in the mid-
1820s some borrowers asked the Treasury for a reduction to 4 per cent, based on 
lower market rates. The Treasury granted these requests, and sacrificed around 
£2,000 of interest receipts by doing so. Without this loss, mining loans would have 
made a £1,000 surplus. Given the high level of bankruptcy in the mining industry, 
the near breakeven outcome must be seen as an impressive financial 
performance by the PWLB.    
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Table 2.10 Loss on mining loans 1817-26
£000 £000
Costs interest paid to gov't on £272,000 loans 3.93% 42
8.5% share of PWLB office costs 2 44
Income interest charged to borrowers at 5.00% 54
less loans not recovered -5
less interest forgone -4
less impact of Treasury rate reductions -2 43
Loss on mining loans made in 1817-26 -1
Sources:    Costs. Interest rate on loans paid to government is an average
for 1817-26 of long term gilt rates; from Homer, History of Interest
Rates  (New Brunswick NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1963)
(154) and shared pro rata to loans made.
Notes: Assumes loans repaid over average of 8 years.
PWLB office costs are taken from its report to Parliament BPP 1831
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2.5 Why the PWLB’s objectives had changed by 1826 
The PWLB was created with the objective of making loans in three areas: to the 
private businesses of mines and fisheries; to promote public works; and to 
parishes for the benefit of the labouring poor. By the end of the PWLB’s first ten 
years, lending to mines, fisheries and parishes had effectively ended. For the ten 
years after 1826, virtually all of the Board’s lending would be to public works 
projects. This section explores the reasons for this shift of emphasis. 
   
Section 2.2 showed that the low success rates for the applications had sent clear 
discouraging messages to future applicants. Table 2.11 makes clear that these 
messages – however anecdotally and imperfectly they were spread – had an 
impact on potential applicants. In the PWLB’s first five years, 28 per cent of loan 
applications were from private businesses, but this fell to 16 per cent in the 
second five year period. After 1826, it fell again to 2 per cent of all applications to 
the PWLB. Between 1827 and 1831, 98 per cent of all applications were for public 
works, and the majority of those were for transport related projects. In effect, the 
PWLB’s objective of lending to mine owners had simply withered on the vine 
because of a lack of demand and a lack of success. For the same reasons, the 
Board’s objectives of lending to fisheries and parishes had also withered on the 
vine. 
The second reason for the end of loans to private businesses was that the views 
of the PWLB had hardened against loans to private businesses. In February 1821 
the PWLB had nearly exhausted the £1.75m sum made available to it for lending. 
Charles Grant, as chairman, wrote to Vansittart, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
setting out the case for a new sum to be made available to the Board for lending. 
Grant’s major reason for the new funding was to support ‘various useful schemes 
Table 2.11 Changing nature of applications to PWLB  
1817-21 1822-26 1827-31
Business applications 28% 16% 2%
Public works - transport 53% 54% 54%
Public works - other 19% 30% 44%
Totals 100% 100% 100%
Source: Analysis of PWLB 6/1 applications ledger.
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upon which money cannot be borrowed in the usual way’.59 Grant also made clear 
that the PWLB saw its role as being very different to the pre-1817 commissions. 
Their role was not ‘to relieve the temporary pressures of commercial distress’, or 
to support ‘individual trades’. Grant continued that ‘objections have been made to 
such measures as encouraging private speculation at the public expense’. Grant 
made it clear that the PWLB’s future priority was public works (‘various useful 
schemes’) and not supporting mine owners (‘individual trades’). His comments 
also imply that the PWLB’s role was no longer as lender of last resort (‘to relieve 
the temporary pressures of commercial distress’). Instead the PWLB’s role was 
redefined as lending to individual applicants who were unable to borrow (‘in the 
usual way’) from commercial sources. Since the PWLB was lending at the 
prevailing market rate of 5 per cent, we can define this role as that of a ‘market 
rate lender’.60 
Vansittart’s response to Grant’s letter shows that the government’s view had also 
changed since 1817. Vansittart replied that ‘circumstances are so materially 
changed since … 1817’, and that ‘public aid … is always liable to much 
objection’.61 He therefore proposed to wind up the PWLB. The government clearly 
moved from this view, since in 1822 Vansittart successfully promoted a Bill to 
advance a further £2m to the PWLB. There is no record of the further debate that 
took place between government and the Board that led to this change of heart. 
However, reading the letters of Grant and Vansittart, it seems highly likely that it 
was the PWLB’s movement in favour of lending money to promote public works, 
and against lending money to private businesses, which carried the day. 
In January 1823, Thomas Reid (who was shortly to become the PWLB deputy 
chairman) turned decisively against all lending to private businesses. Reid 
recommended rejecting a mining application, saying that the ‘expediency of 
lending money to increase private concerns is problematical, and has been acted 
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upon as inexpedient in former applications’.62 This view questioned any lending to 
private concerns. The only exceptions to this were loans to private businesses for 
the provision of public works. The PWLB did not adopt Reid’s view, and continued 
to make loans to mine owners. Even so, the message to future applicants must 
have been discouraging. Grant’s 1821 letter and Reid’s 1823 view both indicate 
that the Board saw loans to mine owners as the exception, or a temporary 
expedient – suitable for circumstances in 1817 - but not suitable for the 1820s. 
The hardening of the government’s view on supporting loans to private 
businesses can be seen in its reaction to separate crises in 1822 and 1826. In 
1822 there was a financial crisis in agriculture, with many calling for ‘cheaper 
money’.63 Charles Bragge Bathurst suggested an issue of Exchequer bills that 
would allow landlords to redeem some of their mortgages. Vansittart rejected this 
idea, on the basis that the problem was a scarcity of security, not credit.64 A 
similar outcome resulted from the 1826 financial crisis. Merchants reacted to this 
crisis as they had in 1811, by calling for the issuing of exchequer bills to 
distressed firms. Lord Liverpool, supported by Huskisson and Peel, refused this 
approach.65 Instead, all three argued that this was a problem for the Bank of 
England to address. Both events show that after 1822, support for private 
businesses was seen as a task for banks, not the government. From 1826, the 
role of lender of last resort had passed from the government to the Bank of 
England.66  
A final reason for the shift away from loans to businesses was that business loans 
were higher risk than loans for public works. The problem was that mining loans 
were repaid from inherently risky trading income, and the businesses rarely 
owned sufficient assets that could be sold in the case of a debt default. Loans to 
transport-related public works projects were also secured against risky trading 
income. In contrast, loans for church building and the building of county gaols and 
courts carried much lower risks, since the loan was secured against local rate 
income. As a legally enforceable tax, this source offered much greater security 
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than either physical assets, like bridges or harbours, or a variable trading income 
stream from mines or toll roads. It was therefore riskier for the PWLB to lend to 
mine owners than to finance the building of a county gaol. As a commercially 
minded lender it was natural for the Board to gravitate towards lower risk lending. 
The government shared the PWLB’s views on the prime importance of avoiding 
making loans with a high risk of default. After each of the pre-1817 incarnations of 
the PWLB, governments had been keen to convince Parliament that all advances 
had been recovered, and small profits had been made.67 There is a sense in each 
of the reports that if any of the loans had not been recovered, this would have 
been embarrassing for the government. This sense is repeated in the PWLB’s 
report to Parliament in 1843, which emphasised that the PWLB had made a ‘profit’ 
of £600,000 in the 25 years after 1817.68 The government clearly shared the 
Board’s desire to avoid risky lending that could result in losses having to be 
reported to Parliament. 
Even if neither the PWLB nor the government thought they should intervene in 
private businesses, both can be seen as willing to intervene to generate public 
works investment. The PWLB’s views are shown both by their increasing shift in 
lending toward public works, as in table 2.10, and in their letter to the Chancellor 
in 1821 as part of the renewal debate. The government’s willingness to intervene 
to create public works investment can be seen in a comparison of PWLB lending 
and civil government spending. The Board’s lending between 1817 and 1826 was 
£3.2m. Over the same period, civil government spending was £55m. The PWLB 
lending was therefore equivalent to a 6 per cent increase in civil government 
spending.69 For a government trying hard to reduce spending and debt, this was a 
major additional financial commitment. This large scale intervention in the 
economic life of the nation has passed largely unremarked upon, because 
historians have not taken up Flinn’s implied challenge to study the PWLB.70 
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In practice (if not formally), the PWLB’s objectives had changed by 1826, and 
were focused entirely on making loans to support public works. The 1817 
objectives of supporting mines, fisheries and parishes had been informally 
dropped. By 1826, neither the PWLB nor the government thought that loans 
should be provided to ‘individual trades’ or sectors of the economy. Nor did the 
government any longer see the PWLB as a lender of last resort, injecting liquidity 
into the economy. At a more practical level, the demand for loans from mine and 
fishery owners and from parishes had always been low, and had virtually ended 
by 1826. Instead, the PWLB’s letter to the Chancellor in 1821 made clear that the 
Board saw its future in terms of supporting public works schemes. The same letter 
redefined the PWLB role as lending to those unable to borrow from commercial 
lenders. The PWLB was to act as a commercially minded lender, charging market 
rates for its loans.  
Conclusions 
This chapter set out to describe the PWLB’s lending to mine owners. It also set 
out to show how the Board established its working methods and developed its 
own philosophy of lending. The PWLB’s emerging philosophy saw it acting as a 
commercial lender, demanding very high levels of security from its borrowers, and 
determined to avoid losses through bad debts. The Board did not see its primary 
purpose as creating employment for the labouring poor. The PWLB also took a 
narrow, rather legalistic view of its brief in the 1817 Act, and became ever more 
reluctant to lend to private firms. It therefore declined to lend to manufacturers, 
applicants who wished to repay debt or profitable mine owners who wished to 
expand their businesses. This philosophy was applied to all of the PWLB’s lending 
decisions for the first 20 years of its existence. 
The PWLB lent just £272,000 to mine owners over the ten years 1817 to 1826. 
This was 2 per cent of the mining fixed capital formation, and was far too small to 
have any material impact on ether mining output, or on employment levels in the 
industry. The result of this was that PWLB lending to mine owners had no 
discernible impact on the living standards of the population as a whole. The 
PWLB’s negligible impact was because mine owners were able to finance the vast 
majority of their growing investment needs from retained profits. While the 1817 
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Act had been based on a belief that there was a lack of credit, the evidence of this 
chapter indicates that the lack of security was a bigger problem. The potential 
impact of PWLB lending was also hampered by the Board’s restrictive lending 
philosophy and the very low success rate for applications. Indeed, there were only 
two further mining applications after 1826. 
By 1826, the PWLB’s objectives had changed in two ways. First, in practical terms 
it now had a single objective: lending to finance public works. Lending to mines 
was a short term phenomenon, and atypical of the PWLB’s longer term lending. 
The second change in the PWLB’s objectives was that by 1826, it was no longer a 
lender of last resort, responding to shortages of liquidity. This role had passed to 
the Bank of England. Instead, the PWLB had become a lender to those who could 
not borrow from commercial sources. The focus had become lending to public 
works projects at the prevailing market rate of 5 per cent.  
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Chapter 3, An independent PWLB? Turnpike trusts, 1817-26  
  
     
  
     
Figure 3.1 The ‘before’ picture 
(left) shows the 1762 line of the 
Ashbourne Leek road as it went 
over the summit of Lowe Hill. It 
is now reduced to a farm track 
and a public footpath. Telford 
surveyed the whole road and 
suggested improvements 
costing £25,000. The trust 
realised that it could not afford 
the repayments on a loan of 
this size and so borrowed just 
£5,000 from the PWLB, and 
completed this single 
improvement.  
Figure 3.2 The ‘after’ 
picture (right) shows the 
1828 line of the road, 
which has become the 
A432. It now takes a 
longer and flatter route 
around Lowe Hill. Ten 
years after the 
improvement, the trust 
saw its toll income fall by 
a third when railways 
arrived in the area. All 
the trust’s creditors were 
eventually repaid. 
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The Public Works Loan Board lending to turnpike trusts was typical of the PWLB’s 
lending to finance public works in its first 20 years. Adam Smith argued that ‘good 
roads, bridges, navigable canals, harbours etc’ were ‘public works which facilitate 
the commerce of any country’.1 The PWLB made loans in all four cases to 
supplement the predominantly private finance used to provide most turnpike 
roads, bridges, canals and harbours. The challenges of PWLB lending to turnpike 
trusts were typical of all of the PWLB’s lending to public works. As well as 
exploring the PWLB’s lending to turnpike trusts, this chapter examines the extent 
to which the PWLB was properly independent from the government. In particular, 
did Parliament and the government overrule any of the PWLB’s lending 
decisions? In addition, local savers to turnpike trusts eventually lost £5m on their 
loans to trusts. Could the PWLB have used its position as lender to improve the 
financial performance of trusts, and limit the scale of these losses? 
By 1826, over 1,000 turnpike trusts were responsible for more than 21,000 miles 
of main roads in England and Wales.2 The other 100,000 miles of minor roads 
were the responsibility of over 15,000 parishes.3 The purpose of establishing a 
turnpike trust was to improve the condition of the main roads in an area. The key 
benefit was that trusts had the right to borrow to fund road improvements, and 
could repay the loans from future income collected from road users. The vast 
majority of the borrowing and investment was undertaken in the 100 years from 
1727 to 1826. The investment resulted in an improved national road network, 
support for the growth in regional movement of goods and people, and the 
promotion of economic growth.4 The number of turnpikes and their annual income 
reached a peak between 1826 and 1836. Thereafter, traffic volumes fell, and after 
1850 there was a steady fall in the number of turnpike trusts as they wound 
                                            
1
 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the  Wealth of Nations, ed by Kathryn 
Sutherland (Oxford, Oxford University Press,1993) p. 414. 
2
 BPP 1833 (703) Second Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords to Examine Turnpike 
Returns, p. 175. 
3
 J.E. Ginarlis and Sidney Pollard, ‘Roads and Waterways 1750-1850’, in C. H. Feinstein and Sidney 
Pollard, eds, Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom 1750-1920 (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1988), p. 202; S. and B. Webb, English Local Government. Volume 5: The Kings Highway 
(London, Longmans Green, 1913), p. 204. 
4
 E. Pawson, Transport and Economy: The Turnpike Roads of Eighteenth Century Britain (London, 
Academic Press,1977), pp. 301-339; William Albert, The Turnpike Road System in England 1663-
1840 (London, Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 168-199.  
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themselves up. This led to the ending of toll charges and the transfer of the 
responsibility for road maintenance back to parishes and other local government 
bodies.  
This chapter has four main sections. The first examines the scale of turnpike trust 
capital spending and the relative importance of PWLB lending to trusts. The 
second section explores turnpike trust applications to the PWLB, how the Board 
made its decisions, and the results of those decisions. It also examines how the 
PWLB dealt with the widespread insolvency of turnpike trusts. The third section 
covers the PWLB’s actions to recover its loans, and the larger scale problems that 
non-PWLB lenders had in recovering their loans to trusts. The last section looks at 
the broader issues of the extent of the PWLB’s independence from government, 
its achievements by 1826, and the Board’s reluctance to accept a wider role than 
that of a commercial lender. 
3.1     The PWLB’s role in financing turnpike trusts 
There is an extensive literature on turnpike trusts. Much of the early writing 
concentrated on the parliamentary processes necessary to establish a trust, and 
the many parliamentary attempts to regulate traffic on turnpike roads.5 In the 
1970s, William Albert and Eric Pawson separately wrote about a much broader 
range of turnpike issues. They analysed the geographic development of trusts 
over time, arguing that there was a broad logic to network development, with 
arterial roads near London being improved first, and roads further away from 
London coming later.6 Both Albert and Rawson also argued that turnpike trusts 
had led to the reduction in transport costs and the growth in traffic volumes.7 
Since 2005, Dan Bogart has written three articles on the impact of turnpike trusts 
on investment levels and property values, and on the development of the network 
of turnpikes.8 However, only Albert touched on the overall finances of trusts, and 
                                            
5
 W. T. Jackman, The Development of Transportation in Modern Britain. 3rd edn. (London, Frank 
Cass,  1966) pp. 217-230; S. and B. Webb, The Kings Highway pp. 120-2. 
6
 Albert, The Turnpike Road System, pp. 30-56; Pawson, Transport and Economy, pp. 134-168. 
7
 Albert, The Turnpike Road System, pp. 168-187; Pawson, Transport and Economy, pp. 293-8. 
8
 D. Bogart, ‘Did Turnpike Trusts Increase Transport Investment in Eighteenth Century England?’ 
Journal of Economic History, 65, no. 2, 2005, pp. 438-468; ‘Turnpike Trusts and Property Income: 
New Evidence of the Effects of Transport Improvements and Legislation in Eighteenth Century 
England’, Economic History Review, Vol 62, no. 1, 2009, pp. 128-152; ‘Neighbors, Networks, and the 
Development of Transport Systems: Explaining the Diffusion of Turnpike Trusts in Eighteenth Century 
England’, Journal of Urban Economics, Vol 61, 2007, pp. 238-262. 
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no one has addressed the national picture of how trusts financed their capital 
spending. Mentions of the PWLB in the turnpike trust literature are occasional 
only. 
Before 1970, there was no estimate of turnpike trust capital formation. Instead, it 
was common to treat the number of Turnpike Acts passed by Parliament as a 
proxy for the level of capital spending by trusts.9 This led to a common view that 
the peak period of turnpike investments was the 20 years after 1750.10 A major 
advance came in 1970, when John Ginarlis made an estimate of trust capital 
formation over the one hundred years after 1750. Ginarlis argues that turnpike 
trust capital formation was £10.3m in the ten years after 1817. However, the 
Ginarlis estimate of capital formation includes all routine maintenance spending 
and management costs.11 This failure to distinguish between capital and revenue 
spending means the Ginarlis estimate is far too high. Sidney Pollard dealt with a 
similar problem with his own capital formation estimates for the coal industry by 
reducing them by a third, to remove the assumed repairs element.12 The problem 
of making an estimate of capital formation in turnpikes therefore remains 
unresolved. 
Using the post-1834 turnpike trust annual returns to Parliament allows a different 
approach to estimating trust capital investment. For the first time, these returns 
included an estimate of ‘improvements’, or capital spending. Table 3.1 uses 
information from the 1834 return to show that Ginarlis’s estimate can be improved 
upon. Column 1 shows that total trust spending for 1834, including capital and 
revenue spending, was £1.7m. Column 2 shows the Ginarlis definition of capital 
formation. This gives an estimate of £1.3m for 1834, but includes all repairs and 
management costs. Columns 3 and 4 apply modern accounting definitions to the 
1834 data. Column 3 shows the normal annual revenue costs of £1.5m, including 
repair and maintenance. Column 4 shows only spending of a capital nature, and 
                                            
9
 P. Deane and W. A. Cole, British Economic Growth 1688-1959. 2nd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1969), p. 237; W. Albert, ‘The Turnpike Trusts’, in D.  Aldcroft and M. J. Freeman, 
Eds, Transport in the Industrial Revolution (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1983), p. 38. 
10
 Albert, Turnpike Roads, p. 51. 
11
 J.E. Ginarlis, ‘Road and Waterway Investment in Britain 1750-1850’ (PhD thesis, Sheffield 
University, 1970) and J. E. Ginarlis and S. Pollard, ‘Roads and Waterways 1750-1850’, in Feinstein 
and Pollard, Studies in Capital Formation, pp. 182-224. 
12
 S. Pollard, ‘Coal Mining 1750-1850’ in Feinstein and Pollard, Studies in Capital Formation, p. 63. 
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totals £247,000. This is a fifth of the Ginarlis figure, but can be regarded as much 
more realistic, because it follows the Pollard principle of excluding routine 
maintenance costs.  
  
Note: Ginarlis’s figure for 1834 is £45,000 less than the £1,274,000 shown 
here, as he excluded the value of statutory duty provided by parishes, 
presumably on the grounds that it was a non-cash transaction appearing as 
both income and spending in the Parliamentary returns.13 
Using the data from the parliamentary returns of 1834 to 1838, the principles of a 
new capital formation estimate for turnpike trusts are easily determined. The 
starting point is the Ginarlis estimates of turnpike trust spending. These need to 
be increased to include land, debt and non-cash costs, which Ginarlis excluded. 
The result gives combined revenue and capital spending figures for each year 
between 1817 and 1826. Capital spending had two components: first, based on 
new trust applications to the PWLB, an average of £8,000 for each new Act 
passed in the year. Second, based on the 1834 to 1838 returns to Parliament, 
14.5 per cent of annual trust spending is assumed to be for all other capital 
spending.14 It is then assumed that 90 per cent of capital spending was financed 
                                            
13
 Ginarlis and Pollard, ‘Roads and Waterways, 1750-1850’, table 8.3, p. 199. Their figure for Britain, 
less Scotland, for 1833/34 is £1,229,000, plus £45,000 of non-cash transactions (see p. 197), which 
Ginarlis excluded. Ginarlis, Road and Waterway Investment, table XVII, p. 132, shows the 
composition of the Ginarlis figure, and BPP 1836 (2), Turnpike Trust Returns 1834, p. 3 shows the 
national totals.  
14
 There were 37 applications to the PWLB from newly formed trusts. The 1834 to 1838 returns to 
Parliament show that residual capital costs were 13 per cent of total spending. From 1817 to 1826 
they are assumed to have been marginally higher. 
Table 3.1             Estimates of investment in turnpike trusts in 1834
1834 Trust Ginarlis
spending quasi-net 
investment Revenue Capital
Column 1 2 3 4
£000 £000 £000 £000
Repairs 935                935               935              
Management 122                122               122              
Improvements 217                217               217               
Land costs 30                   30                  
Debt interest 289                289              
Debt repayments 107                107              
Totals 1,700    1,274   1,453          247               
Sources: BPP 1836 (2), p. 3 for col 1. See text for columns 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Modern accounting 
definitions
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from borrowing, and the remainder from toll income.15 The resulting estimates can 
be verified by comparing them with the known total spending and debt figures in 
the returns to Parliament. With a few adjustments, the approach can also be 
verified against the annual returns for 1834 to 1838. Appendix 3.A gives more 
detail on the approach and the verification of the results. Table 3.2 shows that 
using this method gives a capital spending estimate of £2.8m for 1817 to 1826, 
and shows capital spending rising throughout the period to a peak of £423,000 in 
1825. The boom in capital spending also led to a boom in trust borrowing, with 
debt increasing from £5.3m in 1820 to £8.5m in 1834.16 In turn, this debt increase 
explains the ‘great alarm’ of the House of Lords Select Committee in 1833 at the 
‘increasing debt of turnpike trusts’.17 
   
The above approach to estimating capital spending in the 1820s can be used to 
make estimates of trust capital spending back to 1750. Figure 3.3 indicates that 
turnpike trust capital spending in the twenty years from 1750 averaged £75,000 a 
year. This period is normally considered the peak time for the creation of trusts. 
However, Albert’s list of trust formations shows that there were only around 300 
trusts operating by 1770. In contrast, three times as many trusts were operating 
by 1826, and they invested an average of £335,000 a year between 1822 and 
                                            
15
 The 1834 to 1838 returns show around 60 per cent of capital spend financed by borrowing. In the 
borrowing boom of the 1820s a much higher proportion will have been financed by borrowing. 
16
 See appendix 3.A. 
17
 BPP 1833 (703) House of Lords report, p. iv. 
Table 3.2 Turnpike trust capital spending estimate 1817-26
Ginarlis Land, debt Total New Act Residual All
estimate etc costs spending capital capital capital
£000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000
1817 880         308           1,188     56         172        228        
1818 877         307           1,184     80         172        252        
1819 937         328           1,265     40         183        223        
1820 921         322           1,243     24         180        204        
1821 928         325           1,253     8            182        190        
1822 1,042     365           1,407     24         204        228        
1823 1,115     390           1,505     56         218        274        
1824 1,174     411           1,585     152       230        382        
1825 1,219     427           1,646     184       239        423        
1826 1,163     407           1,570     136       228        364        
1817-26 10,256   3,591        13,847   760       2,008    2,768    
Source: Appendix 3.A
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1826.18 Figure 3.3 confirms that the five year period 1822-6 was clearly the peak 
for turnpike trust capital spending. It also indicates that the main determinant of 
turnpike trust capital spending was the number of trusts operating at the time, not 
the number of new trust Acts passed in the year. 
         
How was this capital spending of £2.8m financed? Parliamentary returns show 
that after 1834, trusts financed 40 per cent of investment spending direct from toll 
income.19 This high figure was a reflection of the pressure on trusts to reduce their 
borrowing. In the years 1817 to 1826, rising income made it relatively easy to 
justify new debt, and trust debt boomed. Table 3.2 therefore assumes that trusts 
borrowed in order to finance 90 per cent of their capital spending between 1817 
and 1826. This is equivalent to nearly £2.5m of the £2.8m capital investment. The 
PWLB ledger of loan applications shows that PWLB lending to trusts in these ten 
years totalled £430,000, or 16 per cent of trust capital spending.20 The question 
therefore arises: where did the remaining £1.5m of turnpike capital finance come 
from?  
                                            
18
 Albert Turnpike Roads, appendix B, pp. 201-223 lists over 900 trusts in 1826, although the returns 
of the period show more than a thousand. Some trusts functioned in two or more divisions, however, 
and submitted a return for each. 
19
 The critical early returns were: BPP 1821 (747), BPP 1824 (470), BPP 1833 (733), and BPP 1836 
(2). After 1834, trust returns to Parliament were annual. 
20
 National Archives, PWLB 6/1, Applications ledger 1817-41. 
Figure 3.3
Sources: Number of trusts: Albert, Turnpike Roads, appendix B. 
                  Capital spending: see appendix 3.A
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An examination of the mortgage registers of 41 trusts shows that the trusts raised 
over £200,000 across the period 1758 to 1845, through nearly 850 loans. The 
overwhelming proportion of this non-PWLB lending is shown as coming from 
individuals. There are no examples of loans from banks or insurance 
companies.21 However, Albert gives two examples of loans from banks, one for 
£1,500 and one for £300.22 There is also just a single example of a loan from an 
insurance company, and that was for a maximum of £5,000.23 This suggests that 
lending from banks and insurance companies was much less than 1 per cent of 
the total. The registers also show that 14 loans, or 2 per cent of loans, came from 
local groups such as schools, religious bodies and local corporations or 
parishes.24 In nearly a third of the 41 trusts examined, a local landowner or a 
clergyman acted as an anchor lender with an early loan of £1,000 or more, but the 
vast majority of the loans were for around £100 each.25 The role of the anchor 
lender was to encourage other smaller lenders by reassuring them that the loan 
would be safe. It is also clear from the mortgage registers that there were no more 
                                            
21
 Appendix 3.B gives the record office and file reference for each trust mortgage register examined.  
22
 Albert, Turnpike Roads, pp. 76, 108. Yorkshire Joint Stock Bank loan to Wibsey Low Moor Trust in 
1823, and subscription from Bradford Bank to the same trust in the same year.  
23
 Robin Pearson, ‘Collective Diversification: Manchester Cotton Merchants and the Insurance  
Business in the Early Nineteenth Century’, Business History Review Vol 65 Summer 1991, pp. 379-
414, 409, 412. 
24
 Appendix 3.B shows five contributions from corporations or parishes, and nine from schools, 
benevolent societies and religious orders. 
25
 The Duke of Devonshire was (with the Duke of Norfolk and the Earl of Surrey) locally the anchor 
lender for the Sheffield to Glossop Trust, and was sole lender for the Ashford and Buxton Trust. 
Sheffield Archives, Arundel MSS D67 CPG 8(6), and A.F. Roberts, Turnpike Roads Around Buxton 
(Buxton, A. F. Roberts Publications, 1992), pp. 89-104. 
Table 3.3 Sources of turnpike trust capital 1817-26
£000 Share
Fixed capital
Toll income 277               10%
Borrowing
     PWLB 430               16%
     Individuals 1,999           72%
     Societies 55                 2%
     Banks etc 7                   0%
Total capital finance 2,768           100%
Sources: Toll income from appendix 3.A, PWLB lending
                   lending from PWLB 6/1 applications ledger. 
                  other finance from sample of trust mortgage 
Ten year totals
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than ten examples of lenders that were not local to the area served by the turnpike 
trust. Therefore, the 72 per cent of turnpike trust capital finance that came from 
individuals was overwhelmingly from local individuals. 
     
Because the scale of lending from individuals was so large, it is useful to try to 
understand who was lending to trusts, and why. Turnpike trust mortgage registers 
often give the social class of the lender, and it is possible to reduce the many 
social groupings used in mortgage registers to just three. Table 3.4 treats those 
described as ‘lords’, ‘baronets’ and ‘gentlemen’ as landowners. Those described 
as ‘women’, ‘churchmen’, ‘professionals’ and estates that are controlled by 
executors are grouped together as ‘savers’. The remaining groups, described as 
‘merchants’, ‘manufacturers, ‘bankers’, ‘farmers’, ‘yeomen’ and ‘tradesmen’ are 
grouped together as ‘commercial interests’. The landowners and commercial 
interests can be expected to have lent money to the turnpike trust in order to 
increase the value of their land or business. In contrast, the savers can be 
expected to have lent money to the trust simply to earn interest on the sum.  
Table 3.4 shows similar groupings for canal shareholders and canal 
mortgagees.26 The differences and similarities are striking, and point to two 
conclusions from the analysis. First, that lending to turnpike trusts and canals was 
more attractive to savers, confirming the view that savers were looking for interest 
on their savings. Savers did not want to take the risk of buying canal shares, even 
though the rewards may have been high. Similarly, commercial interests were 
much more willing to invest in canal shares, where they might both earn a return 
and see better transport links improve the profitability of their businesses. Second, 
                                            
26
 J. R. Ward, The Finance of Canal Building in Eighteenth Century England (London, Oxford 
University Press, 1974). Summary of Ward’s figures for individual canals.  
Table 3.4 Professions of those lending money to turnpike trusts and canals
Landowners Commercial Savers
interests
Turnpike trust  lenders, 1755-1845 42% 31% 27%
Canal shareholders, 1750-1850 22% 66% 12%
Canal mortgagees, 1750-1850 24% 46% 30%
Source: See appendix 3.B, and J. R. Ward, The Finance of Canal Building in
Eighteenth Century England , London, OUP, 1974)
Note: Percentages represent numbers of people in each group.
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table 3.4 suggests that the greater attractiveness of turnpike loans to landowners 
was because they expected to see a return from their investment in terms of 
increased land values or increased rental income. To a lesser extent this also 
appears to have been true of commercial interests and their lending to turnpike 
trusts. This conclusion is consistent with Bogart’s findings that land values and 
rental yields rose by 20 per cent after the road improvements delivered by 
turnpike trusts.27 The importance of local savers as turnpike lenders will become 
critical in section 3.4. 
Section 3.1 has shown that the 1820s were the peak period for turnpike trust 
capital formation. It has also shown that Ginarlis’s estimates of trust capital 
formation are too high by a factor of four. A much more realistic estimate is that 
£2.8m was invested in turnpike improvements between 1817 and 1826. The peak 
years for the boom in investment and borrowing were between 1824 and 1826, 
when an average of £390,000 a year was being invested. Ten per cent of this 
£2.8m was financed directly from toll income, and 16 per cent came from PWLB 
lending. The balance of 74 per cent was borrowed from local lenders, 
predominantly in loans of around £100. The PWLB’s lending of £430,000 was 
modest, both as a monetary total, and as a share of the £2.8m. The following 
sections show that there was a danger that PWLB lending had financed unsound 
projects, and had fuelled the boom in trust borrowing. 
3.2 Turnpike trust applications to the PWLB   
This section examines the PWLB’s thought processes as it dealt with loan 
applications from turnpike trusts. It also explores the consequences of the Board’s 
decisions on the boom in road improvements, and on non-PWLB lenders to trusts. 
The focus is on the national picture, but this is illustrated by considering the 
applications of individual trusts.  
 
                                            
27
 D. Bogart, ‘Turnpike Trusts and Property Income: New Evidence on the Effects of Transport 
Improvement and Legislation in Eighteenth Century England’. Economic History Review, Vol 62, no. 1 
2009, pp. 128-152. 
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Between 1817 and 1826, there were 263 applications for loans to the PWLB from 
turnpike trusts, with a total value of just over £1m. The average size of each 
application was just under £4,000 (see table 3.5). Applications from turnpike trusts 
were therefore small when compared to those for canals, railways, harbours and 
other transport related public works.28 This low value was a reflection of the 
relatively short lengths of road that each of the 1,000 trusts were responsible for. 
Table 3.6 shows the applications by year. Nearly a quarter of the 263 applications 
were made in 1826, and a sixth were made in 1817. So, altogether, these two 
years account for 40 per cent of the applications.  
    
The explanation for the 44 applications in 1817 was that a new source of finance 
initially attracted a large number of applications. This initial surge of applications 
                                            
28
 See table 2.4, chapter 2. 
Table 3.5 Turnpike trust applications to PWLB 1817-26
Number Total value Ave size
£000 £000
Over £5,000 65 658               10.1
£2000-£5000 96 281               2.9
Under £2000 102 96                 0.9
All 263 1,035           3.9
Source: National Archives, PWLB 6/1 applications
                ledger. 
Table 3.6 Applications and Acts by year
Turnpike Acts
Number Share No.
1817 44 17% 7
1818 14 5% 10
1819 17 6% 5
1820 25 10% 3
1821 22 8% 1
1822 21 8% 3
1823 29 11% 7
1824 11 4% 19
1825 20 8% 23
1826 60 23% 17
total 263 100% 95
Source: National Archives, PWLB 6/1 
                applications ledger.  Act numbers, 
                Albert, Turnpike Roads,  appendix B.          
Applications  
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was seen in the PWLB applications across all sectors of the economy. After 1817, 
the annual number of turnpike applications halved, and averaged 20 a year until 
1826. The number of applications then trebled to 60 in 1826. Four factors might 
have contributed to the 1826 increase in applications for PWLB loans. The first is 
that the increase in the number of new turnpike Acts in 1824-6 could have led to 
an accompanying rise in applications to the PWLB in 1826. This was partially 
correct, since 17 of the 60 applications to the PWLB in 1826 came from newly 
formed trusts.29 However, more than two thirds of the 1826 applications came 
from well-established trusts. Therefore, the increasing number of new Acts does 
not fully explain the rise in applications to the PWLB. The second possible 
explanation is that the economic downturn in 1826 caused a reduction in trust 
income, reducing trusts’ ability to finance improvements from toll income. In these 
circumstances, trusts would seek to borrow more. Yet this is unconvincing: capital 
spending fell by about the same amount as the fall in income.30 The third possible 
explanation is that the better road construction techniques of John Macadam and 
Thomas Telford led to pressure for increased capital spending.31 However, this 
happened throughout the 1820s, and does not therefore explain the 1826 rise in 
application numbers. 
A much more convincing explanation is that the constant increases in trust capital 
spending had simply exhausted the capacity of local savers to fund them. In 
particular, the increase in average investment from £230,000 a year before 1823, 
to an average of £400,000 in 1824 and 1825, with local savers financing 90 per 
cent of it, will have reduced the available pool of local savings. On top of this, the 
1826 crisis will have reduced the ability of the middle class to save in that year. 
With local savings squeezed by these two pressures, turnpike trusts had to look 
elsewhere for finance. Since table 3.3 shows that banks provided no loans to 
turnpike trusts, and that trust income had dipped slightly, the only alternative to a 
more dramatic fall in capital investment was an increase in applications to the 
PWLB. This explanation is confirmed by noting that in 1826 the PWLB granted 
loans equal to 27 per cent of trust capital spending in the year. In contrast, in the 
                                            
29
 Derived by cross checking Albert’s list of new Acts with the PWLB’s list of applications. 
30
 See table 3.2. It is reasonable to assume that the spending fall in the table was matched by an 
income fall. 
31
 Albert, Turnpike Roads, pp. 142-148. 
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nine years before 1826 the PWLB had granted loans equal to just 14 per cent of 
trust capital spending. The increase in applications to the PWLB in 1826 was a 
forced change in trust financing strategy, not a change in trust spending levels. 
Borrowing from the PWLB was more expensive than borrowing locally. Trusts 
borrowing from the PWLB had to repay at least 5 per cent of the loan each year, 
and pay 5 per cent interest, so each loan cost 10 per cent of its value each year.32 
On the other hand, borrowing from local lenders would cost an average of around 
5 per cent a year, since most trusts made no repayments of debt, and some did 
not pay all the interest due.33 Turnpike trusts would not, therefore, have borrowed 
from the PWLB as a matter of choice; they would only have done so when there 
was no alternative way to finance their improvement plans. The PWLB was 
therefore acting as a 5 per cent lender when trusts were unable to borrow from 
local lenders. 
    
Forty three per cent of turnpike applications to the PWLB were successful. This 
was little different to the average for all applications to the Board between 1817 
and 1826, but substantially higher than for the mining applications detailed in 
chapter 2. The 43 per cent success rate did not vary materially in the ‘surge’ years 
of 1817 or 1826. Neither did the size of an application make a material difference 
to its outcome, as table 3.7 makes clear. Table 3.7 also shows that just 21 per 
cent of turnpike trust applications were rejected. The remaining 35 per cent were 
withdrawn or abandoned by applicants who chose not to proceed with the 
application. The explanation for the high withdrawal/abandoned rate lies in the 
questions that the PWLB asked applicants. These were much more financially 
                                            
32
 The PWLB minute books give details of the terms of most loans, and the 1843 PWLB return to 
Parliament show the interest rate for each loan, and the loan repayments for each loan. BPP 1843 
(47), Exchequer Loans (Public Works). 
33
 This is clear from the trust annual returns to Parliament. 
Table 3.7   Outcome of turnpike trust applications 1817-26
Number Granted Rejected Withdrawn
abandoned
Over £5,000 65 46% 25% 29%
£2-5,000 96 38% 20% 43%
Under £2,000 102 50% 18% 32%
All 43% 21% 36%
All numbers 263 114 55 94
Source: Analysis of PWLB 6/1 applications ledger.
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based than was the case with mining applications, and the PWLB would probe the 
trust’s business case for the loan. Doubts about the financial merits of an 
application was the most common reason the Board gave for rejecting turnpike 
applications, accounting for 31 out of 55 rejections.34 Very often applicants could 
not provide satisfactory answers to the financial questions, and did not pursue 
their applications. These applications were then treated as withdrawn or 
abandoned. Only if the financial questions were satisfactorily answered would 
questions be asked about the security that the applicant could offer. The inability 
of applicants to provide sufficient security led to the rejection of 11 applications.  
An examination of the four turnpike applications set out in table 3.8 gives a deeper 
understanding of the PWLB’s thinking on turnpike applications. In the first case, 
that of Leeds Dewsbury, the trust provided no financial information at all to 
support its 1817 application. Despite this, the Board granted a £5,000 loan, but 
made the loan subject to a number of personal sureties being given by trustees. 
As with the mining applications, the PWLB wanted to ensure that it would be 
repaid even if the turnpike trust itself was unable to repay the loan. Initially, the 
trustees refused to accept this condition because they were unwilling to accept 
personal responsibility for the loan. Without sureties from the trustees, the Board 
would reject the application. The trustees then wrote to the Prime Minister, asking 
him to intervene and get the PWLB to make the loan without the trustees’ 
personal security. Lord Liverpool declined, and the PWLB maintained its view that 
no loan would be made without adequate security. Eventually, the Leeds and 
Dewsbury trust conceded, and a number of trustees provided personal sureties. 
The Board made two further loans to the Leeds Dewsbury trust, in 1818 and 1822. 
Worryingly, the 1822/3 return to Parliament showed that the trust was making no 
loan repayments on its £19,000 loans from non-PWLB lenders, and only had toll 
income of £1,900 a year.35 In spite of this, the PWLB loans were repaid on time 
and the trustees were not called upon to honour their guarantee.36 The Leeds 
Dewsbury trust case illustrates the absolute priority the PWLB gave to securing 
sufficient security for all loans. It also shows that the Board was willing to make 
loan advances even when the applicant was making inadequate provision to 
                                            
34
 Analysis of the PWLB minute book discussions on individual applications. 
35
 BPP 1824 (470), Turnpike Trust Returns 1822/3, p. 862. 
36
 National Archives, PWLB 2/2 minute book, 16 March 1820, p. 329. 
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repay non-PWLB lenders. The trust’s fortunes later improved, and all the non-
PWLB lenders eventually received repayment of their loans. 
  
The Stratford Dunchurch turnpike trust application was for an £8,000 loan to 
finance an improvement on its part of the London to Holyhead road. The 
improvement was part of seven schemes proposed after Telford’s survey of the 
whole road for the government.37 The trust’s expectation was that toll income 
would more than double after the improvement. However, because the trust 
expected that costs would also double, little more than a bare breakeven would be 
achieved. In practice, the Board had no choice but to approve this application, 
since Parliament had legislated to approve both the London to Holyhead road 
improvements and the loan to finance them.38 The PWLB was therefore directed 
to make the loan. This was a rare case of parliamentary intervention in the 
PWLB’s decision making process. On this occasion, the loan was easily repaid.39  
                                            
37
 BPP 1824 (305) First report of the London Holyhead Road Commission. 
38
 Ginarlis and Pollard, ‘Roads and Waterways 1750-1850’, p. 200, suggest that the government was 
keen to improve its ability to transport soldiers to Holyhead and on to Ireland.  
39
 London-Holyhead Road Acts 1823 and 1827, 1&2 George IV c30 and 2&3 George IV c91 s39 
approved seven schemes for the improvement of the London-Holyhead road, at a cost of £36,000 and 
£54,000 respectively. 
Table 3.8 Details supporting four applications to the PWLB
Leeds Stratford Leeds Gomersal
Dewsbury Dunchurch Whitehall Dewsbury
Date
Application £
Cost of work
Past Future Past Future Past Future Past Future
Debt no 5500 8000 18000 0 3500
Income details 570 1450 4800 750
Costs provided 636 1436 4100 250
Surplus/deficit -66 14 700 500
Sources: PWLB 2/1-7 minute books.
Note:      'Past' = recent actual income, debt, costs etc. 'Future' = trusts' estimated costs
                  etc once the improvements were complete.
Unclear £8,000 £22,000 £3,500
24 July 1817 28 August 1820 5 July 1826 20 Sept 1826
£5,000 £8,000 £10,000 £3,500
Outcome
Granted with 
personal 
security
Granted
Granted with 
personal 
security
Refused
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A subsequent directed loan for Holyhead road improvements was not repaid, 
however, and eventually had to be written off.40  
The next two examples show the importance of personal security and local 
contributions in the PWLB’s decision making. They also highlight the impact of 
trust insolvency on non-PWLB lenders. The Leeds Whitehall trust wanted a loan 
of £10,000 towards a £22,000 scheme.41 The rest of the costs were met by loans 
totalling £12,000 from local people. The financial projection was of a reasonable 
surplus, after meeting loan costs, and after personal security was offered by the 
trustees, the loan was granted. By 1834, the Leeds Whitehall trust had built up a 
debt of £69,000, but only had an income of £2,243 for the year.42 The trust was 
technically insolvent, because it was unable to service its debts.43 In spite of its 
insolvency, the PWLB loan was repaid in full, because the trust had accepted the 
Board’s standard condition of PWLB loans being repaid before all other debts.44 
By the time the trust was dissolved in 1859, its non-PWLB lenders had been paid 
only 84 pence in the pound for their loans. In addition, they only received 31 
pence in the pound of the interest due to them. Collectively, the non-PWLB 
lenders lost £77,000. 
The financial case for the Gomersal trust was just as strong as that for Leeds 
Whitehall. The difference was that this trust had not been able to raise any loans 
from local people, so the whole cost had to be financed by a £3,500 PWLB loan. 
Crucially, the Gomersal trustees refused to provide personal security, so the 
Board rejected the application. Gomersal eventually borrowed from local people, 
and the scheme went ahead. By 1834, the trust had accumulated a debt of nearly 
£13,000, but had annual income of only £295, so could not even afford to pay 
interest on its debts unless income rose sharply.45 Like Leeds Whitehall, the 
Gomersal trust was technically insolvent. However, over the next 40 years it did 
                                            
40
 See appendix 7.B for a list of all ‘directed loans’. 
41
 National Archives, PWLB 2/7, minute book, September 1826 to January 1828, 5 July 1827, p. 224.  
42
 BPP 1836 (2) Returns from Turnpike Trusts 1834. 
43
 The 1986 Insolvency Act says that an entity is insolvent if it is unable to pay its debts when they fall 
due. See www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpgs/1986/c45. S122(1)f accessed 17 September 2012.  
44
 BPP 1851 (512) PWLB report to Parliament, which lists loans with outstanding debts. 
45
 BPP 1836 (2), Turnpike Trust Returns 1834. 
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manage to repay all of its loans, and 86 pence in the pound of its interest due.46 
Local lenders lost ‘only’ £6,500. 
These four examples illustrate three factors that have a broader importance. First, 
three of the sample turnpike trusts were technically insolvent by 1834. One of the 
three failed to repay a post-1826 PWLB loan, and the two others failed to make 
full repayment to their non-PWLB lenders. How widespread was this problem? 
Second, the PWLB was willing to lend to individual trusts that had no means of 
repaying existing non-PWLB loans.47 The PWLB’s simple response to this 
problem was to ensure that PWLB loans were repaid first. With the desire to 
ensure that it was able to recover its own loans, the PWLB appeared indifferent to 
the fate of non-PWLB lenders. Third, the PWLB appeared to be more willing to 
lend in two circumstances. Each of these three factors will be examined 
separately. 
      
An examination of the 1834 turnpike trust returns to Parliament reveals that 28 per 
cent of trusts were technically insolvent.48 This means that their income was 
insufficient to allow them to repay their loans over 20 years, and to pay their 
lenders 5 per cent interest a year.49 Therefore, a trust should have provided for 
debt service costs of a combined 10 per cent of the loan’s value. On this basis, if a 
trust had debt more than ten times its annual income, it was insolvent because it 
                                            
46
 See appendix 3.C for BPP numbers of annual reports of turnpike spending between 1852 and 
1884.  
47
 BPP 1836 (2) shows that the PWLB lent to 45 trusts that were technically insolvent in 1834. 
48
 BPP 1836 (2). This was not a new problem. The same test applied to the 1822/3 returns in BPP 
1824 (470) reveals that 23 per cent of trusts were insolvent. 
49
 BPP 1836 (2) shows that most turnpike debts carried interest at 5 per cent. The Acts creating trusts 
gave the right to levy tolls for a 21 year period. Assuming an initial year for construction, this meant 
that all debt needed to be discharged within 20 years. 
Table 3.9            The parlous state of turnpike trust finances in 1834
All Trusts
1834
Most trusts were not meeting their debt service obligations
Proportion not repaying loans 74%
Proportion not fully meeting interest payments 50%
Making proper debt service provision would make many trusts insolvent
Proportion of trusts where proper debt service 
28%
Sources: Analysis of data from BPP 1836 (2), trusts' returns to Parliament.
costs exceeded trust annual income
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would be unable to meet its debt service costs even if it devoted all of its income 
to the task. However, this test understates the problem, because the 1834 returns 
to Parliament showed that 74 per cent of trusts were not repaying their loans (or 
making provision to do so), and 50 per cent were not fully meeting their interest 
payments to non-PWLB lenders (see table 3.9). The problem of trusts’ 
indebtedness was therefore widespread, and meant that very large numbers of 
non-PWLB lenders would lose money on their loans to turnpike trusts.  
The second factor revealed by the four examples is that the PWLB appeared 
more concerned to secure repayment of their own loans, and less concerned 
about the fate of non-PWLB lenders. This was a natural consequence of the 
PWLB’s philosophy of putting the recovery of its loans above all else. While this 
philosophy may be understandable in a bank manager, it looks odd in a 
government agency. It raises questions of whether the PWLB could or should 
have behaved differently and exercised a role in the regulation of trust debt to 
minimise the risks of non-payment to non-PWLB lenders. This issue is addressed 
in section 3.4. 
  
The third issue raised by the four examples is that the PWLB were much more 
willing to grant turnpike trust loans in 1817 than they were in 1826. Table 3.10 
shows that the Board granted 59 per cent of all 1817 applications for loans under 
£2,000, rejecting just 2 per cent of the applications. These outcomes were 
materially different to the 29 per cent rejection rate for small applications in 1826. 
This pattern is partly explained by Grant’s 1821 letter to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, revealing a preference for small loans for ‘useful schemes’.50 By 1826 
the Board would have been more conscious that the debt of turnpike trusts was 
climbing unsustainably, and that turnpike trust loans were looking riskier. 
                                            
50
 National Archives, PWLB 2/3 minute book, 15 February 1821, p. 178. 
  
Table 3.10 Impact of time and size of application
No. of Share Granted Rejected With-
apps <£2K drawn etc
1817-8 applications 58 59% 59% 2% 40%
1825-6 applications 80 25% 39% 29% 33%
Source: National Archives, PWLB 6/1 applications ledgers analysis.
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Finally, the Gomersal example shows that the PWLB was more inclined to accept 
an application where some of the costs of an improvement scheme were financed 
by loans from local lenders. Table 3.11 shows that 65 per cent of applications to 
the PWLB were accepted where there was a contribution from toll income of non-
PWLB lenders. In contrast, only 38 per cent of those where the PWLB was the 
only source of finance were granted. The reason for the difference is probably that 
the business cases for schemes with a local contribution had already been tested 
and found supportable. They were therefore more likely to gain support from the 
PWLB. 
This section has shown that nearly a quarter of PWLB lending to turnpike trusts 
occurred in 1826, at the peak of the boom in trust capital investment. So, trust 
investment was not affected by the economic downturn of 1825/6. Instead, it 
suggests that the savings of local, non-PWLB lenders to turnpike trusts were 
insufficient to finance this increase in investment. Trusts therefore increased their 
borrowing from the PWLB. Borrowing from the PWLB was more expensive than 
normal trust borrowing (if only because most trusts did not pay interest in full, or 
make provision for loan repayments). The PWLB was therefore acting as a market 
rate lender when other sources were unavailable. However, the 1834 returns 
show that £1m was owed to local lenders for unpaid interest, and 74 per cent of 
trusts were making inadequate provision for the repayment of their borrowings.51 
Consequently, trusts should have been using their increased toll income to pay 
the interest they owed, and to repay loans. Trusts ought not to have been 
increasing their loans in 1826. PWLB lending thus exacerbated the boom in trust 
debt, and contributed to the eventual losses suffered by non-PWLB lenders after 
                                            
51
 BPP 1836 (2), Turnpike Trust Returns 1834. 
Table 3.11   Impact of local contributions on outcomes 1817-26
No. of Granted Rejected With
All applications applic's drawn etc
With contribution 66 65% 24% 11%
No contribution 197 38% 19% 44%
Source: National Archives, PWLB 6/1 applications ledger.
Notes:  'With contribution' indicates those loans where non-
                PWLB lenders were providing some of the finance. 
               'No contribution' indicates loans where a PWLB loan
                was the sole source of finance.
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1850. This reinforces the view set out in chapter 2 that the PWLB was making its 
lending decisions as a bank manager would: extremely concerned for the security 
of its own loans, and not concerned at all with the impact on non-PWLB lenders.  
3.3 Recovery of loans 
A good test of PWLB decision making is whether trusts that were granted PWLB 
loans were more, or less, prone to insolvency. If the Board had been good at 
weeding out the applicants with potential financial problems, then fewer than 28 
per cent of trusts with PWLB loans would have been insolvent in 1834. Equally, if 
the years 1817 to 1826 represented a period of unwise borrowing, then a higher 
proportion of newly created trusts would have been insolvent in 1834. This section 
tests these propositions. It also examines the PWLB’s ability to recover its loans, 
and compares the financial performance of turnpike trust loans with those of all 
PWLB lending in the period 1817 to 1826. Finally, this section highlights the 
consequences of turnpike trust insolvencies on the large number of non-PWLB 
lenders to trusts. 
   
Table 3.12 shows the relative rates of insolvency for different groupings of trusts. 
As shown in section 3.2, 28 per cent of all trusts were insolvent in 1834. However, 
table 3.12 shows that 71 per cent of trusts created after 1817 were insolvent in 
1834. This is consistent with a boom period in trust borrowing, and with new trusts 
being able to borrow on less viable business plans. The same trend is shown in 
the new trusts benefitting from PWLB loans, with 83 per cent of this group being 
Table 3.12 Relative insolvency rates
Number
in sample Number Share
All Trusts 1,025       283 28%
Pre 1817 Trusts 960           237 25%
Post 1817 Trusts 65             46 71%
Trusts with PWLB loans 72             16 22%
Pre 1817 Trusts with PWLB loans 66             11 17%
Post 1817 Trusts with PWLB loans 6                5 83%
Source:  BPP 1836 (2). Trusts with PWLB loans, PWLB 6/1. Post 
                 1817 trusts (those created after 1817) from Albert,
                 Turnpike Roads , appendix B.
Notes:   Of the 118 trusts with PWLB loans it was only possible to
                 identify 72 in BPP 1836 (2). It was also only possible to
                 identify 66 of the 95 post-1817 trusts in BPP 1836 (2).
Insolvent  
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insolvent in 1834, compared to just 17 per cent of pre-1817 trusts with PWLB 
loans. The PWLB was therefore more willing to invest in new trusts than was 
really justified by their business cases. Instead of acting as a restraining hand, the 
Board participated in the boom just as enthusiastically as trusts and non-PWLB 
lenders. The PWLB exacerbated the boom in turnpike borrowing in the period 
1817 to 1826. 
If PWLB and non-PWLB lending to new trusts was equally optimistic, then the 
consequences were very different for the two groups. The PWLB recovered the 
vast majority of its loans, but non-PWLB lenders were much less fortunate. Of the 
118 loans the Board made, 21 loans, or 18 per cent, had some form of difficulty 
with repayment. These difficulties were dealt with by granting extensions in four 
cases, and even payment holidays in a few cases, as instalment payments were 
missed in seven cases. In six cases where these actions did not resolve the non-
repayment, legal action was taken, and led to full recoveries in two cases. Table 
3.13 lists the four remaining cases where there were outstanding balances in 
1851, amounting to around £63,000, or 15 per cent of the total lent.52 In the 1888 
PWLB annual report, three of these debts were reported as having been written 
off, and one had been recovered.53 The following paragraphs recount the story of 
four of the debts. 
  
The first irrecoverable debt was that of the Gatton and Povey Cross trust in 
Surrey. The trust applied for a loan of £3,500 in July 1817, and this was agreed 
                                            
52
 BPP 1851 (512), PWLB Report to Parliament, pp. 3-34. 
53
 BPP 1888 (200) 13th PWLB Annual Report, pp. 134-9. 
Table 3.13 Turnpike Trust bad debts in 1851
Original Oustanding
loan in 1851 Outcome
£ £
Gatton & Povey Cross 5,500   5,500          £5,500 written off in 1850
Bradford & Thornton 6,000   6,000          Fully repaid by 1859
Bradford & Eccleshall 3,000   3,000          £3,000 written off in 1850
Highland Roads & Bridges 51,450 49,029       £36,000 written off in 1876
65,950 63,529       
Total written off as %age of loans 15%
Sources: PWLB Report to Parliament, BPP 1851 (512) 
                  and BPP 1888 (200) PWLB annual report 1887.
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almost without challenge or debate.54 In 1818, the trust applied for a second loan 
of £2,000 when the work went over budget. Only at this point did the PWLB 
recognise that the business case was weak, and so asked for personal security 
from two trustees. These two wisely proposed adding the surveyor as a third, so 
that he had an interest in completing the work satisfactorily. The eventual cost of 
the work was £13,000, but annual income was just £122. In 1821 the PWLB took 
possession of the tollgates and so collected the income direct. However, income 
remained too low to pay off any of the debt, and little of the interest. Two of the 
sureties accepted their responsibilities and paid the interest until they ran out of 
money themselves. The third surety was the surveyor, and he disappeared to 
Ireland, never to be heard of again. By 1851, none of the principal of the loans 
had been repaid, and around £5,000 of interest charges remained unpaid.55 The 
trust was wound up in 1850 with outright losses to all its creditors, and the PWLB 
wrote off its loans. This was a simple error of judgement by the Board in 1817 and 
1818, making two small loans on poor or non-existent business cases. 
The two Bradford loans represent a different kind of error of judgement by the 
PWLB. The PWLB applications ledger records that the reason for the applications 
were ‘alleviating (the) starving population of Bradford’ and ‘to provide works for the 
distressed poor’ respectively.56 The extent to which these explanations influenced 
the Board only emerged in a PWLB minute in December 1837.57 The minute 
reveals that in August 1826 the PWLB vice chairman, Benjamin Harrison, saw the 
Home Secretary to discuss four applications from the West Riding of Yorkshire. In 
1837, when he had become the PWLB chairman, Harrison recalled that the Home 
Secretary saw the West Riding as being in ‘an extreme state of distress’ because 
of a ‘temporary want of employment in manufacturing’. The outcome of the 
discussions was that the Home Secretary had ‘encouraged’ the PWLB chairman 
to grant loans. Without this encouragement the PWLB would have rejected the 
applications because the cases for the loans were commercially very weak. The 
Board’s error of judgement was to be persuaded to make loans that it judged 
commercially unjustified. 
                                            
54
 The details come from the very large number of minuted PWLB discussions of this debt. 
55
 BPP 1851 (512) PWLB Report to Parliament, pp. 3-34. 
56
 National Archives, PWLB applications ledger PWLB 6/1 numbers 736 and 743, August 1826. 
57
 National Archives, PWLB minute book 2/16, 21 December 1837, pp. 203-5. 
81 
 
The Bradford Eccleshill loan was never likely to be repaid, because the business 
case looked hopeless. In addition to the £3,000 PWLB loan, the trust managed to 
borrow another £2,600 locally to finish the road. However, toll income never rose 
above £100 a year, so there was no prospect of paying interest or repaying the 
loan. The PWLB chased it for payment in 1831, but conceded that it was a lost 
cause.58 The trustees did not even meet between 1831 and 1839, and the trust 
was wound up in 1850, with neither the PWLB nor the local lenders recovering 
any of their money.  
The Bradford Thornton loan was more complex. In addition to the £6,000 PWLB 
loan, the trust raised local loans of £3,000 to complete the road in 1829. Included 
in the £3,000 was £1,000 from E. C. Lister, who was a Bradford MP from 1832 to 
1841. Income ranged between £500-800 a year; and the trust chose to use this 
income to repay the £3,000 raised locally, rather than maintain the road or repay 
the PWLB. This was of course contrary to the PWLB’s position as preferential 
creditor, and the Board protested, but without effect. The trust minute books 
reveal that the decision to repay Lister’s loan was taken at a meeting when Lister 
was in the chair!59 Eventually, in 1841 the PWLB took possession of the tollgates. 
Although the 1851 report shows no principal having been repaid, in the period 
1851 to 1859 the PWLB managed to recover the loan and the interest due.60 In 
both Bradford cases the PWLB had allowed its independence to be compromised 
by a politician’s influence. These two loans highlight the dangers of political 
decision making on loans, and the benefits of disinterested PWLB decision 
making. 
The final case of non-recovery was the result of parliamentary decision making, 
with the PWLB playing no role. The Commission for Highland Roads and Bridges 
promoted a local Bill to approve the building of a series of east-west and north-
south roads in Lanarkshire and Dumbartonshire.61 The Act ‘authorised and 
required’ the PWLB to advance a loan for up to £51,450.62 Once the roads were 
completed, the Commission was to operate them as a turnpike trust, and to repay 
                                            
58
 Bradford Record Office, 5D76/1/1, minute book of Bradford Eccleshill trust. 
59
 Bradford Record Office 5D76/2/2, Bradford Thornton minute book and 5D76/2/1 mortgage book. 
60
 BPP 1851 (512), PWLB Report to Parliament, p. 8.  
61
 Roads in Lanark and Dumbarton Roads and Bridges Act 1820, 1 George IV c84. (The modern 
spelling is ‘Dunbartonshire’ but in 1820 it was ‘Dumbartonshire’.) 
62
 Lanark and Dumbarton Roads Act 1820, section XXI. 
82 
 
the loans from toll income.63 Ginarlis and Pollard argue that the rationale for the 
roads was not commercial, but political: ‘the activities in Scotland were concerned 
with the continued pacification of a potential ally of the French’.64 The roads failed 
to generate sufficient toll income; thirty years later, in 1851, £49,000 was still 
outstanding.65 By 1888, the debt had been reduced to £36,421 and was written 
off, together with £120,000 of unpaid interest.66 Chapter 7 shows that this 
outcome was typical of the cases where parliamentary action directed the PWLB 
to make loans, often against the PWLB’s judgement. 
Of these four write offs, only the Gatton and Povey loans were entirely the result 
of flawed PWLB decision making. The two Bradford loans were cases of the 
PWLB making loans against its better judgement, after the intervention of the 
Home Secretary. By bowing to the Home Secretary’s wishes, the PWLB failed to 
meet its own high standards of independent decision making. In the Scottish loan 
case, Parliament legislated to bypass the PWLB’s independent decision making. 
Three of these loans would not have been made by the PWLB acting alone, and 
the losses would thus have been avoided. These three cases demonstrate the 
benefits of the PWLB as a disinterested and independent decision maker. 
However, they also demonstrate the danger of not creating the PWLB as an 
entirely independent body.  
The four turnpike trust bad debts meant that in 1851, 15 per cent of the value of all 
turnpike loans was still outstanding. Table 3.14 shows that this was a much worse 
performance than the 5 per cent of all the PWLB’s 1817-26 loans that were 
outstanding in 1851.67 For a higher risk lender, the overall 5 per cent bad debt rate 
was a commendable performance. The reason that the performance of the road 
loans was so much worse was entirely due to the losses on the Scottish loan 
made at Parliament’s instigation. Without this loss, the PWLB write offs on the 
Gatton and Bradford loans would have been just 3 per cent. By the end of 1826, 
table 3.15 shows that the PWLB had lost £7,000 on its turnpike trust loans. This 
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 Lanark and Dumbarton Roads Act 1820, section XVI. 
64
 Ginarlis & Pollard, ‘Roads and Waterways, 1750-1850’, p. 200. 
65
 BPP 1851 (512) PWLB report to Parliament, pp. 3-34. 
66
 BPP 1888 (200) 13th PWLB Annual Report. 
67
 BPP 1851 (512) PWLB Report to Parliament. 
83 
 
was a poor performance, and one that would get much worse as the unpaid 
interest on the Highland roads loan grew.  
   
  
In 1826, the PWLB had no formal accountability to Parliament, and did not 
produce annual reports or accounts. Nor did the Board report the profit or loss on 
its loans (as in table 3.15). Instead, it had informal meetings with the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, and acted on the basis that it was to avoid losses. This lack of 
accountability was common to the three long standing agencies of the Ordnance, 
the Post Office and naval dockyards. Even the recently created Commissioner of 
Table 3.14 PWLB bad debts for 1817-26
Sum lent Bad debts at 1851 Share of
£000 Number Value £000 sums lent
Bridges 195 1 39 20%
Turnpikes 435 4 64 15%
Rail 154 1 16 10%
Colleges 88 1 9 10%
Canals 651 1 13 2%
Mines 267 2 6 2%
Fisheries 34 1 1 3%
Improvements 550 2 3 1%
Harbours 278 1 1 0%
Drainage 282 0 0 0%
Gaols 212 0 0 0%
All others 86 0 0 0%
All loans 3232 14 147 5%
Source: BPP 1851 (512) PWLB Report to Parliament.
Table 3.15 Losses on PWLB turnpike trust loans by 1826
£000 £000
Costs £430,000 borrowed for 19 years, 3.68 per cent 150      
Expenses 0.4 per cent of £430,000 2           
Sums eventually written off 45        197      
Income £430,000 lent at 5 per cent for 19 years 204      
Less interest not paid on Highland Roads 15-        189      
and Gatton & Povey loans by 1828
Losses 7           
Sources: Interest on borrowed money; Homer, History of Interest Rates
Expenses, see appendix 7.A. Write-offs BPP 1888 (200) p. 136.
Note: The loss of interest not paid grew to £120,000 by the time
the loan was written off.
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Woods and Forests, did not produce annual reports to Parliament until 1830.68 
Instead, it was established on the old model of its head being a cabinet minister. 
The PWLB’s failure to account for its actions through an annual report to 
Parliament missed an opportunity to highlight the impact of ministerial and 
parliamentary interference in its decision making. Better accountability may have 
produced better decision making, and better outcomes. However, the PWLB’s 
governance was good because it had the advantages of a small organisation, a 
stable Board that took all the decisions, and a clear philosophy of lending. None of 
this was true of the giant and sprawling Ordnance, Post Office or naval dockyards; 
their governance was as weak as their accountability.69  
In part at least, the PWLB  only managed to recover some of its loans because of 
its condition that it should be repaid before all other creditors. The PWLB was 
therefore largely able to avoid the consequences of lending in a boom period, on 
the back of poor business cases. Non-PWLB lenders were not so fortunate. They 
had no effective security for their loans, since the only assets a failed trust would 
own were the tollhouses, and their right to levy tolls.70 Worse still, most mortgage 
agreements did not specify the term of the mortgage, assuming instead that 
mortgages would be repaid when authority to levy tolls ended. Nor did Acts 
specify a maximum sum that could be borrowed, or that a sinking fund should be 
established to repay lenders.71 These shortcomings left local lenders very 
exposed. In 1833, a House of Lords Select Committee had proposed that 
individual trusts should not be able to borrow more than three years’ income.72 
However, by 1834, trusts owed a collective £8.5m, or five times their collective 
income. Even so, government declined to intervene, and took no action until 1849.      
Between 1849 and 1851, the government accepted the need to intervene, and 
produced three measures in as many years to address the problem of turnpike 
trust debt. Legislation made it compulsory for trusts to repay at least 5 per cent of 
their debt each year; trusts could write off all long term unpaid interest; they could 
negotiate with lenders to repay debt at less than 100 pence in the pound; they 
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could negotiate lower interest rates.73 At the same time, it was made clear that 
most trusts would be wound down, tolls would end, and trusts would all eventually 
close. Over the following 30 years, these proposals led to 30-40,000 local lenders 
collectively losing £5.4m, or 39 per cent of what they were entitled to receive (see 
table 3.16).74 There were three elements to this loss: £1.6m of unpaid interest 
being written off; a further £1.8m of interest being forgone by lenders; and loans 
worth £2m being written off.75 The PWLB’s 1851 bad debts of 15 per cent look 
modest beside these losses.  
   
There are four conclusions to this section. First, it is clear that both the PWLB and 
non-PWLB lenders were far too willing to lend to newly created turnpike trusts in 
the 1820s, when capital spending and borrowing increased rapidly. Second, by 
1851, the PWLB had bad debts of £63,000, or 15 per cent of all their turnpike trust 
lending of £430,000. Nearly £50,000 of this bad debt was a loan that the Board 
was forced to make by Parliament. Without this single large loss, the PWLB’s 
losses would have been below the 5 per cent losses on all of the PWLB’s 1817 to 
1826 loans. The third conclusion is that the PWLB recovered its loans at the 
expense of non-PWLB lenders, who had agreed to PWLB loans having priority for 
repayment. The final conclusion is that the cost to non-PWLB lenders of their lack 
of security was very high, and saw them lose a collective £5.4m in loans and 
interest that they had expected to see repaid. 
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Table 3.16 Losses incurred by trust lenders, 1850-83
At start of decade Total
Trust Mortgage Unpaid loans not Interest Loses
numbers debt o/s interest repaid given up to lenders
£m £m £m £m £m
1850s 1,154     6.5 0.8 0.4 0.7 1.9
1860s 1,101     4.8 0.5 0.4 0.7 1.6
1870s 936        2.7 0.3 1.2 0.4 1.9
up to 1883 113        0.3
Totals 1.6 2.0 1.8 5.4
Loss 100% 31% 47% 39%
Source: Annual turnpike trust returns to Parliament, 1852 to 1884.
                See appendix 3.C for the detail behind this table.
During the decade
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3.4 The independence and achievements of the PWLB 
The economic benefits of the PWLB’s first ten years were questionable. On the 
one hand, by 1826, PWLB loans injected £3.2m into the economy, equivalent to a 
6 per cent rise in civil government spending.76 This £3.2m went entirely on capital 
investment, and provided a recognisable improvement in the country’s transport 
infrastructure. Without the PWLB, these roads, bridges and harbours would either 
not have been built, or would have taken longer to secure financing. On the other 
hand, the spending of £3.2m was small-scale compared to the £3 billion national 
income over the ten years.77 The impact on employment was equally small, and 
the £3.2m would have provided only 5-10,000 extra jobs a year.78 The economic 
benefits of PWLB lending were therefore mixed.  
Even so, the establishment of the Board did show that the government was willing 
to intervene in the economy. By 1826, the PWLB had ceased to be a temporary, 
short term lender, responding to exceptional circumstances. Instead, the PWLB 
was a permanent addition to the machinery of government, lending government 
money over 20 years to finance public infrastructure works. The Board also 
provided a good mechanism to remove the government, and Parliament, from 
having to intervene at the level of making decisions on individual projects. The 
examples of the Isle of Dogs, the Caledonian canal, and the Highlands Roads and 
Bridges Commission showed that parliamentary lending decisions could be 
politically driven and commercially inept, and could lead to large losses. In 
contrast, PWLB decisions were commercially based, disinterested and individually 
small; they therefore carried a much lower risk of failure. The PWLB concept was 
also very successful as a capital market mechanism for raising large sums of 
money relatively cheaply, using the government’s improved credit rating.79 The 
PWLB and the government were then able to manage the risk of lending the 
money to small local bodies. The link to capital markets provided a strong element 
of market discipline to the PWLB’s lending decisions. These benefits combined so 
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that the Board’s decision making was a significant improvement over a Parliament 
based alternative. 
What the PWLB commissioners saw as their ability to make independent lending 
decisions was actually a very narrow independence.80 The Scottish roads 
example shows that Parliament was capable of overriding the PWLB’s judgement 
and giving directions to the Board. More importantly, the PWLB was only 
independent within the limits set by the government, Parliament and the Treasury. 
Parliament determined the powers of the PWLB, voted on its renewal and 
provided its funding. The government appointed the PWLB commissioners, and 
the Treasury set PWLB interest rates and the periods for which it was able to lend. 
Parliament, the government or the Treasury could therefore severely limit the 
PWLB’s ability to make loans. Effectively, the PWLB was an institution that was 
controlled by Parliament; the PWLB was not therefore an independent body. 
Nor did the PWLB exercise an independent voice. In part this was because 
institutionally the PWLB was not an independent body. It was also a consequence 
of the PWLB commissioners having come from a narrow pool of City of London 
bankers, merchants and MPs.81 These groups inevitably shared much of the 
government’s political and economic outlook. With greater institutional 
independence, and if members had been drawn from a wider circle, it is likely that 
the PWLB would have challenged government and parliamentary views. Obvious 
challenges would have been to the potential benefits of lending in order to allow 
profitable mines to expand, or on the merits of placing limits on turnpike trust 
borrowing. In challenging on these issues, a more independent PWLB would have 
given greater weight to broader social or economic gains. Instead, PWLB 
commissioners took a narrow view of their role, did not exercise an independent 
voice, and invariably acted with a bank manager’s prime concern for the security 
of their loans. 
The case study of lending to turnpike trusts indicates that PWLB commissioners 
could relatively easily have adopted a broader view of their role, and done so with 
considerable benefit. The 1821 Select Committee asked all turnpike trusts to 
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provide a return of their spending, income and debt.82 Adding up these returns 
shows that, collectively, trusts were heavily loss making, had debts five times their 
annual income, and were failing to pay all of the interest due on half of their debt; 
only a quarter of trusts were repaying any of their loans. In addition, the Select 
Committee made clear that it saw a need for trusts to combine into fewer but 
larger trusts in order to improve efficiency and reduce wasteful competition. At the 
same time, the PWLB was sufficiently financially experienced to see the same 
things in the applications from trusts, and to recognise this as evidence that trusts 
were in a parlous financial position. However, the PWLB’s response was not to 
look for ways to minimise the risks to trusts and their creditors. Instead, the Board 
sought to minimise the impact on the PWLB by ensuring that it was treated as a 
preferential creditor. 
Between 1810 and 1840, eight select committees recognised the unsustainable 
nature of turnpike trust debt, and explored many options for addressing the 
problem.83 Select committees had a long history of successfully encouraging the 
regulation of traffic on turnpikes, and government had adopted their proposals in a 
‘dozen or so successive statutes relating to roads’ between 1800 and 1835.84 On 
turnpike trust financial issues, the government steadfastly declined to intervene to 
regulate. This was a regulatory role that the PWLB could have adopted by taking 
four steps to change its own lending practices. The first step would have been to 
decline to lend to trusts that were not meeting their interest obligations to existing 
lenders. The second, and similar, step would have been to decline to lend to trusts 
that were making insufficient provision to repay loans over the 21 years for which 
they had the power to levy toll charges. These two steps would have acted to 
encourage trusts to honour their existing obligations to lenders. The third step 
would have been to stop demanding that trusts treat PWLB debt preferentially.  
The fourth step would then have been to decline to lend where a trust’s debt 
would be more than (say) three times its income, as later recommended by a 
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House of Lords report.85 This would have prevented further rises in the debt of 
troubled trusts. The PWLB could also have used its strong position as the largest 
single lender to turnpike trusts to publicise its views on trust indebtedness. The 
result of these steps may well have led to non-PWLB lenders declining to lend to 
trusts with high debt and poor records of paying interest and repaying loans. The 
benefit from these four steps would have been to limit the growth in trust debts, 
and to limit the losses that non-PWLB lenders suffered after 1850, when the 
government eventually intervened. These four steps would also have meant that 
the PWLB was not treated as a preferential creditor at the expense of all other 
creditors. 
The case of trust consolidation was very similar. The view of a number of select 
committees was that there were too many trusts, and that they were too small.86 
This was held to lead to inefficiencies, high costs, and, in some cases, wasteful 
competition. Only in two cases did the government intervene. In 1826, the 
government agreed to promote an Act to consolidate most of the North London 
trusts into a single trust. The consolidation was seen as a success, and the debt 
of the Metropolis trust fell from £105,000 in 1834 to £45,000 in 1843.87 The 
second case was in 1844, when an Act was passed to consolidate the South 
Wales trusts into a single body.88 Apart from these two examples, the government 
declined to intervene in the management of trusts until 1849. Again, the PWLB 
could have acted as a regulator by making loans conditional upon the 
amalgamation of small trusts. The Board’s aim, as a lender, would have been to 
increase the income available to repay the loan. The Board could also have 
adopted a value for money role by declining to lend to demonstrably high cost 
trusts. In both cases, the PWLB’s aim would have been to reduce the risk of non-
repayment of trust loans.  
However, in the cases of trust debt and trust consolidations, the PWLB followed 
the government’s lead, and declined to intervene. PWLB commissioners almost 
certainly chose not to act because they recognised themselves as being a 
government controlled institution, without an independent voice. An equally 
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convincing reason is that the Board was committed to its philosophy of acting like 
a bank manager, concerned only with the security of the loan. Had it chosen to act 
to discourage excessive lending to trusts, or to have promoted trust 
amalgamations, this would have been to act as if the Board had a wider social 
responsibility. Such a responsibility was not explicitly given to the Board by the 
1817 Act. As was argued in chapter 2, the Board consistently took a narrow view 
of their legal powers. It therefore declined the opportunity of adopting a regulatory 
role in the cases of trust debt and trust consolidations.  
By 1826, the PWLB had produced some significant benefits. The independent 
lending decisions of commissioners were a vast improvement on the larger and 
much riskier parliamentary decisions to support individual schemes. The PWLB 
mechanism of borrowing cheaply and lending small sums at higher interest rates 
worked well, and spread risks and benefits. However, the PWLB was not as 
independent as it could have been; effectively, it was controlled by Parliament, 
and could be overruled by Parliament. The result of this lack of independence was 
that the PWLB lacked an independent voice. Commissioners were not therefore 
willing to act beyond their bank manager role, even though doing so could have 
reduced the huge risks faced by non-PWLB lenders to turnpike trusts. This was a 
missed opportunity to provide a wider social and economic benefit. 
Conclusions 
PWLB lending to turnpike trusts was typical of the Board’s core lending in its first 
20 years. Yet over ten years, the PWLB only lent £430,000 to turnpike trusts, 
financing 16 per cent of all trust capital spending. Once again, PWLB lending was 
really too small to make any significant impact on either the road network, or on 
employment levels.89 It is not difficult to argue that the PWLB had an adverse 
impact on both the road network and on private lenders to turnpike trusts. This is 
because the PWLB was lending in a boom period for trust borrowing. It therefore 
financed too many non-viable schemes, and only managed to recover its loans by 
increasing the losses of other, private, lenders to turnpike trusts.  
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The key benefit of the PWLB was that it distanced Parliament from financial 
decisions on supporting individual projects, at least in the vast majority of cases. 
Yet the PWLB was not a truly independent body. The Highlands Roads and 
Bridges case showed that the PWLB could see its lending decisions overruled by 
Parliament. In this case there was a very heavy cost, with an eventual loss of 
£156,000. This was not an isolated example, and appendix 7.B lists 16 cases of 
this sort. Compared to the 8,000 loans the PWLB made, the 16 where the PWLB’s 
independence was compromised sound trivial. Yet the losses on those 16 loans 
were £2.3m. This was the price of the PWLB’s lack of real independence, and of 
Parliament’s ability to overrule its decisions.  
This lack of real independence was also visible in the PWLB’s reluctance to act 
outside its bank manager role of only being concerned with making commercially 
sound loans. The Board therefore passed up the opportunity to exercise a wider 
role of regulator to minimise the risk of local lenders losing their money. Section 
3.4 showed that the PWLB could easily have fulfilled this role by changing its 
lending practices. The PWLB could also have chosen to encourage the 
consolidation of trusts, again by doing little more than a good lender or equity 
investor would do in order to protect their investment. These missed opportunities 
were a result of the PWLB’s lack of independence. In spite of these shortcomings, 
the PWLB had developed a successful and profitable means of making lending 
decisions, and had carved out a role for itself as a permanent financial institution 
making market rate loans to those unable to raise funds from private or 
commercial sources.  
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Chapter 4, A major change for the PWLB: building 
workhouses, 1835-44 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
Figure 4.1 Bakewell workhouse 
was built in 1839 with a PWLB loan 
of £6,500. Two years later it 
borrowed £1,400 from an 
insurance company to extend the 
workhouse. It now operates as 
Newholme Hospital.  
Figure 4.2 Ecclesall Bierlow workhouse 
was in the suburbs of Sheffield. It was 
built in 1842/3 with £8,000 borrowed 
from an insurance company and £1,800 
from the PWLB. It became Nether Edge 
hospital in 1929. In 2003 the majority of 
its buildings were converted for 
residential use. 
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The 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act brought a major change to the activity of the 
PWLB, and to the approach of government to social problems. The Act created a 
need for large scale investment in new and larger workhouses, and gave the 
PWLB power to lend to finance the building of the new workhouses. After a year, 
the PWLB for the first time started to make loans at below market rates of interest 
to build workhouses. Lending to poor law unions also saw the PWLB cease to be 
an independent decision maker. For the government, the change was just as 
radical, as the Act set out a social policy that was to be implemented nationally. 
The Act also gave the central Poor Law Commission powers to intervene in local 
affairs, effectively to compel local action.1 The 1834 Act therefore fundamentally 
changed the government’s relationship with parishes, creating a large scale shift 
of power from parishes to central government and its agent, the PLC. 
Before 1834, relief for the poor was delivered by over 15,000 parishes, and 
governments had no power to control the annual relief spending or capital 
investment of parishes. In 1803 poor relief cost £4.1m, rising to £7.9m in 1818. In 
the early 1830s poor relief was costing an average of £6.8m a year.2 These costs 
were met entirely by local ratepayers, who pressed for changes in the poor law in 
order to reduce the burden.3 This pressure led the government to appoint a Royal 
Commission that in 1834 made radical proposals for change. Edwin Chadwick 
was the workhorse of the commission, producing many of the mechanisms to 
implement the proposals and the outline of the draft Bill.4 Chadwick believed that 
reform of the poor law should aim to reduce costs by reducing the entitlement to 
relief. In essence, this meant the eventual ending of outdoor relief for able-bodied 
men, and the delivery of relief only within a new and larger workhouse. There 
would be a new workhouse in each of the 616 locally managed unions that were 
created by grouping together an average of around 25 existing parishes.5 To 
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achieve these changes, Chadwick argued that a central body – later called the 
Poor Law Commission -- was needed to inspect and supervise the local unions.  
This chapter has four main sections. The first examines how the role of the Poor 
Law Commission ended PWLB independent decision making on which 
applications to grant or reject. It also explores how central and local government 
relationships changed as a result of the 1834 Act. The second shows that unions 
were very quick to invest in new workhouses, and that the PWLB financed the 
majority of lending to unions between 1835 and 1844. The section demonstrates 
how the PWLB’s new objective as a low cost lender led it to lend four times as 
much to unions as it had lent to turnpike trusts. The third section explores the 
impact of the PLC’s role and the high volume of applications on the PWLB’s 
approach to dealing with loan applications. The increased scale of the PWLB’s 
lending also created funding problems for the government. The fourth section 
concentrates on the results of the large scale capital investment in workhouses 
and the changes to the PWLB’s role and objectives. These last two sections 
illustrate the events in these ten years by describing the actions of the Derbyshire 
poor law unions, in order to give a local perspective to the changes.6 
4.1 The innovations of the 1834 Act 
Before the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act, the PWLB’s role was as independent 
decision maker, and Parliament very rarely intervened in the PWLB-borrower 
relationship. The 1834 Act inserted the Poor Law Commission between the PWLB 
and borrowers. Under the 1834 Act, a union wishing to borrow had to get a PLC 
sanction before applying to the PWLB for a loan. The relationship between 
parishes and the government also changed in 1834. In order to describe the 
changing nature of central and local government relationships, it is necessary to 
develop two models of the relationship, based on how powers were distributed 
between the two levels of government. Before the 1834 Act, there had been very 
little central government intervention in the affairs of local parishes, and no 
coordination or regulation of their activities. This first model is described as a 
relationship of a very weak centre, and strong localities. In contrast, the 1834 Act 
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established a very strong PLC and left local unions with little discretion. This 
second model is described as a relationship of a strong centre, and weak 
localities. Table 4.1 shows the differences between the two models in terms of 
how policy was made, the financing of provision, and the balance of power. 
The aim of the 1834 Act was to reduce poor relief costs. The Act was intended to 
achieve this by introducing a nationally uniform service delivered by compulsorily 
established unions that would cover the whole country. The new social policy was 
created centrally, and policy would be revised nationally when necessary. There 
was little scope for local variation, and localities had no long term ability to opt out 
of implementing the Act. The only exception was a short term one, as the parishes 
governed by local Acts and Gilbert unions would remain outside the scope of the 
1834 Act until their incorporation could be negotiated locally. Elsewhere, the 1834 
Act led to an unprecedented level of national intervention in local affairs.          
      
Pre-1834 model, very 
weak centre and strong 
localities
Post-1834 model, 
strong centre and weak 
localities
Policy formation 
and revision
Local Acts over 200 years, 
then at parish level
Royal Commission, 
then by the PLC
Service delivery 
and standards
15,000 parishes, variety 
of standards
616 unions, but to 
uniform PLC standards
Inspection None By PLC staff
Control of 
borrowing
None
The PLC had to approve 
all borrowing, subject 
to legal cap
Capital
Provided largely by local 
individuals
Initially by the PWLB, 
then increasingly by 
insurance companies
Accounts
Practices very varied. No 
requirement to publish
Uniform system of 
accounting. Accounts 
published annually
Negligible role for 
central govt. Much 
freedom for parishes
Local unions only had 
freedom within 
centrally set framework
Table 4.1 Models of central-local relationships
Poor Relief Policy Making and Delivery
Financing
CeŶtral – loĐal goǀerŶŵeŶt ďalaŶĐe of poǁer
Source: Analysis of Poor Law Report , ed. S. G. and E. O. A. Checkland.
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Intervention in local affairs was undertaken by the newly created Poor Law 
Commission, which was independent from Parliament. The PLC was run by three 
commissioners and a secretary, all appointed by the cabinet. Chadwick was the 
Commission’s secretary, and the first three commissioners were George Nicholls, 
Thomas Franklin Lewis and J. G. Shaw Lefevre. Anthony Brundage wrote of their 
appointments that ‘aristocratic jobbery had triumphed over considerations of 
merit’.7 The poor law commissioners enjoyed a substantial measure of operational 
freedom, in many ways like the PWLB commissioners. However, unlike the 
PWLB, the PLC would issue a flurry of instructions and guidance from London to 
all local unions. The PLC would also exercise considerable powers to veto or 
approve a variety of local actions, and, again unlike the PWLB, displayed a keen 
desire to act as a regulator. The PLC also had a local presence, as assistant 
commissioners visited all parts of the country to group together the 15,000 
parishes into 616 unions. Once unions were established, the assistant 
commissioners would encourage virtually all unions to build large new 
workhouses. Thereafter, the assistant commissioners would act as inspectors of 
local unions. The 15,000 parishes lost their past freedoms of action, and the local 
unions were clearly subsidiary to the central PLC, and could only operate within 
the limits set by the PLC.    
The final major innovation of the 1834 Act concerned the financing of the initiative. 
The expectation was that between 400 and 600 new workhouses would need to 
be built. Each was seen as needing to have between 500 and 1,000 places, and 
to be built at a cost of around £10 per place, implying a total cost of up to £3m.8 
The Poor Law Report argued that new workhouses, ‘though apparently expensive, 
would ultimately be found economical’.9 This was the first time that a national 
social policy had involved capital investment on this scale. The 1834 Act therefore 
specifically gave the PWLB the power to lend to unions.10 The government would 
have had two reasons for extending the PWLB’s powers. The first was that there 
could be no certainty that other lenders would be ready to supply loans to these 
new and untested local unions. The second was that government was under 
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pressure to reduce local poor rates, and any inability to access capital finance 
would inevitably delay the achievement of savings in poor relief costs. Lending by 
the PWLB would therefore be essential to the success of the 1834 Act. The 
central approach to financing also resulted in the introduction of a uniform system 
of accounting and reporting and independent annual audits.11 The combined 
effect of all these changes was that the centre (in the form of the PLC) held most 
of the power, and unions had limited opportunities to depart from the centre’s 
wishes. This also made the PWLB an agent of the PLC. 
The existence of the PLC fundamentally changed the usual relationship between 
the PWLB and its borrowers. A local union could only apply to the PWLB, or any 
other lender, for a loan once it had a ‘sanction’ from the PLC.12 This intervention 
by the PLC ended the PWLB’s ability to make independent decisions on who to 
lend to, and how much to lend. In addition, the 1834 Act specified that no union 
would be allowed to borrow more than the product of half a year’s rate income.13 
The Act therefore ended the turnpike trust problem of unconstrained borrowing by 
local bodies. The Act also specified that all loans would be secured against future 
rate income, and that no further security should be required by any lender.14 The 
result of these provisions was that the PWLB also lost its ability to exercise 
judgement about the adequacy of a union’s security for a loan. For workhouse 
lending, the PWLB ceased to operate in the manner of a security conscious bank 
manager that it had done for the first 20 years of its life. 
The 1834 Act combined the three major changes of a uniform national policy, 
large scale capital spending and major central intervention in local affairs. These 
three changes had appeared separately, but the 1834 Act saw them together in 
the same Act. It could be argued that the 1818 ‘£1m Churches’ Act provided a 
precedent for the provision of large scale capital investment finance.15 However, 
the church initiative was a permissive one, not a compulsory one. Peel’s 1829 Act 
creating the Metropolitan Police had involved a universal and uniform social policy 
                                            
11
 Verna Care, ‘The Significance of a “Correct and Uniform System of Accounts” to the Administration 
of the Poor Law Amendment Act, 1834’. Accounting History Review, Vol. 21, no. 2, July 2011, pp.121-
142. 
12
 The Poor Law Amendment Act 1834, section 63.  
13
 1834 Act s62. 
14
 1834 Act s63. 
15
 M. H. Port, Six Hundred New Churches (London, SPCK, 1961), pp. 21-24. 
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in place of previous local discretions. However, the 1829 Act only had a regional 
impact, and did not apply to the whole country.16 A case could be made that the 
1833 Factory Act involved a large scale intervention in local affairs by central 
government, but this Act involved no major capital investment by government.17 
The last innovation changed the balance of central and local power, while the 
need for capital spending changed the PWLB’s role.  
4.2 Investment in building workhouses 
A great deal has been written about the Poor Law Commission and its work with 
local unions, often using the material in the PLC annual reports to Parliament.18 In 
1981, Karel Williams used these annual reports to quantify the investment in new 
and refurbished workhouses.19 As well as these annual reports, the PLC’s role in 
approving capital spending meant that the Commission maintained records of 
every application to spend by local unions.20 The first published use of the more 
detailed PLC ledgers of applications from poor law unions was by Felix Driver in 
1993.21 Driver covered the 1834-84 period, and was mainly concerned to show 
the purposes of the borrowing. He found that in the first 16 years, 80 per cent of 
borrowing was to provide ‘basic’ workhouses. In the second 16 years, the rate of 
investment slowed, but a higher proportion of borrowing was devoted to specialist 
provision for children, lunatics and vagrants. In the period up to 1884, specialist 
facilities such as hospitals accounted for more than 50 per cent of borrowing. 
Because Williams and Driver were concentrating on a 50 year horizon, their work 
did not emphasise the speed with which new workhouses were agreed, approved 
and built in the early years. 
Within five years of the 1834 Act, 81 per cent of the eventual 616 unions had 
already been formed, and had been given PLC approval to borrow to build a new 
                                            
16
 Douglas Hurd, Robert Peel: A Biography (London, Phoenix, 2007), pp. 103-4. 
17
 Oliver MacDonagh, Early Victorian Government 1830-1870 (London, Weidenfield and Nicholson, 
1977), pp. 42-54. 
18
 The 1834 to 1844 PLC annual reports are all in British Parliamentary Papers, as follows: 1835 
(500), 1836 (595), 1837 (546), 1837-8 (147), 1839 (239), 1840 (245), 1841 Session 1 (327), 1842 
(389), 1843 (468), 1844 (560), 1845 (660). 
19
 Karel Williams, From Pauperism to Poverty (London, Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1981), p. 218, table 
4.32. 
20
 National Archives, MH34 1-3, Poor Law Commission Papers, Ledgers of applications from unions 
to incur capital spending. 
21
 Felix Driver, Power and Pauperism: The Workhouse System 1834-84 (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), p. 78, table 5.2. 
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workhouse or adapt an existing workhouse. By the end of 1844, approvals had 
risen to 85 per cent. These PLC approvals totalled £2.8m, close to the 1834 
Report’s implied £3m spending estimate. By 1844, only 92 unions had not 
received spending approval from the PLC. This may have been because they 
were adequately served by an existing workhouse, or because their poor relief 
costs were so low that a workhouse was not needed.22 It took around a year after 
a loan had been approved for a union to build and open a workhouse. So, by the 
end of 1839, 75 per cent of unions were operating an adequate workhouse, and 
81 per cent were doing so by the end of 1844.23 Given the need to establish an 
entirely new institutional structure, and the scale of the building programme, the 
speed with which new workhouses were opened seems remarkable. It is also at 
odds with the often quoted view that there was substantial resistance to the 
provisions of the 1834 Act.24   
  
                                            
22
 National Archives, MH34 1-3 Poor Law Commission ledgers of applications for sanctions from poor 
law unions. 
23
 Kathryn Morrison, The Workhouse: A Study of Poor Law Buildings in England (Swindon, English 
Heritage, 1999), pp. 201-220. Appendix 2 lists all workhouses functioning long term after 1834, 
showing opening dates of each. 
24
 Nicholas Edsell, The Anti Poor Law Movement 1834-44 (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1971). Appendix 2 lists the 25 unions in the textile districts of Lancashire and West Riding, showing 
that only four workhouses were built by 1844. However, PLC MH34 1-3 records show that nine of the 
25 gained approval for capital spending on workhouses before 1844. 
Figure 4.3
Source: Analysis of MH34 1-3 Poor Law Commission sanctions ledger.
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Figure 4.3 shows the annual totals of the approvals given by the PLC. The trend is 
very clear: an initial rush in 1836 and then a gradual slow down, rather than a slow 
build up that gradually gathered pace. The slow start in 1835 was caused by the 
need to form unions, have elections, and then prepare workhouse designs. These 
processes normally took a minimum of a year to complete. It was, therefore, 1836 
before the rush of requests for approval went to the PLC. Submissions then 
reduced in 1837 and 1838, before roughly halving by 1839. The years 1840 to 
1844 then saw a much lower level of submissions to the PLC. This slowdown was 
because relatively few workhouses were still needed, and many of the post-1840 
applications were for the extension or improvement of workhouses, not the 
provision of new workhouses.25 Overall, the picture is one of achievement, not 
resistance.   
  
As well as recording spending approvals, the PLC ledgers also record how each 
union financed its building work, together with the names of those who made 
loans to each union. This data appears never to have been analysed or reported 
before, and figure 4.4 covers the 40 years after 1835. Over the first ten years, 
PWLB loans financed 61 per cent of workhouse building; insurance companies 16 
per cent; and individuals 8 per cent. The residual 15 per cent came from other 
                                            
25
 National Archives, MH34 1-3 ledgers. 
Figure 4.4
Source: Analysis of MH34 1-3 Poor Law Commission sanctions ledger.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1835-44 1845-54 1855-64 1865-74
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
in
su
ra
n
ce
 c
o
.s
%
a
g
e
 o
f 
fi
n
a
n
ci
n
g
Long term financing of workhouses
PWLB Insurance cos Individuals
Others Reserves no. of ins cos lending
101 
 
sources, or was small enough to be financed directly from the poor rate rather 
than from borrowing. For the first time, the PWLB had become the majority lender, 
rather than a minority lender as described in chapters 2 and 3. Figure 4.4 shows 
that the PWLB’s share of lending to unions fell consistently in later decades, 
reaching just 20 per cent in the ten years up to 1874. This was consistent with the 
PWLB’s pre-1834 role as lender only when loans were not available from private 
or commercial sources. 
  
Even though the long term downward trend in the PWLB’s share of borrowing was 
clear, the short term pattern between 1835 and 1844 was more complex (see 
table 4.2). The next paragraphs will show that over these ten years, three factors 
interacted. First was the entry of insurance companies into the market of lending 
to unions. Second was the Treasury decision in 1836 to reduce the rate of interest 
the PWLB charged on workhouse loans from 5 per cent to 4 per cent. Third, as a 
consequence of the rate reduction, the PWLB found itself running short of funds 
on six separate occasions between 1835 and 1844. These three factors interacted 
to explain the volatility in the PWLB’s share of lending between 1835 and 1844. 
In 1835, the insurance companies had yet to enter the market for loans to unions. 
The PWLB therefore provided 89 per cent of the finance, even though it was 
lending at 5 per cent. In 1836, there were two changes, first the insurance 
companies started lending, and lent £318,000 in the three years 1836-38. Their 
delay for a year would be consistent with them coming to a view that lending to 
Table 4.2 Sources of finance for workhouse building
All £000 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 Total Share 
PWLB 205 449 294 356 65 81 46 74 113 35 1,718  61%
Insurance cos 0 157 123 38 67 25 29 16 4 1 461      16%
Individuals 17 62 47 39 48 6 3 6 7 2 238      8%
Others 0 6 21 11 26 3 1 2 0 1 72        3%
Poor rate 8 55 69 43 39 39 26 23 17 8 328      12%
Total 230 730 554 488 245 154 105 122 142 46 2,816  100%
PWLB share 89% 62% 53% 73% 27% 53% 44% 61% 80% 76% 61%
Source: Analysis of MH34 1-3 Poor Law Commission sanction ledger.
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unions would be plentiful and low risk, and so profitable. The second change was 
that the PWLB interest rate was reduced from 5 per cent to 4 per cent.26  
Insurance companies reacted to this rate reduction by keeping their rates at 5 per 
cent, so PWLB loans were much more attractive. So much so, that in 1837 it ran 
out of money for the first time, and its lending fell to a low 53 per cent share for the 
year.  Between 1839 and 1842, the PWLB ran out of money on a further five 
occasions, and in 1839, 1840 and 1841, had to reduce their lending substantially, 
or even stop for a period. In the other two periods short term solutions were found 
to avoid lending being reduced. (The impact of the interest rate reduction will be 
examined further in section 4.4.) These periods when PWLB ran short of funds 
are the four years when the PWLB share of lending to unions was at its smallest.  
In the final two years, 1843 and 1844, the PWLB returned to dominate the market, 
with more than three quarters of the union lending market. In contrast, the 
insurance companies lent just £5,000 in these two years. Two factors probably 
contributed to this. First, because of the low PWLB interest rate, the PWLB had 
become the preferred lender, and unions would mainly use insurance companies 
when the PWLB had run out of funds. By 1842, there was no shortage of PWLB 
funds, and the PWLB now received £360,000 a year. At the same time, the first 
phase of workhouse building was tailing off, and the need for finance was 
markedly lower than in the earlier years. 
Why did insurance companies start lending to unions? In the ten years after 1834, 
two insurance companies accounted for three quarters of the total insurance 
company lending to unions. The larger company, the Royal Exchange Assurance, 
was experiencing rising income from its life assurance business, so it had a 
growing volume of cash for investment. The company wanted to move away from 
investing most of its cash in government stock, where the yields were falling, and 
direct the money to more profitable areas.27 Loans to unions would have been 
attractive because the ratepayer guaranteed them; they would earn 5 per cent, 
                                            
26
 The change in PWLB interest rates can be seen in BPP 1851 (512), The PWLB report to 
Parliament.  
27
 Barry Supple, Royal Exchange Assurance: A History of British Insurance 1720-1920 (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 312. 
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and most of the 616 unions would have needed loans.28 The REA was well 
positioned to spot that lending to unions represented good business. The PWLB 
chairman, Charles Bosanquet, was a substantial REA stockholder, and three 
members of his family had been REA directors. Two other PWLB commissioners 
either were, or had been, REA directors.29 The second insurance company, the 
West of England, had Thomas Dyke Acland as a director, and he had been a 
PWLB commissioner since 1817.30 These dual directorships allowed the two 
insurance companies to take early advantage of the opportunities offered by 
lending to poor law unions. 
The growing role of insurance companies tended to reduce the role of lending by 
individuals. In the 10 years to 1844, individuals financed 8 per cent of workhouse 
building. Compared to their large scale lending to turnpike trusts, 5 per cent from 
unions would have been a much lower risk. Even compared to buying government 
stock, loans to unions would have been relatively low risk. Even so, individuals 
were less likely to lend to a single union. The much safer option for the individual 
was to save with an insurance company who would spread the sum across a 
range of investments to reduce risk. There is therefore a link between the low 
level of individual lending to unions and the rise of insurance company lending. 
As well as showing who financed workhouse lending, the PLC approvals data can 
also be used to show why unions invested in workhouse building. A comparison of 
the PLC data with 1834 poor relief spending shows that counties with the highest 
per capita level of poor relief spending invested the most in new workhouses. The 
reverse is also true: counties with the lowest level of poor relief spending invested 
the least in new workhouses. Figure 4.5 shows this relationship by grouping 
counties into modern government regions. It was necessary to adjust the county 
investment levels to reflect both the existence of adequate workhouses built 
before 1834 and the presence of Gilbert unions.31 It was also necessary to ensure 
that all counties included nine years’ workhouse investment. The statistical 
correlation between 1834 poor relief spending and adjusted workhouse 
                                            
28
 Supple, Royal Exchange Assurance, p. 315. 
29
 A. G. Robarts was appointed a PWLB commissioner in 1831 and an REA director in 1834. Sir John 
Henry Pelly had been an REA director 1816-24, and was made a PWLB commissioner in 1831. Pelly 
was the father in law of Benjamin Harrison, the PWLB deputy chairman. Supple, REA, pp. 77-79. 
30
 West of England prospectus for 1830s in Aviva Assurance Archive, Norwich. 
31
 The adjustments are shown in appendix 4.A. 
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investment was very high at both regional and county levels.32 Expressed in per 
capita terms, for every 45p per head of 1834 poor relief spending, unions invested 
an average of 25p per head in workhouses. The closeness of the relationship 
demonstrates two things. First, that unions shared the view of the 1834 Poor Law 
Report that investment in workhouses would be economical in the long term. 
Based on this belief, unions made sound business-like investment decisions, 
recognising the scope for savings in their annual poor relief costs. Second, the 
patterns of investment imply that unions were motivated by the opportunity to 
reduce their annual poor relief costs. They were not simply responding to the 
pressure from the Poor Law Commission. 
       
Figure 4.5 shows that the ten regions fall into three clear groups. East and South 
East regions were the highest spenders on poor relief, with poor relief spending 
more than 50 per cent above the 45p national average per head. These two 
regions were also the biggest investors in new or improved workhouses, investing 
50 per cent more per head than the national average of 25p. Because their poor 
                                            
32
 Statistically, for the regional correlation, r=0.95, r squared = 0.90. For n=10, on a two-tailed test, r 
must be greater than 0.83 for there to be a less than 1 per cent probability that the correlation is due 
to chance alone. For the county level correlation, r=0.80, r squared=0.65. For n=42, on a two-tailed 
test, r must be greater than 0.3 for there to be a less than 1 per cent probability that the correlation is 
due to chance alone. Both region and county correlations easily pass this 1 per cent chance test. 
Even if the correlation is between unadjusted PLC approval totals and 1834 poor relief spending, then 
the coefficient is 0.88 for a regional comparison. 
Figure 4.5
l stock
Source: See appendix 4.A for sources and derivations
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relief spending was the highest, these two regions had the greatest scope to 
reduce their poor relief costs by investing in new, larger workhouses. At the other 
end of the scale, Wales, the North East, Yorkshire and the North West were the 
lowest per head spenders on poor relief. These four were also the four smallest 
investors in new or improved workhouses because they recognised that they had 
much less scope to reduce their poor relief costs. The four remaining regions were 
close to the national average in both 1834 spending and 1835-44 capital 
investment. Calculating regional poor relief spending in per capita terms confirms 
Mark Blaug’s view that the cost problems of the old poor law regime were 
confined to the agricultural areas of the East and South East regions.33 It also 
confirms the link between workhouse investment and poor relief spending. 
The very close link between poor relief spending and workhouse investment is 
inconsistent with the common view of resistance to the 1834 Act.34 Driver in 
particular concludes that ‘the geography of authorised workhouse construction 
after 1834 was distinctly uneven’.35 He goes on to refer to ‘the resistance of some 
newly formed Boards of Guardians, particularly in Lancashire, Yorkshire, Wales, 
and the South West’.36 Driver concludes that levels of investment in workhouses 
were often dependent on a union’s support for or resistance to the 1834 Act. In 
contrast, figure 4.5 shows that workhouse investment levels were determined by 
the level of poor relief spending in 1834. It is much more convincing to argue that 
unions were making business-like investment decisions, unaffected by their 
attitudes to the 1834 Act.  
The 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act therefore marked a clear change in both the 
scale of public infrastructure investment and its financing. Because the 1834 Act 
was national and compulsory, it led to a much higher level of investment than 
earlier years. Between 1835 and 1844, the PWLB provided 61 per cent of the 
finance needed to build new workhouses: a much larger role than was seen in the 
case of mines or turnpikes. The main reason for the increased role for the PWLB 
                                            
33
 Appendix 4.A contains the 1834 spend per head figures at county level. M.  Blaug, ‘The Myth of the 
Old Poor Law and the Making of the New’, Journal of Economic History, Vol 23, 1963, pp. 151-184.  
34
 M.A. Crowther, The Workhouse System 1834-1929: The History of an English Social Institution 
(London, Methuen, 1983), p. 45; David Ashforth, ‘The Urban Poor Law’, in Derek Fraser, ed., The 
New Poor Law in the Nineteenth Century (London, Macmillan, 1976), pp. 128-148.  
35
 Driver, Power and Pauperism, p. 81. 
36
 Driver, Power and Pauperism, p. 81. 
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was that after 1836, it was offering loans at below market rates of interest.  The 
greater role for PWLB ensured that poor relief savings were achieved quickly. 
Lower interest rates turned PWLB into a low cost preferred lender, rather than a 
lender at market rates. In the longer term, the PWLB’s rates rose back to 5 per 
cent and insurance company rates fell to under 5 per cent, so insurance 
companies became the largest lenders in the long term.  
4.3 Applications to the PWLB  
The 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act brought three major changes to the pattern 
of the PWLB’s work. First, it shifted the balance of PWLB lending from being 
mostly for transport related infrastructure before 1834, to being mostly to poor law 
unions in the ten years after 1834 (see figure 4.6). Second, the role of the Poor 
Law Commission in sanctioning union borrowing radically changed the way the 
PWLB dealt with union applications. The third change was that, from 1836, the 
PWLB was a low cost lender, making the PWLB the preferred lender, rather than 
the lender only when cheaper funds were not available. The result was that the 
volume of workhouse applications overwhelmed the funds available to the PWLB. 
This section explores how the PWLB coped with these changes.  
              
Effectively, the PWLB lost its power of independent decision making in the case of 
workhouse applications. Yet this does not appear to have been a planned change. 
Figure 4.6
Source: PWLB 6/1 and 2 applications ledgers.
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There is no evidence of any discussion between the government and the PWLB, 
nor between the PWLB and the 1832 Royal Commission, in any of the available 
archives.37 The first signs of discussion about how the PLC and the PWLB should 
work together appeared at the end of March 1835, when the PLC had passed the 
first applications for loans to the PWLB.38 Over the next two months there was an 
exchange of correspondence between the solicitors for both bodies. The outcome 
was that the PWLB would approve a loan recommendation from the PLC if the 
application was accompanied by six separate pieces of evidence.39 
The PWLB minute books make clear that the PWLB was processing applications, 
not making independent decisions.40 Each application was to be supported by: 1) 
A certificate from the PLC sanctioning the expenditure. 2) An assurance from the 
PLC that the local union had properly issued the notice of the meeting agreeing to 
apply for the loan. 3) The signatures of at least half the guardians agreeing to the 
loan. 4) A certificate from the clerk to the union agreeing that half the guardians 
had properly signed the application. 5) A certificate from the PLC that all the 
provisions of the 1834 Act had been met. This included an assurance that the loan 
was no more than half a year’s rate income. 6) The union’s application to the 
PWLB for a loan, setting out the amount of the loan, the union’s acceptance of the 
period and interest rate of the loan, and the repayment terms. With these six 
pieces of supporting evidence, the Board would approve a loan application without 
further scrutiny. 
The evidence from the Derbyshire Unions shows that the insurance companies’ 
processes for dealing with application from unions were just as bureaucratic as 
those of the PWLB.41 Insurance companies asked similar questions, sought 
similar assurances, and used some of the same paperwork. The insurance 
companies also charged the same interest rate, and used the same term of years 
for its loans as the PWLB did. In essence, they took their lead from the PWLB.  
                                            
37
 These include: National Archives, MH19/190, the Poor Law Commission file of correspondence 
with the PWLB; the Chadwick Papers for 1828-1835 at University College London; and the PWLB 
minutes 1828-35. Nor is there any reference in any secondary sources. 
38
 National Archives, MH19/190 correspondence between the PLC and the PWLB, 24 March 1835 to 
23 May 1835, no page numbers.  
39
 National Archives, MH19/190, PWLB letter to Chadwick, 15 May 1835, no page numbers. 
40
 National Archives, PWLB 2/13 minute book, July 1834 to June 1835, 7 May 1835, p. 274. 
41
 See footnotes 62, 63 and 64 later in thesis chapter for Derbyshire Record Office file references. 
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On 21 May 1835, the PWLB formally agreed the first loans to build workhouses in 
Clifton, Abingdon and Newhaven. The Board also agreed to an internal process 
for future PLC-approved workhouse applications. In these cases, PWLB officers 
would go ahead and ‘prepare securities and execute them without waiting for a 
Board decision’, and simply report that they had done so to a future PWLB Board 
meeting.42 PWLB commissioners did not therefore discuss individual union 
applications; instead they just rubber stamped the officers’ actions.43 Table 4.3 
makes clear the outcome of this change of practice, with 97 per cent of 
applications granted because they met the requirements, and just five rejected. 
The Board rejected these five because they felt that the agreed processes had not 
been followed, and that the PLC was recommending loans when no loan should 
be made. The very high level of acceptances, and the lack of discussion of 
individual applications, makes it clear that the PWLB commissioners had lost their 
power of independent decision making. Their role was to ensure that agreed 
processes had been followed. 
   
The PWLB’s working practices also changed because it had been used to 
granting all of the applications that met its criteria for a loan. The sheer volume of 
workhouse applications made this impossible. As demonstrated in section 4.2, 
between 1835 and 1844 the Board had to deal with six funding crises. On two 
occasions, 1839 and 1841, the PWLB was unable to make any workhouse loans 
for prolonged periods. In two other cases, 1837 and 1838, the Board had to 
reduce by two thirds or more the number of workhouse loans it was able to make. 
It did this by delaying the processing of applications. These four periods are 
highlighted by arrows in figure 4.7. In two further cases, the Board managed to 
find short term solutions to the crises, without slowing down the granting of 
                                            
42
 National Archives, PWLB 2/13 minute book, 11 June 1835, p. 337. 
43
 National Archives, PWLB 2/13 minute book, 21 May 1835, p. 311. 
Table 4.3     Workhouse applications to PWLB 1835-44
Number        Value Share
    £000
Granted 596          1,719          97%
Rejected 5               30                1%
Withdrawn 10            26                2%
All applications 611          1,774          100%
Source: Analysis of PWLB application ledgers
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workhouse loans. These six periods are shown in table 4.4, and are examined in 
the following paragraphs. 
  
The first crisis came in August 1836, when the Board wrote to the PLC to say that 
it had only £9,000 of uncommitted funds remaining.44 The PLC responded that it 
had around £200,000 worth of applications in the system, which would come to 
the PWLB shortly.45 This response shows that even after the entry of insurance 
companies into the union loan market, the PLC continued to regard the PWLB as 
the preferred lender. Benjamin Harrison, now the third PWLB chairman, went to 
see Thomas Spring Rice, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1836. The 
Chancellor was willing to put a new Bill before Parliament to provide more funds, 
but this could not happen until May 1837. In the short term, the PWLB wrote to 
four applicants who had been offered (non-workhouse) loans totalling £40,000, 
and effectively withdrew the offers.46 The PWLB also secured agreement from the 
Chancellor that £176,000 of the £250,000 the Board were committed to lend to the 
Thames Tunnel company could be diverted to workhouse loans.47 (Work on 
                                            
44
 Advances for Public Works Act 1834, 4 & 5 William 4 c72, of Sept 1834 provided the PWLB with 
£1m. National Archives, PWLB 2/13 minute book, 14 April 1836, p. 278. 
45
 National Archives, PWLB 2/15 minute book, 22 September 1836, PLC letter 2 September 1836. 
46
 National Archives, PWLB 2/15 minute book, May 1836 to April 1837, 25 August 1836. 
47
 National Archives, PWLB 2/15 minute book, 1 September 1836, p. 115. 
Figure 4.7
Source: PWLB applications PWLB6/1 and 2, applications to PLC, MLH34 1-3.
Note:    Applications to PLC are delayed by a quarter to reflect time taken
                to be submitted to PWLB. 1835.1 = quarter 1 of 1835.
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digging the tunnel had stopped after it had been inundated by water five times).48 
The £216,000 released by these two steps was sufficient to meet normal demand 
until January 1837. The second crisis occurred between February and April 1837, 
the Board then had to reduce the number of workhouse loans they made by two 
thirds, by delaying them until after the passing of the new Act in May 1837. 
   
The third crisis came in June 1838, when the PWLB minutes report that the Board 
had applications worth £70,000 that it did not have the funds to honour.49 Again 
the Board responded by reducing the number of workhouse loans it made by two 
thirds. In August 1838 another new Act was passed, providing a further £500,000, 
with half reserved for the building of workhouses in Ireland.50 This earmarking of 
funding created the fourth funding problem for the Board, when in April 1839 it told 
                                            
48
 Eventually, £250,000 was advanced to the Thames Tunnel, but no repayments were ever received, 
and in the 1860s the PWLB sold the tunnel to a railway company for £100,000, thereby writing off 
£150,000 as unrecoverable. The tunnel is still used as a rail tunnel. 
49
 National Archives, PWLB 2/17 minute book, April 1838 to June 1839, 7 June 1838, p. 28. 
50
 Advances for Public Works Act 1838, 1 and 2 Victoria c88. 
Table 4.4 PWLB and funding crises 1836-42
Date
Uncommitted 
funds remaining Nature of crisis Solution
1 April 1836
£200,000 left in 
April, down to 
£9,000 by August 
1836
Delay to large 
non-workhouse 
applications
Released 
previously 
committed 
£216,000
2
February 
1837
'None left'
Wrote to 
applicants about 
delay
New Act in May 
1837 provided 
£500,000
3 June 1838
Not specified, but 
probably none left
Delay in 
processing 70 
applications
New Act in Aug 
1838 provided 
£250,000
4 April 1839
£22,000 
uncommitted
No loans made 
for 3 months at 
end of 1839
Release £250,000 
earmarked for 
Ireland
5
Septemb
er 1839
No funds 
remaining
Four loans made 
in first quarter. 
Others delayed
New Act provided 
£400,000 extra in 
April
6 July 1841
No funds 
remaining
No loans made 
for 10 months 
until May 1842
New 5-year Act 
provided £300,000 
a year
Source: PWLB Minute books for the period, PWLB 2/13-20
       and BPP 1851 (512) PWLB report to Parliament
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the PLC that it had only £22,000 in uncommitted funds. The PWLB proposed a 
short term solution that the £250,000 which had yet to be committed in Ireland 
should be used to make English and Welsh workhouse loans.51 The fifth crisis 
occurred in September 1839, when, for the first time, the Board actually ran out of 
money; and no further workhouse loans were made until January 1840.52  
In April 1840 yet another Advances for Public Works Act provided a new tranche 
of funds, but only £400,000 of the £1.2m provided by the new Act was available 
for England and Wales.53 In July 1841, the PWLB went into its sixth crisis: the 
£400,000 had been used, and the Board was unable to make any new workhouse 
loans until May 1842.54 The new Advances for Public Works Act of 1842 ended 
the 12 month drought, and gave the PWLB the certainty of £360,000 a year for 
five years.55 As part of the settlement, £60,000 of the funds each year was 
earmarked for Ireland. By then, the completion of the first major phase of 
workhouse building had led to a reduction in loan applications. 
In earlier years, the PWLB had suffered occasional periods of shortage of funds, 
when it had to tell applicants that it was unable to process applications. Even so, 
these six years from 1837 to 1842 were by far the worst in terms of the shortage 
of funds. The solutions that the PWLB and the Chancellor agreed to deal with 
these six crises were therefore a mixture of providing more funds to the Board in 
the medium term, and a series of short term expedients to release funds that 
would have been committed elsewhere. The reality, though, was that the PWLB 
had become the preferred lender, with market-beating low interest rates. The 
alternative to providing the PWLB with more money would have been to increase 
the interest rate the Board charged poor law unions. This would have made 
insurance company loans more attractive, and would have returned the Board to 
being a market rate or even a high cost lender. This difficulty will be returned to in 
section 4.4. In practice, some applicants waited for the Board to gain access to 
more funds and grant their applications. Others applied instead to insurance 
companies or individuals, as the experience of Derbyshire unions will make clear.  
                                            
51
 National Archives, PWLB 2/17 minute book, 11 April 1839, p. 270. 
52
 BPP 1851 (512), PWLB Report to Parliament, p. 25. 
53
 Advances for Public Works Act 1840, 3 Victoria c10. 
54
 BPP 1851 (512), p. 26.  
55
 Advances for Public Works Act 1842, 5 Victoria Session 2 c9. 
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So far, this section has dealt with the national position; it is now useful to look at 
the nine unions in Derbyshire to see how individual unions behaved.56 The 
Derbyshire unions have been chosen because they are local, their records are 
readily available, and they are generally typical of the national picture. The PLC 
assistant commissioner began his visits to Derbyshire in 1836, and by December 
1837 had agreement on the formation of seven unions.57 Agreement on the 
Bakewell Union was reached in 1838, but the agreement for Ashbourne was not 
made until 1844 because of an existing Gilbert Union workhouse in Alstonfield.58 
Even so, nearly 90 per cent of the population eventually covered by the nine 
unions were served by an established union by the end of 1838.59 This was 
marginally better than the national position. Most unions agreed within six months 
of their formation to virtually double the number of workhouse places in the county 
from 900 to 1,780, at a cost of £32,000, or £18 a place.60 (See table 4.5.) 
  
Table 4.5 also shows that by the time the workhouses were built, their cost had 
escalated to just over £50,000, and a cost of £30 per place. However, the costs 
                                            
56
 See appendix 4.B for details on sources for Derbyshire unions. 
57
 BPP 1837-8 (147), PLC Annual Report. 
58
 National Archives, MH12/1772 and 1799, PLC files for Ashbourne and Bakewell unions. 
59
 BPP 1837 (546) and BPP 1837-8 (147), the PLC Annual Reports for 1837 and 1838, show there 
was also a significant Derbyshire population covered by the Mansfield, Burton, and Ecclesall Bierlow 
unions. All of these had their larger parts in neighbouring counties.  
60
 Data on pre-1834 workhouse places are from www.workhouses.org.uk from the pages on each 
union, and cross checked where possible with the MH12 files for each of the nine unions. 
Table 4.5
1834 Planned places Actual places built
poor 
relief £ places cost  £
place cost         
£
cost/ 
place £
Derby 25,484    5,470   350      5,360    300       6,460   22
Bakewell 25,879    6,392   250      6,500    200       7,900   40
Belper 33,388    6,161   250      3,700    300       9,450   32
Chesterfield 34,246    8,874   300      6,240    300       9,500   32
Chapel en le Frith 10,488    2,344   100      2,000    100       3,160   32
Hayfield 9,493      1,500   100      1,750    120       2,700   23
Shardlow 29,812    6,318   230      1,500    230       3,400   15
Ashbourne 20,658    5,567   200      5,000    160       8,000   50
Glossop 9,631      1,075   Workhouse completed in 1834
Totals 178,421  38,134 1,780  32,050  1,710    50,570 30
Source: See appendix 4.B
Note: These nine unions only account for 75% of the Derbyshire population
             The other 25% lived in union areas centred in neighbouring counties
Derbyshire Workhouse Building
1831    
pop 
ulation
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per place ranged from £22 in Derby to £50 in Ashbourne, even though the PLC 
had approved the designs for each. This wide range suggests that the PLC saw 
agreement with individual unions as more important than standardisation or value 
for money. In spite of these local variations in costs, the Derbyshire unions 
showed good business sense in their workhouse investments. Those with higher 
1834 poor relief costs invested more in workhouses because they saw larger 
potential savings, (see figure 4.8).61 Only Shardlow, with high 1834 spending and 
low investment, lay significantly outside the trend. This is because Shardlow’s 
capital costs were low because it was adapting an existing workhouse, rather than 
building a new workhouse as other unions were.  
             
Nationally, 61 per cent of the funding for capital spending on workhouses was 
borrowed from the PWLB, and in Derbyshire 60 per cent of the £50,000 spent was 
borrowed from the Board (see table 4.6). Three of the six unions that applied to 
the PWLB for loans were told that the PWLB had run out of funds.62 Two of these 
chose to wait until the PWLB was back in funds, while Chapel went to the REA 
instead. Of the other two unions, Derby borrowed £4,000 from the local bank - one 
                                            
61
 The correlation coefficient for Derbyshire was 0.84, compared with the national county level 
correlation of 0.81. 
62
 Derbyshire Record Office files for Bakewell, Chesterfield and Chapel unions, D521/W/1, D522, and 
D442/C/W2-3.  
   Figure 4.8
Source: Table 4.5 and appendix 4.B.
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of only seven bank loans in the 1835 to 1844 period. Shardlow borrowed from two 
local individuals.63 Seven of the nine unions needed a second round of borrowing 
to complete or extend their workhouses, but this time only two secured PWLB 
loans.64 Three went instead to insurance companies, and two borrowed from 
individuals. The experience of the Derbyshire Unions therefore very closely 
follows the national picture. 
         
The review of the experiences of the Derbyshire unions follows the national 
picture very closely. Even though the PLC vetted all workhouse plans, the 
Derbyshire plans show no evidence of standardisation of either size or cost per 
place. Instead, the PLC’s approach was more consistent with a desire to get 
workhouses built. The PLC also appears to have treated the PWLB as the 
preferred lender, and directed unions towards the Board. This is consistent with 
the PLC’s clear annoyance that the Board was unable to process all of the 
applications the PLC directed to it. In spite of the PWLB’s funding problem, it still 
provided 60 per cent of the capital for Derbyshire unions, and 61 per cent 
nationally. Most Derbyshire unions sought a second round of loans to extend or 
complete their workhouses, but most of the second round finance was provided 
from non-PWLB sources. Finally, the Derbyshire unions’ investment decisions 
were just as closely linked to their levels of poor relief spending as was the case 
                                            
63
 Derbyshire Record Office file D523/C/W1/1. 
64
 Derbyshire Record Office files for all unions. See appendix 4.B. 
Table 4.6 Financing of Derbyshire workhouses 1835-44
Work Source of finance
house PWLB Insur Indivi Bank Sales
cost £ ance dual etc
Derby 6,460      4,000   2,460    
Bakewell 7,900      6,500      1,400   
Belper 9,450      7,450      2,000   
Chesterfield 9,500      6,900      2,600   
Chapel 3,160      3,160   
Hayfield 2,700      700          2,000   
Shardlow 3,400      3,400   
Ashbourne 8,000      8,000      
Total 50,570    29,600    9,160   5,400   4,000   2,460    
Source: See appendix 4.B
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nationally. So, Derbyshire guardians displayed good business sense in making 
their investment decisions.  
4.4 The results of investments and role changes 
Two major outcomes of the investment in workhouses require further examination. 
The first is the outcome of the investment in building workhouses. The hope was 
that annual poor relief costs would fall once the new workhouses were available. 
The first part of this section shows that this aim was easily achieved, and that the 
underlying business case for the investment in workhouses was therefore sound. 
The second outcome was the change to the PWLB’s role. Earlier sections have 
shown that the role of the PLC had removed the PWLB’s ability to make 
independent lending decisions. The second part of this section examines why the 
PWLB’s role in making workhouse loans had changed to that of a preferred low 
cost lender.  
Poor relief spending per head of population was 31 per cent lower in 1844 than in 
1834.65 This is equivalent to a saving of £2.2m a year, and represents a very good 
return on an investment of £2.8m in workhouses. The choices of start and end 
year for the before and after comparison could be critical to this saving. Here, the 
‘before’ year was the year to March 1834, when poor relief spending was £6.3m, 
down 10 per cent from the peak of 1832. The ‘after’ year ended in March 1844, 
when poor relief costs were £5m, 5 per cent below the peak in 1843. The 
comparison is therefore a fair one, of two points just past cyclical peaks. In 
absolute terms, poor relief spending had fallen by £1.3m. However, between the 
1831 and 1841 census dates the population of England and Wales had increased 
by over 14 per cent.66 With no reform, relief costs would have been expected to 
rise by 14 per cent, or around £900,000, and this increase needs to be added to 
the absolute change of £1.3m to give the £2.2m saving. The £2.2m annual saving 
should be reduced by the £300,000 per year debt service costs, so the net annual 
                                            
65
 Nicholls, English Poor Law, Vol 2, p. 438. The 1831 county level census data appear in the PLC 
2nd Annual Report, BPP 1836 (595), and the 1841 census data at county level are taken from B. R. 
Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1971) but London and Surrey totals have been amended to reflect the difference between 
county and union boundaries. 
66
 Mitchell and Deane, British Historical Statistics, p. 6. 
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saving to ratepayers would have been £1.9m a year.67 This can only be seen as a 
very successful financial outcome. 
  
Figure 4.9 shows that the more a region invested in workhouses, the higher the 
percentage saving in annual poor relief costs.68 The South East and the East 
regions, which invested most per head, achieved the largest savings, of 43 per 
cent and 42 per cent respectively. At the other end of the scale, Yorkshire and the 
North West, which invested the smallest per capita sums in workhouses, achieved 
the smallest savings, of 9 per cent and 6 per cent respectively. Importantly, 
though, all regions made savings, while at a county level only Lancashire failed to 
show any saving in poor relief costs, experiencing a 5 per cent per head increase 
instead. A second approach to the investigation of savings is to examine how long 
it took each region to recover its investments in workhouses. Table 4.7 shows that 
at the national level it took 1.2 years to recover the £2.8m investment from the 
annual £2.2m savings. All but the North West recovered their investments in new 
workhouses in three years or less. The North West, though, took more than seven 
                                            
67
 See table 4.7 and appendix 4.1 for the savings split by region. 
68
 The correlation coefficient for workhouse investment and per capita savings is: r= 0.92, r squared 
=0.85. For N=10, r must be at least 0.83 for there to be a 1 per cent or less chance of the correlation 
being the result of chance. At county level, r=0.62 and r squared=0.39. Where n=40, r must be at 
least 0.39 for there to be a 1 per cent or less chance that the correlation is due to chance. At both 
regional and county level, both r scores just meet this confidence level. 
Figure 4.9
Source: see appendix 4.A for sources and derivations
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years to recover its investment. There are two contributory explanations for the 
long recovery period; the first is that the North West invested too much in new 
workhouses. The second explanation is that Lancashire, accounting for 70 per 
cent of the North West’s population, saw its poor relief costs rise, and this will 
have significantly reduced the level of regional savings in poor relief costs.  
     
The outcome of workhouse investments in Derbyshire was much more mixed, 
with an average payback period of eight years. Table 4.8 shows the results for 
each union, with the exception of Ashbourne, whose workhouse was not built until 
after 1844. Only Derby, Belper and Glossop achieved short payback periods of 
two to four years, and all three of these unions saw large population increases 
and large savings in poor relief costs. In contrast, Hayfield and Shardlow both 
failed to achieve a positive payback at all, with poor relief costs rising in both 
unions between 1834 and 1844. Bakewell and Chesterfield saw payback periods 
of ten years, largely because their poor relief costs only fell by 9-10 per cent. This 
mixed picture points to a conclusion that when the population was growing, then 
most workhouse investments were likely to prosper. Equally, when the local 
population was shrinking, then few investments were likely to succeed. Overall, 
the results of Derbyshire union investments are the one area where the 
Derbyshire experience was not typical of the national pattern, and the Derbyshire 
experiences were materially worse than those of most counties. 
Table 4.7    Payback periods for investments 1835-44
Investment Savings Payback
£000 £000 years
South East 695               602              1.2
East 465               462              1.0
East Midlands 314               179              1.7
South West 484               200              2.4
West Midlands 231               159              1.5
London 124               194              0.6
Wales 160               53                3.0
North East 60                 25                2.4
North West 181               24                7.6
Yorkshire 101               38                2.6
Total 2,816           2,255          1.2
Source: See appendix 4.A
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The second outcome by 1844 was a clear change to the role of the PWLB. 
Section 4.1 shows that the PWLB had lost its independent decision making role 
with the introduction of the PLC. It had moved from the security conscious bank 
manager role described in chapters 2 and 3 to becoming a simple processor of 
workhouse applications. It followed from this change that the PWLB lost the ability 
to exercise any regulatory role; in effect this transferred to the PLC. Since the 
PWLB had chosen not to develop a regulatory role, this was not a material loss. 
But the transfer of the independent decision making power to the PLC was a 
major change, making the PWLB just a loan-arranging agent of the PLC. This role 
would be repeated in chapters 5 and 6, and in many other similar cases. Once 
again, the 1834 Act marked a decisive and permanent shift of power, this time 
from the PWLB to the PLC. 
An even bigger change came with a Treasury agreement to reduce the interest 
rate for PWLB workhouse loans. In 1834 the Treasury set the terms for 
workhouse lending as 5 per cent interest and a 10 year loan period. Both were 
consistent with a preference for shorter term loans and interest rates at market 
rates. In November 1835 a union wrote to the Chancellor of the Exchequer asking 
for the interest rate on its loan to be reduced to 4 per cent.69 The PWLB was 
happy for the rate to be reduced, but was concerned that all unions should be 
                                            
69
 National Archives, PWLB 2/14 minute book, 5 November 1835, p.129. 
Table 4.8   Derbyshire workhouses, returns on investment 1835-44
Payback
cost £ £/head £/head change change years
Derby 6,460     0.21 0.12 37% 45% 2
Bakewell 7,900     0.25 0.22 21% 10% 10
Belper 9,450     0.18 0.13 38% 31% 4
Chesterfield 9,500     0.26 0.23 15% 9% 10
Chapel 3,160     0.22 0.21 8% 5% 24
Hayfield 2,700     0.16 0.23 0% -46% no payback
Shardlow 3,400     0.21 0.25 9% -16% no payback
Glossop 1,500     0.11 0.09 51% 21% 4
Total 42,570   0.21 0.18 23% 15% 8
Source: Appendix 4.B
Note: Table excludes Ashbourne, as its workhouse was 
             built after 1844 . The cost of Glossop workhouse is estimated
Work 
house
Poor relief costs        
1834            1844
1831-41 
pop 
ulation 
Saving/ 
cost
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treated in the same way, and said that the rates on all union loans should be 
reduced to 4 per cent. The Treasury declined this suggestion, and instead issued 
an instruction to reduce the rate on the single loan.70 In June 1836 the Treasury 
conceded that rates could fall for all past and future workhouse loans, but only on 
application from individual unions.71  
There was a similar pressure to extend the maximum loan period from 10 to 20 
years, and in March 1836 four unions were asking for extensions to 20 years.72 In 
November 1836 the Treasury accepted extensions to 20 years for the four unions, 
but again insisted on individual applications for extensions from all other unions.73 
Over the next 10 years, the PWLB’s minute books record over 80 per cent of 
unions with a PWLB workhouse loan asking separately for a 4 per cent interest 
rate and a 20 year loan term. All these requests were passed on to the Treasury, 
and eventually granted. However, the official rate for PWLB workhouse loans 
remained at 5 per cent; it was just understood that a later application to reduce the 
rate to 4 per cent would almost certainly be successful.74 From the limited 
evidence on insurance company lending it is clear that they kept their rates at 5 
per cent.75 The PWLB was therefore offering cheaper loans than any other 
provider. The PWLB had ceased to be a market rate lender, advancing loans 
when money was not available from other sources.  
After 1835, the PWLB became a low cost lender to poor law unions, lending at 
below market rates. The action of insurance companies in leaving their rates 
unchanged at or just below 5 per cent is explained by the data in a return of debts 
for Urban Sanitary Authorities from 1874.76 The data show that insurance 
companies were making loans to Urban Sanitary Authorities in the late 1860s, at 
around 4.75 per cent. At the same time, gilt yields were around 3.25 per cent, 
implying that the companies wanted a margin of 1.5 per cent over gilt yields. If the 
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 National Archives, PWLB 2/14 minute book, 12 May 1836, p. 316. 
71
 National Archives, PWLB 2/15 minute book, 23 June 1836, p. 32. 
72
 National Archives, PWLB 2/14 minute book, 10 March 1836, p. 231. 
73
 National Archives, PWLB 2/15 minute book, 10 November 1836, p. 176. 
74
 PWLB minute books record the advances being made at 5 per cent, and BPP 1851 (512) shows 
the interest rate being reduced to 4 per cent, p. 18. 
75
 The MH34 series of PLC registers of union requests for capital spending approvals record the 
interest rates of just five insurance company loans to unions in the period 1835 to 1844. All were 
made at 5 per cent. The PLC files for Derbyshire unions confirm that non–PWLB loan rates remained 
unchanged. Only after 1851 were a minority of non-PWLB loans made at rates below 5 per cent. 
76
 BPP 1874 (396), Return of Debts for Urban Sanitary Authorities. See also table 5.7 in chapter 5. 
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1.5 per cent margin also applied in 1836, when gilt yields were 3.4 per cent, then 
companies would be unlikely to lend at less than 4.9 per cent.77 This would 
explain their decision not to reduce their rates to compete with the PWLB. As 
section 4.2 demonstrated, the reduction in PWLB rates accounts for the extra 
demand for PWLB loans, and led to the funding crises as the PWLB was 
swamped with loans. If this cause and effect is right, the next question is: why did 
the Treasury grant the applications for rate reductions? 
The Treasury response to the requests for lower interest rates was at best 
confused. This view applies equally to the PWLB, which agreed to the reduction, if 
not to the way it was implemented. The answer to why both the Treasury and the 
PWLB departed from the well-established principle of the PWLB as a lender at 5 
per cent is that they were subject to pressure from borrowers for lower interest 
rates. Two things lay behind this demand. The first was that lower interest rates 
would result in lower poor rates. As was the case later with school loans, local 
ratepayers were being expected to pay for a nationally imposed policy. In the 
1870s, the pressure for lower local costs led to local MPs supporting a call for 
lower PWLB loan rates, and this was likely to have been the case in 1836 as 
well.78 The second reason was that unions and MPs could see that the 
government’s borrowing costs had fallen to around 3.4 per cent.79 Unions and 
MPs will have realised that by charging 5 per cent, the government was making a 
significant profit on the loans at the expense of local ratepayers.  
This profit would have struck the local unions and MPs as unfair, and increased 
the pressure for a rate reduction. In effect, any attempt to maintain the rate at 5 
per cent was a battle the Treasury was bound to lose. The Treasury therefore 
bowed to the inevitable, and gracelessly conceded to a 4 per cent interest rate. 
Philip Harling explains the context to this decision by arguing that the Whigs had a 
‘general indifference to fiscal matters’, ‘lack(ed) a commanding majority in the 
House of Commons’, and were more interested in reducing taxes than reducing 
                                            
77
 Sidney Homer, A History of Interest Rates (New Brunswick NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1963), p. 
195. 
78
 See chapter 6, when MPs demanded a low interest rate for PWLB lending to school boards out of 
concern that the local cost of a national policy would have been too high. 
79
 Homer, History of Interest Rates, p. 63. 
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the national debt.80 It is also possible that the Treasury wanted the PWLB to 
continue as the major workhouse loan provider, because at 4 per cent the 
government made a profit of £125,000 on workhouse loans in the ten years from 
1835 to 1844 (see table 4.9). Keeping the rate at 5 per cent and starving the 
PWLB of funding would have reduced the profit substantially. 
   
A further Treasury confusion was that it failed to understand the impact on 
demand of reducing the interest rate to 4 per cent. The unintended consequence 
was the increase in demand for PWLB loans, and the reduction in demand for 
insurance company loans. Had the Treasury (and the PWLB) wished to abide by 
the principle of the PWLB as a lender only when the market would not lend, then 
the PWLB interest rate should have been raised to above the 5 per cent market 
rate. This would have reduced the demand for PWLB loans, and encouraged 
insurance companies and individuals to lend more to unions. It would also have 
avoided the need for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to increase PWLB funding 
to £360,000 a year in 1842. However, this approach would have been unlikely to 
                                            
80
 Philip Harling, The Waning of ‘Old Corruption’, The Politics of Economical Reform in Britain 1779-
1846 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 216-222. 
Table 4.9 Profits on workhouse loans 1835-44
£000 £000
Income
Interest from borrowers
650
Costs
Cost of government borrowing
519
PWLB's office costs
7 525
Loans not recovered 0
Profit 125
Sources: Loans, PWLB 6/1 and 2. Interest rate charged to
                  borrowers based on 80% of loans being reduced to 
                  4%; see BPP 1851 (512) for list of loans and rates.
                  Interest rate paid by government from Homer, 
                  Interest Rates,  1961. PWLB office expenses, see
                  appendix 7.A. No bad debts are listed in BPP 1851 
                  (512) or in later reports for the 1835-44 period.
0.4% of sums lent
£1.72m @ 4.2% over 18 years
£1.72m @ 3.35% over 18 years
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gain approval in the House of Commons, and this is probably the reason it was 
not followed. 
In practice, the PWLB had become the PLC’s preferred provider of low cost loans 
to deliver the government’s poor law policy. For the government this had three 
advantages. First, it led to a rapid delivery of the national policy; second, it did so 
at a lower cost to the local ratepayer. The third advantage was that, with the 
PWLB as the major lender, Treasury control over local unions was maximised. It 
is understandable that these advantages were attractive to the government. 
However, in 1857 loans to unions ceased to be reduced automatically to 4 per 
cent, and were simply recorded as being made at 5 per cent, and remained at that 
level.81 There is no discussion in the PWLB minutes of the reasons for the 
change. It seems highly likely that the new PWLB chairman, John Gellibrand 
Hubbard, a former Bank of England governor, simply wished to re-establish the 
PWLB as a lender at 5 per cent, only lending when others would not. The PWLB 
then either used the Board’s powers to decide that interest rates for workhouse 
loans should cease to be lower than market rates, or persuaded the Treasury to 
make the change. This change would be consistent with the view Hubbard 
expressed in 1859 in a discussion with the Treasury.82  
The outcome of the 1834 Act is therefore important in two ways. First, the PWLB 
lost its role as an independent lender. Instead, it became simply an agent of the 
government, lending as much money as was needed, at below market rates, to 
deliver a social policy as quickly as possible. This was a major new objective for 
the PWLB; over time, more and more of PWLB’s lending was at below market 
rates in order to deliver government policies. This low cost lending objective is still 
in place in 2014, as is the PWLB’s role as agent of central government. Second, 
an entirely new relationship was established between central government and 
local bodies. The PLC in the centre was strong, and wanted to deliver a uniform 
social policy in all parts of the country. In contrast, the local parishes and unions 
had little discretion, and were therefore weak. This relationship between a strong 
centre and weak localities has also lasted until the modern day. The PWLB played 
a part as a component of the strong centre, providing low cost finance to local 
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bodies. The 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act therefore established an enduring 
long term model of a highly centralised state with a government agency providing 
low cost capital finance. 
By 1844 the accountability regime of the PWLB had changed, and two reports had 
been made to Parliament. The first, in 1831, did no more than list the names of 
commissioners, the office expenses for running the Board, and a single total for 
the value of loans made and outstanding. As a means of judging the performance 
of the PWLB, it was without merit. The second report in 1843 was a marked 
improvement. It listed every loan made by the board and the outstanding balances 
for each. It was therefore possible to judge the wisdom of the Board’s lending. The 
final page of the report claimed to show the ‘profit’ made on all loans, but it failed 
to make any provision for bad debts, and the ‘profit ‘was therefore illusory. There 
was no narrative commentary by the Board on its actions. However it was a start, 
and the same format was used in 1851. Even the Post Office and the 
Commissioners for Woods and Forests, were by 1844 reporting annually to 
Parliament on their activities for the preceding year. However, the Crown Agents, 
established in 1833 did not start providing accounts for Parliament until 1856, and 
did not produce an annual report until 1909.83 The Poor Law Commission and the 
Committee of the Council on Education were required from their inception to 
produce reports to Parliament each year. Both included a narrative commentary 
on the previous year, and full details of financial support and borrowing approvals 
given. This set a standard for accountability that all bodies would eventually 
follow. 
As chapter 3 demonstrated, the PWLB enjoyed good governance in 1826, and it 
remained good in the period 1835 to 1844. All PWLB staff were in a single 
location, most were long-serving, giving a stability to its operations. The Board still 
dominated decision making, and still had a clear view of their role. For many of the 
same reasons, the newer Committee of Council on Education also enjoyed good 
governance. It was also small, centrally located and well led. The governance of 
the Poor Law Commission was more mixed: the differences of view between 
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 David Sunderland, Managing the British Empire: The Crown Agents 1833-1914 (Woodbridge, 
Boydell Press, 2004) p.22, and BPP 1909 (5391) Accounts of the Crown Agents office funds for the 
year. 
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Chadwick and the three commissioners often resulted in confused messages to 
the assistant commissioners around the country.84 Debates with ministers also led 
to some changes of approach. It is possible to claim that the governance of the 
three old agencies: the Ordnance, the Post Office and the naval dockyards, had 
improved as new organisational structures were developed. However, their size 
meant that their governance problems were of a different order of magnitude to 
those of the smaller PWLB, PLC or Committee of Council.  
Conclusions 
There are four main conclusions to this chapter. The first is that the 1834 Act 
reflected a major shift in the approach of governments to social policy. Second, 
and largely because of the different approach, the balance of power between 
governments and local bodies shifted substantially towards the centre. Third, the 
shift of power to the centre resulted in a very successful outcome, both for the 
government, and for local unions. Fourth, the 1834 Act fundamentally altered the 
PWLB’s role and objective.  
Before 1834 most public infrastructure had been provided by local bodies 
established by local Acts of Parliament. These Acts generally gave the local body 
a right to borrow money, which would be repaid from charges to users. As a 
result, the government had little power once the local Act was passed, while the 
local bodies had very substantial areas of discretion. The 1834 Act broke this 
mould, and imposed a uniform service standard throughout the country. The 
creation of the Poor Law Commission provided a very strong and powerful central 
body. In contrast, the compulsorily created local unions had little discretion about 
how they administered the Act. This was a strong centre and weak locality model 
of service provision, and one that still exists in 2014. It is undeniable that this shift 
of power to the centre produced results. Within five years, approval had been 
given for the building or improvement of workhouses in more than 80 per cent of 
unions. However, the real impact of the Act was that by 1844, poor relief costs 
had fallen by £2.2m a year, or 31 per cent.  
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The 1834 Act’s shift of power also changed the PWLB’s role. It ceased to act as a 
commercially minded lender at market rates, providing loans when others would 
not, and lost its role as an independent decision maker. Instead it lent at below 
market rates, and acted as an agent of the PLC. In the ten years covered by this 
case study, the PWLB lent £1.8m, and provided 61 per cent of the finance to build 
workhouses in these years. The PWLB loans therefore had a very significant 
impact, at least on ratepayers who saw an average 31 per reduction in poor law 
rates. The impact on employment was modest, providing 3,400 jobs a year, 
because this was still only 1 per cent of the numbers demobilised from the armed 
services after 1815. The impact of workhouse building on the wider population of 
the destitute is a topic beyond the scope of this thesis. Even so, the PWLB had 
become very important in financing public infrastructure, and thereby delivering 
government social and welfare policies. Chapter 5 and 6 will show that this was 
the long term future for the PWLB. 
This new approach to financing public infrastructure gave the government four 
material advantages over the pre-1834 approach. The first was that delivery of the 
new public infrastructure was quicker and more certain. Second, interest rates 
were lower, and this reduced local resistance to the imposition of the national 
policy. Third, the government retained more control because it was the provider of 
the finance, and because of the strong central body – the PLC in this case. A final 
advantage was that the new approach to financing public infrastructure carried a 
negligible risk of bad debts. This was because loan repayments would be financed 
from local rates, not from charges to users, and limits to local borrowing were set 
in the legislation. The disadvantages were that the new approach involved much 
greater central control, and much less local discretion. These disadvantages 
loomed large when the 1848 Public Health Act was debated in Parliament. 
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Chapter 5, Failure and then success: water supply and sewers,     
1848-76 
 
 
        
 
 
Figures 5.1 & 5.2. In 1875 
Bakewell Local Board 
borrowed £10,000 from the 
PWLB to provide a piped 
water supply to the town. 
Soft water from a spring fed 
the reservoir above, was 
piped two miles and 300 
feet down to the town, and 
then piped into all houses. 
So pleased were the 
population with the water 
supply that they erected a 
water fountain (right) to 
commemorate the event. 
Raw sewage continued to  
pour into the river running 
through the town, and it was 
1937 before piped sewage 
removal and a filtration plant 
were provided. 
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This case study examines the role of the PWLB in one of the most important 
initiatives in social policy during the nineteenth century. In doing so, the chapter 
provides a very good illustration of the difference between success and failure in 
policy implementation. The chapter also highlights the factors that separate an 
important role for the PWLB from an insignificant role. Between 1848 and 1863, 
many public health Acts had almost no success in raising the level of water supply 
and sewer infrastructure investment. And between 1848 and 1872, the role of 
PWLB lending was insignificant. Yet between 1863 and 1872, the level of water 
and sewer investment more than doubled, and between 1873 and 1876,  the 
PWLB were financing a third of all investment in water and sewer facilities. The 
main purpose of this chapter is to explain the factors that separated initial failure 
from subsequest success. 
There were a number of compelling reasons for public health reform. Cholera 
epidemics, typhoid, typhus, TB and many other diseases killed large numbers in 
the poorer parts of cities.1 In the 1840s only 10-20 per cent of city households had 
piped water, and in those that did it was not a constant or fresh supply.2 Even in 
the smarter parts of cities, overflowing cesspools were common.3  In The Sanitary 
Conditions of the Labouring Population of Great Britain, Edwin Chadwick showed 
that in 1839/40 the average age at death of a labourer in Liverpool was just 15 
years.4 In contrast, a gentleman living in Rutland would live to an average age of 
52 years. The 1848 Public Health Act made three sets of proposals to improve life 
expectancy in cities. The first two were the removal of ‘nuisances’ and 
improvements in medical care; neither of these involved large scale capital 
investment, and so will not be considered here. The third was major investments 
in water and sewer infrastructure. Chadwick saw the need for the provision of 
constant, clean, high-pressure water supplies to all houses. He also argued that at 
the same time, houses should be connected to sewers flushed with water, to 
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 Rob Baggott, Public Health Policy & Politics (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 29.  
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 Wohl, Endangered Lives, p. 62. 
3
 Anthony S. Wohl, Endangered Lives: Public Health in Victorian Britain (London, Methuen, 1983), p. 
90. 
4
 Edwin Chadwick, The Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Population of Great Britain, with an 
introduction by M. W. Flinn (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press,1965), pp. 223-7. 
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remove human waste products.5 In a recent review of spending and mortality, Bell 
and Millward argue that water supply and sewer improvements almost certainly 
made the greatest long term contribution towards increasing life expectancy.6 
The chapter comprises four sections, with the first section concentrating on the 
scale of the change in water and sewer investment over the 29 years, and the 
change in the share of the investment funded by PWLB loans. The second section 
covers the years 1848 to 1862, when investment scarcely rose above the pre-
1848 level. It shows that the reason for the lack of progress was that the 
government had returned to a pre-1834 central and local government relationship, 
with a weak centre and strong localities. In this period, PWLB lending for water 
and sewer facilities was almost negligible because the PWLB was offering to lend 
at 5 per cent, not at below market rates as it had for workhouses. The third section 
examines the changes made after 1863, as the government gradually reverted to 
the 1834 strong centre and weak localities model, and the PWLB reverted to 
being a low cost lender. Section 4 then examines the two stage impact of these 
changes as the level of investment doubled in the mid-1860s. The second stage 
of the transformation came after 1872, as the PWLB’s interest rate was reduced 
and its share of financing sanitary investment rose sharply.  
5.1 Water and sewer investment and PWLB lending 
The first task is to determine the scale of all water and sewer infrastructure 
investment between 1848 and 1876. There were three routes to gaining approval 
for capital spending. The first was by being granted permission to borrow from the 
General Board of Health and its successors. The General Board of Health issued 
borrowing sanctions to local health boards in the same way as the Poor Law 
Commission issued borrowing approvals to poor law unions. The second route 
was to gain parliamentary approval for borrowing by promoting a local Act. Water 
companies and municipal corporations had being using this approach before 
1848, and continued to use it after 1848. Finally, two public Acts gave approval for 
capital spending: one in London, and a second in Lancashire, Cheshire and 
Derbyshire.  
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 Chadwick, Sanitary Conditions, pp. 35, 43 and 423-4. 
6
 Francis Bell and Robert Millward, ‘Public Health Expenditures and Mortality in England & Wales 
1870-1914’, Continuity and Change, Vol 13 issue 2, 1998, pp. 221-250. 
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Table 5.1 shows that the water and sewer investments approved by each route 
totalled £63m between 1848 and 1876. This total is broadly consistent with C. H. 
Feinstein’s estimate of £47m for water investment alone during the same period.7 
The General Board of Health only gave approvals for £12m of the £63m of 
investments. This implies a less significant role for the GBH than many authors 
have given it.8 Part of the reason for overplaying the importance of the GBH is that 
the sanction totals quoted in annual reports covered all public health investment.9 
They therefore included approvals for street improvements, public baths and 
many other minor public health functions. To provide a total for water and sewer 
sanctions for the whole 29 year period it is necessary to use the more detailed 
HLG 16 ledgers.10 Analysis of these ledgers provides the £12m total in table 5.1, 
and demonstrates that water and sewer sanctions only accounted for 69 per cent 
of all the borrowing approvals issued under public health Act powers.11 The 
reason why the total for GBH water and sewer approvals was so modest will be 
addressed in section 5.2. 
   
                                            
7
 C. H. Feinstein and Sidney Pollard, Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom 1750-1920 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press,1988), pp. 305, 429 and 437. It was necessary to convert figures from 1900 
prices to current prices, and exclude Scotland and Ireland. 
8
 Wohl, Endangered Lives, pp. 162-3 is a good example of over-emphasis on public health Act 
sanctions. 
9
 BPP 1857 (328) Local Boards of Health Return. Annual reports under Local Government Act 1858: 
BPP 1859 S2 (2585), BPP 1860 (2746), BPP 1861 (545), BPP 1862 (505), BPP 1863 (553), BPP 
1864 (554), BPP 1865 (479), BPP 1866 (532), BPP 1867 (576), BPP 1867-68 (437), BPP 1871 (287), 
BPP 1871 (463). Local Government Board annual reports: BPP 1872 (516), BPP 1873 (748), BPP 
1874 (1071), BPP 1875 (1328), BPP 1876 (1585). 
10
 National Archives, HLG16 General Board of Health ledgers of sanctions granted.  
11
 BPP 1876 (1585) LGB annual report, p. xlviii shows a sanctions total of £15.6m to the end of 1875. 
Table 5.1 1848-76 water and sewer investment
£m Share
General Board of Health sanctions 11.9 19%
Local Acts, Water companies 25.5 41%
Local government 14.3 23%
Metropolitan Board of Works 10.4 16%
Public Works (Manuf Dist) Act 0.7 1%
Totals 62.9 100%
Sources: Sanctions: HLG16 GBH ledgers; Local Acts:
                  BL Local & Personal Acts volumes; MBW annual
                  reports; Public Works: Report 1868 (6).
Note:      General Board of Health sanctions include 
                  those given by the GBH's successor bodies.
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Nearly two thirds of all water and sewer investment were made under powers 
granted by local Acts. Of the £40m authorised by local Acts, over £25m was 
promoted by private water companies.12 The remaining £14m was authorised by 
local Acts promoted by municipal corporations. The source of both figures comes 
from a search of over 100 volumes of Local and Personal Acts for the period 1845 
to 1876. Each Act had several clauses authorising a maximum level of fund 
raising by share issues and/or borrowing. Earlier writers on the development of 
water supply appear not to have quantified the amounts raised under local Act 
powers.13 Instead, they have used the number of water companies in existence 
and the number of corporation-owned water works as a rough proxy for the 
balance of investment between the private and public sectors. This new research 
therefore produces a more detailed estimate of the total invested by private and 
public sectors. 
The third main source of spending approvals was two regional rather than national 
Acts. The first was the 1858 Act, which authorised the Metropolitan Board of 
Works to borrow to build J. W. Bazelgette’s extensive London intercepting sewer 
network with its sewage outfalls well to the east of the city.14 By 1876 the work 
was virtually complete, and had cost just over £10m. The second Act was the 
1863 Public Works (Manufacturing Districts) Act. Passed at the time of the 
American Civil War, it allowed local bodies in Lancashire, Derbyshire and 
Cheshire to borrow to create employment. Of the sums borrowed under the 1863 
Act, over £700,000 was spent on water supplies and sewer infrastructure.15 
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 Local and Personal Acts volumes for 1848 to 1876. Published by Eyre & Spottiswoode, each for the 
preceding year. British Library St Pancras reading room. 
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 John Hassan, A History of Water in Modern England (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1998), pp. 10-50, and Robert Millward Private and Public Enterprise in Europe: Energy, 
Telecommunications and Transport 1830-1990 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 
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 Annual reports from the Metropolitan Board of Works give annual totals for investment, and are in 
British Parliamentary Papers as BPP 1857-8 (515), BPP 1859 S2 (178), BPP 1860 (556), BPP 1861 
(377), BPP 1862 (11), BPP 1863 (19), BPP 1864 (13) and BPP 1865 (33). 
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 BPP1868 (6) Public Works (Manufacturing Districts) Acts 1863 and 1864. 
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The same sources that were used to build up the total investment in water and 
sewers can also be used to provide two further analyses. Table 5.2 shows that 69 
per cent of the investment in these 29 years was on water supply, and just 31 per 
cent was on sewer infrastructure. Water supply was therefore the priority, because 
it was technically easier to achieve, brought more immediate benefits and was 
easier to charge for.16 Table 5.2 also shows that before 1876, water investment 
was primarily a private sector led activity. It is also clear from table 5.2 that there 
was no private sector investment in sewer infrastructure; sewers were entirely a 
public sector task. However, because half the sewer investment was in London, in 
the rest of the country sewer investment lagged far behind water investment. This 
was no doubt because water was a more obvious need, and sewer investment 
was much more challenging.  
The above analyses are based on the entire 1848 to 1876 period; but breaking 
down the 1848 to 1876 period into three shorter periods is very revealing. In the 
three years before the 1848 Act, investment in water supply had averaged £1.2m 
a year, entirely authorised by local Acts.17 In the 15 years after 1848 the average 
investment in water and sewer facilities had barely increased, and averaged just 
£1.3m a year (see figure 5.3). The obvious conclusion is that for 15 years the 
1848 Act made virtually no impact on the level of water and sewer investment. It 
was only after 1863 that the level of investment in water and sewer infrastructure 
increased substantially, when it more than doubled to £3.1m a year. After 1873, 
investment grew slightly to an average of £3.2m a year. 
 
                                            
16
 Martin V. Melosi, The Sanitary City: Environmental Services in Urban America from Colonial Times 
to the Present (Pittsburg, University of Pittsburg Press, 2008). 
17
 British Library, Local and Personal Acts 1845, 1846 and 1847. 
Table 5.2 Source of water supply and sewer provision 1848-76
Total
£m Share £m Share £m
Water 17.5 41% 25.5 59% 43.1
Sewers 19.8 100% 0.0 0% 19.8
Total 37.3 59% 25.5 41% 62.9
Water % 47% 100% 69%
Sources: As table 5.1.
Private sectorPublic sector
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Figure 5.3 shows that there were several components to the post-1863 rise in 
investment levels. First, between 1848 and 1863, just over half of the investment 
in water and sewer facilities was undertaken by the private sector. Between 1873 
and 1876, two thirds was undertaken by the public sector. This confirms the shift 
in the balance of ownership of water supply assets from private to public that 
Hassan and Millward separately identified. Accordingly, figure 5.3 shows that 85 
per cent of the growth in water and sewer investment over these 29 years came 
from the public sector. Water company investments had reached their peak 
between 1863 and 1872, and would fall in later years. Second, investment in 
water and sewer facilities by local boards of health rose five-fold between the pre-
1863 period, and the post-1872 period. Yet only half of the LBH investment growth 
was authorised by General Board of Health sanctions, and half continued to be 
authorised by local Acts of Parliament. The growth of GBH sanctions under the 
public health Acts only accounted for 40 per cent of the growth in water and sewer 
investment between the pre-1863 and the post-1872 periods. The reasons for 
Figure 5.3
Sources: As table 5.1.
Notes:    1) Sanctions are the General Board of Health borrowing approvals
                       and those of its successor bodies
                  2) 1863 Act is Public Works (Manufacturing Districts) Act.
                  3) Local Govt Acts are the Local Acts promoted by councils & local
                       boards.
                  4) MBW is Metropolitan Board of Works.
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these changes in investment levels between the pre- and post-1863 periods lie at 
the heart of the remaining sections of this chapter.  
How was the £63m capital investment shown in table 5.1 financed, and how 
significant was PWLB lending? PWLB ledgers detail loans of £8.1m for water and 
sewer purposes up to the end of 1876.18 However, this includes £800,000 lent to 
Scottish health boards. It also includes £1.5m of applications made in 1875 and 
1876, where the loans themselves were made five or more years later. £2.3m 
therefore needs to be excluded, since it made no impact on English and Welsh 
public health in the period 1848 to 1876. Net PWLB lending up to 1876 for 
England and Wales was therefore £5.8m, or 9 per cent of the total water and 
sewer infrastructure investment. The PWLB share of financing was therefore 
smaller than was the case for both turnpike trusts and workhouses.  
  
The picture of PWLB lending becomes more complex, yet much more revealing, 
when the 29 year period is split into the three shorter periods (see figure 5.4). As 
with the total infrastructure investment, the pattern in the early part of the 29 years 
was very different to that in the latter part. Figure 5.4 shows that in the period 
1848 to 1862 the PWLB provided just 2 per cent of the financing for water and 
sewer investments. The PWLB’s lending in the middle period, 1863 to 1872, was 
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 National Archives, PWLB 6/1 and 1a, 2-6, PWLB application ledgers. 
  Figure 5.4
Source: As graph 5.3 and analysis of PWLB 6/1-6 application ledgers.
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still less than 4 per cent of the annual total. For the first 25 years after the passing 
of the 1848 Public Health Act, PWLB lending was insignificant. This changed 
materially in 1873, when the PWLB financed a third of the £3.2m a year water and 
sewer investments. If water company investments are excluded, the PWLB was 
financing nearly half of all public sector water and sewer investment. (The logic for 
excluding water company investments was that the PWLB could only lend to 
public sector bodies). 
Table 5.1 shows that 41 per cent of the total water and sewer investment was 
made by private water companies. An analysis of the financing clauses of local 
Acts for water companies indicates that £20m of this finance came through share 
issues, and £5.5m came from borrowing. Together, PWLB lending and water 
company finance accounted for 50 per cent of the financing for water and sewer 
infrastructure. The remaining half came from a mixture of insurance companies, 
individuals and banks. An 1874 a Local Government Board report lists all the 
loans that had been raised since 1848 by urban sanitary authorities (these were 
the 1872 successors to local boards of health). It shows that these authorities 
raised 49 per cent of their non-PWLB borrowing from corporate bodies, and 51 
per cent from individuals.19 Although there were seven loans from banks in the 
corporate body total, these loans totalled just £9,000, so are insignificant. All the 
other corporate body loans were from insurance companies. The same return 
shows that the Metropolitan Board of Works relied on individuals to provide 50 per 
cent of its capital finance needs. The MBW relied on the Bank of England for 49 
per cent of its funding, with just 1 per cent coming from insurance companies.20 
Manchester Corporation also borrowed £0.4m from the Bank of England in 1848 
to finance its waterworks.21 There are several records of other authorities taking 
small loans from local banks, but these totalled no more than £60,000.22 
Manchester Corporation followed the lead of the Metropolitan Board of Works, 
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 BPP 1874 (396). Loans on Dues (Vestries etc). An earlier report, BPP 1873 (381), covers the debts 
of municipal boroughs, but provides no detail of individual loans. 
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 MBW annual reports. 
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 National Archives, PWLB 2/22 minute book, October 1846 to September 1848, 8 June 1848, p. 
269, and J. H. Clapham, Bank of England: A History, Vol 2 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1944), p. 218. 
22
 B. J. Barber, Leeds Corporation 1835-1905: A History of its Environmental, Social and 
Administrative Services (Leeds, Leeds Archaeological Society/University of Leeds, 1975), p. 389, 
table 8.5b. 
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and issued £3m of consolidated stock in 1876. The vast majority of the 
Manchester stock was taken by individuals, with just £100,000 being taken by a 
single bank.23  
    
This information can be consolidated to produce table 5.3. As seen earlier, the 
PWLB provided only 9 per cent of the finance for the water and sewer 
infrastructure. In contrast, water company shareholders and lenders financed 41 
per cent of the total. Of the balance, individuals provided 24 per cent and 
insurance companies 17 per cent; 9 per cent came from banks. The 9 per cent 
provided by banks was a much larger share of financing than banks took in other 
case study areas. However, the vast majority of this was loans from the Bank of 
England to the Metropolitan Board of Works, and so it might be considered a 
special case. Over the 29-year period as a whole, PWLB lending was lower than 
for workhouses or turnpike trusts. Nevertheless, dividing the period into pre- and 
post-1872 sub-periods, the PWLB provided 4 per cent of the finance before 1872, 
and 31 per cent after 1872. Excluding water company borrowing, the PWLB 
became the provider of nearly half the finance for public sector water and sewer 
investment. The next sections show why the level of investment increased after 
1863, and why the PWLB share of financing increased after 1872. 
5.2 A very slow start: 1848-62 
This section addresses two interrelated questions: first, why was total investment 
in water and sewer facilities so low in the period 1848 to 1862? Second, why did 
                                            
23
 Manchester Record Office, M610/4/1 and M610/4/15 Council mortgage registers, and M610/12/1 
consolidated stock register.  
Table 5.3 Financing of water and sewer
investment 1848-76
£m Share
PWLB 5.8 9%
Insurance companies 10.6 17%
Individuals 15.4 24%
Banks 5.6 9%
Water company investors 25.5 41%
Total 62.9 100%
Sources: As table 5.2, with BPP 1874 (396) giving split
                  between insurance companies, individuals 
                  and banks.
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the PWLB make so few loans for water and sewer purposes in the 15 years after 
the 1848 Act? The nature of the 1848 Public Health Act was at least in part 
responsible for the very low level of investment at the time. Chadwick was a 
believer in centralisation: ‘the advantages of uniformity in legislation and in the 
executive machinery, and of doing the same things in the same ways’.24 He was 
also opposed to ‘the extensive public loss occasioned by’ independent local 
action.25 The Sanitary Report therefore made a set of proposals that would 
centralise power and limit local discretion. A General Board of Health would have 
the power to intervene in local affairs, and would have to sanction all local capital 
spending proposals. New local boards of health would be formed to cover the 
whole country, and they would have an obligation to improve water and sewer 
provision. Chadwick even proposed that the central board should appoint 
members to local boards, rather than allow them to be locally elected.26 These 
proposals were consistent with Chadwick’s centralising tendencies, but were not 
acceptable to parliamentarians of the time. The 1848 Act rejected three of these 
proposals outright, and watered down the powers to intervene in local affairs. The 
only proposal to survive was the General Board of Health’s powers to sanction all 
local capital spending proposals. These changes were a political reaction against 
the strong centre and weak locality model of the Poor Law Amendment Act.27  
As a result, the 1848 Act was largely permissive, not obligatory. Urban areas were 
given permission to form local boards of health, but they were not obliged to do 
so. At the same time, the General Board of Health had little power to intervene in 
the decisions of a local board of health. It also had little ability to influence or 
provide technical support to local boards, other than as part of the process of 
sanctioning borrowing requests. For these reasons, the 1848 Act should be seen 
as creating a ‘weak centre and strong locality’ model of central-local relationships. 
This watering down of Chadwick’s proposals was judged necessary in order to get 
the 1848 Act through Parliament. In effect, Parliament seemed to be more 
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concerned with avoiding the creation of a powerful and interfering central body, 
and less concerned with improving water and sewer provision nationally.28  
The consequences of the permissive nature of the 1848 Act and its resulting lack 
of impact are perfectly illustrated by the slowness of local areas to form local 
boards of health. In the ten years after 1848 only 196 local boards were formed, 
and these covered just 13 per cent of the population of England and Wales.29 
Only 104 of the 196 local boards had sought approval to spend any capital to 
implement water supply or sewer schemes.30 The reluctance of local areas to form 
local boards of health explains the low level of investment under the 1848 Act in 
the 15 years after 1848. Even by the mid-1860s, only 34 per cent of the English 
population were covered by local boards.31 The vast majority of areas therefore 
simply ignored the 1848 Act and its successors. For example, J. A. Chandler 
observes that the six largest cities (excluding London) took an average of 12 
years to adopt the provisions of the 1848 Act.32 Large urban areas that wished to 
improve water and sewer provision were more likely to use local Act powers which 
Bellamy argues they preferred for three reasons. First, they wanted to be free of 
General Board of Health scrutiny or control of their proposals; second, they could 
not rely on the 1848 Act to give them the individual detailed powers they wanted. 
Third, Bellamy argues that corporations preferred using local Acts because they 
gave corporations ‘direct access to Parliament (and) symbolised the corporations’ 
special status’.33 The permissive rather than obligatory nature of the 1848 Act was 
therefore an important reason why the level of water and sewer investment did not 
rise materially above the levels of the three years before 1848. 
The second question concerns why the PWLB’s share of lending was so small, at 
less than 2 per cent of the total. To address this question it is useful to examine 
the 15 year period from 1848 in three smaller sub-periods, as in table 5.4. In the 
first five years up to 1852 the PWLB refused to grant any of the 18 applications it 
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received from local boards of health for loans for water or sewer improvements. In 
the second period, up to 1857, applications to the PWLB increased three fold, and 
just over half of them were granted. This contrasts with the final five years, when 
the number of applications fell back to just 17, but only a single application was 
rejected and all the rest were granted. What caused this odd pattern? 
    
    
Table 5.5 shows the reasons why applications failed in each of the five year 
periods. In the first five years seven applications were rejected, because the 
PWLB was not confident that any loans would be repaid. Its uncertainty was 
caused by section 113 of the 1848 Act, which specified that borrowers would only 
repay loans at maturity, having set aside annual sums in a sinking fund. The 
PWLB had never been willing to lend on this basis, believing that it involved a 
higher risk of non-repayment.34 The 1817 Act that established the PWLB provided 
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 PWLB 2/25 minute book, November 1852 to June 1854, 2 December 1852, p. 1, reporting advice 
from the Attorney General and Solicitor General. 
Table 5.4
No. £000 No. £000 Prop'n
1848-52 18 221        0 -       0%
1853-57 57 764        29 264       51%
1858-62 17 159        16 152       94%
15 years 92 1,144    45 416       49%
Source: Analysis of PWLB 6/1 and 1a applications ledgers.
Water and sewer applications to PWLB             
1848-62, and outcomes
Applications Granted
Table 5.5 Reason for failure of applications to PWLB
Outcome 1848-52 1853-57 1858-62
Granted 0 29 16
Rejected No funds 7 3
S113 7
debt 1 6
Other legal 2 3 1
Withdrawn Interest 1 5
unclear 11
Total applications 18 57 17
Source: Analysis of PWLB 2/22-33 minute books.
Note:     'S113' was the section of the 1848 Act prescribing
                 the method of loan repayment. 'Debt' indicates
                 that the loan was wanted to repay debt.
Reason for 
failure Number of applications
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that annual repayments of principal would be made by borrowers to the PWLB, 
and this was incompatible with the 1848 Act. The Board would not lend until the 
conflict was resolved. Neither the PWLB nor the government saw any urgency to 
resolve the conflict, and it was 1853 before the 1848 Act was amended to allow 
the PWLB to lend on its normal terms. The lack of action to resolve the conflict 
can be seen as evidence that public health lending was not seen as a priority by 
the PWLB or the government. 
Further evidence of the PWLB’s lack of commitment to public health lending is 
provided by the seven applications that were rejected because the PWLB said 
they had no available funds. Yet, at the same time, the PWLB did not give a ‘no 
funds’ response to any non-public health applications. Instead, PWLB’s actions in 
directing 58 per cent of its 1848-62 lending to churches and burial boards 
suggests that these had a higher priority. A further two applications were rejected 
because the PWLB had no legal power to grant them. Finally, a single application 
was withdrawn because the applicant found a lower interest rate from another 
lender. Whatever the merit of the PWLB’s explanations, the result was that it 
rejected all the water and sewer applications in the five years after 1848. This 
pattern of decision making on loan applications is not consistent with public health 
lending being a priority for the PWLB. 
Despite the early lack of success, in the second five year period applications to 
the PWLB grew three-fold, and 51 per cent were successful. Three large 
applications were rejected on the grounds of ‘no funds’, even though no non-
public health applications were treated in this way. A further six were rejected 
because the applicants were proposing to use the loan to repay debts. The reason 
for the failure of 11 applications is unclear from the PWLB minute books. More 
revealingly, five applications were withdrawn, and the applicants went on to 
borrow from insurance companies.35 Indeed, a parliamentary return of local board 
of health debt indicates that the average interest rate for non-PWLB lending was 
4.75 per cent during these five years.36 With the PWLB lending at 5 per cent, it 
had clearly moved from being a market rate lender to being a high cost lender. 
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The large scale entry of insurance companies into lending to public sector bodies 
meant that there was sufficient credit in the market to meet demand.37 Given 
these facts, it is scarcely surprising that PWLB lending in the 1850s was so 
modest. 
In the final five year period, 1858 to 1862, the number of applications fell back to 
17, and 16 of these were accepted. The fall in numbers to 17 probably reflects 
local boards’ reluctance to apply for PWLB loans because of the lower insurance 
company interest rates. Nothing in the PWLB minute books suggests any change 
in the nature of the applications to the PWLB. Instead, the change – from rejecting 
all applications, to accepting all but one application – was one in the Board’s 
outlook. Between 1848 and 1858 the Board was uninterested in water and sewer 
lending. This period saw the appointment of a new PWLB deputy chairman and a 
new chairman, and in 1859 the PWLB’s outlook became much more 
accommodating.38 The government’s view of the merits of the PWLB can also be 
seen to change between 1852 and 1859. In the early 1850’s government 
appointed a new chairman and vice chairman, and even tried to abolish the 
PWLB. While at the end of the 1850s, the Treasury opened a discussion with the 
PWLB about reducing its interest rate.  
In 1852 Disraeli, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, appointed Sir Alexander Young 
Spearman as deputy chairman of the PWLB. Spearman had been the permanent 
head of the Treasury until his retirement in 1840 on grounds of ill health.39 In 1850 
he had recovered and was appointed as Comptroller of the National Debt Office. 
Sir John Winnifrith described Spearman as the ‘perfect Treasury all rounder’. In 
these roles he would surely have had a brief to re-establish Treasury orthodoxy 
and the PWLB’s role as a market rate or high cost lender, as well as exert 
downward pressure on the National Debt. Spearman’s views at the PWLB would 
have been reinforced by Gladstone’s appointment of John Gellibrand Hubbard as 
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PWLB chairman in 1854. Hubbard had recently finished his term as Governor of 
the Bank of England. Before the 1850s, the PWLB had chosen its chairman and 
vice chairman from within existing commissioners. Here, both were being 
appointed from outside, by chancellors of the exchequer in what must be seen as 
a clear push for a more Treasury dominated approach to PWLB lending.  
In the 1850s Disraeli and Gladstone shared an approach to budgets. Both 
believed that the priority was to have a budget surplus, and to use the surplus to 
repay debt, rather than increase spending or reduce taxation.40 In his 1852 
budget, Disraeli was faced with a deficit that he wished to eliminate. Sir Charles 
Trevelyan, the permanent secretary to the Treasury, suggested the abolition of the 
PWLB, saving its annual £360,000 funding and eliminating Disraeli’s budget 
deficit.41 Disraeli accepted the proposal, and announced in his budget that he 
would wind up the PWLB.42 In the event, Disraeli’s proposal was met by a storm of 
protest. This was not because MPs necessarily supported the PWLB, but because 
they saw the move as ‘vamp(ing) up a surplus out of borrowed money’.43 The 
government refused to amend its budget, lost the vote and resigned. 
This episode can be used to understand the Treasury’s view of the PWLB in 
1852.44 Disraeli had to defend his abolition proposal in the House of Commons, 
and Lord Derby, as Prime Minister, had to do the same in the House of Lords.45 
Trevelyan was therefore forced to write to Disraeli setting out why the PWLB 
ought to be abolished.46 Trevelyan pointed out that PWLB loans were inevitably 
risky, and that, since 1824, loans worth £700,000 had been made which were 
irrecoverable. However, Trevelyan also told Disraeli that these loans had been 
made at the insistence of Parliament after the PWLB had declined to grant them 
because there was a high risk the loans would not be repaid. Trevelyan’s 
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argument was that the existence of the PWLB put temptation in the hands of 
politicians, and removing the PWLB would remove that temptation. Disraeli only 
used the first point, about the losses, not the second, about Parliament’s role. 
Trevelyan also argued that the high level of lending by insurance companies and 
individuals showed that there was no shortage of credit. The PWLB was therefore 
no longer needed.47 Gladstone may well have shared this view, but, having 
defeated the government on its budget, he could hardly then adopt the proposal to 
abolish the PWLB. Instead, Gladstone appointed a man of his own choice – John 
Gellibrand Hubbard – as chairman of the PWLB. This was the first time the 
chairman had been appointed from outside the ranks of current commissioners, 
and subsequently agreed by the chancellor.48 Although Gladstone and Hubbard 
enjoyed a 35-year correspondence, it contains no direct reference to the PWLB.49 
Even so, Gladstone will have known, and must have agreed with Hubbard’s broad 
economic views. 
From a PWLB perspective, these developments in the early 1850s did not look 
encouraging. Yet in 1859 there was a marked change of approach. The Treasury 
wrote to the PWLB on 17 August 1859 suggesting that PWLB interest rates might 
be reduced from 5 per cent to 4 per cent.50 The PWLB minute refers to a letter 
from a borrower asking for a reduction in their interest rate, implying that the 
Treasury was again acting in response to external pressure. The Treasury letter 
closes by saying that rates could be raised later if market rates rose. Hubbard 
presented the PWLB board with a draft response to the Treasury, including the 
following principles: 
It does not appear … expedient that the rate of interest … should be 
governed by market rates. … (After) making provision for bad debts and 
the annual expense (of the PWLB office) it is considered that 5 per cent 
… is an appropriate rate of interest. …  After a loan has been made … 
no application for reduction should be entertained. … Borrowers are at 
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liberty to repay (a loan) at any time (and) borrow the money at a lower 
rate elsewhere. … The PWLB should not act as competitors in the 
money market with banks, insurance companies or (individuals). … The 
commissioners submit that their loans … can be divided into two 
classes. 1) Loans for works of public utility, but in which there is no 
public interest, such as railways, canals etc. Promoters of the works are 
frequently unable to obtain … a loan elsewhere … (implying) that the 
loan … ought to command a higher rate of interest than the market rate 
for first class securities. 2) Where there is no private interest as in the 
cases of loans under the Poor Law and Burial Acts and loans for 
sanitary purposes. … There appears no reason for attempting to 
distinguish between (the two classes) as regards the rate of interest.51 
The Board instructed the secretary to send the letter to the Treasury without 
amendment. The Treasury replied on 31 October 1859, agreeing to keep the 
interest rate at 5 per cent for all loans.52 It did not comment on the other principles 
in the letter. Even so, Hubbard achieved his first aim of establishing that the long 
term PWLB rate of interest was 5 per cent. At a time when insurance companies 
were willing to lend to public bodies at marginally below 5 per cent, the PWLB had 
become a high cost lender. This accounts for the negligible share of public health 
spending financed by the PWLB during the 1850s and 1860s. Hubbard’s mention 
of sanitary loans in the second class of PWLB loan indicates the PWLB’s 
acknowledgement of the importance of sanitary loans. This explains the PWLB’s 
acceptance of all but one sanitary application after 1858. 
In hindsight, Hubbard’s second class of loans, for workhouses, burial boards and 
sanitary purposes, appears to have recognised that lower rates of interest could 
be justified for some classes of loan. Indeed, the Treasury had long before 
reduced the rate for the first two, to 4 per cent although the rate for workhouse 
loans had returned to 5 per cent by 1859.53 In addition, the PWLB had already 
recognised that loans to rate-supported public bodies were a lower risk than loans 
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to railways and canals.54 In effect, Hubbard was hinting that it would be 
acceptable for the PWLB to fulfil a role of provider of low cost loans in these low 
risk but important areas. Hubbard also recognised that the PWLB operated in a 
political arena, and could be obliged by Parliament to lend at lower rates. Within 
three years there would be a significant extension in low cost lending by the 
PWLB, leading to a marked increase in PWLB lending. 
There are two reasons why spending on water and sewer improvements was so 
modest in the 15 years after 1848, and why PWLB lending was so insignificant. 
The first reason is that the 1848 Act retreated from the strong centre and weak 
localities model of the Poor Law Commission. Parliament did not use the 1848 Act 
to force increased investment in water and sewer facilities. Instead, Parliament’s 
apparent objective in passing the 1848 Act was to preserve local discretion and 
avoid central interference. This philosophy created a permissive Act, and allowed 
the vast majority of local areas to avoid the 1848 Act’s provisions. At the same 
time, the views of the PWLB and the Treasury had turned against the role of 
provider of low cost loans of the workhouse era. So, the PWLB returned to its 
original role as a market rate lender when loans were not available in the market. 
This is the reason the PWLB loan rate was set at 5 per cent, and why Hubbard 
sought to maintain it at this level in 1859. The appointments of Spearman and 
Hubbard were essential to this, as was the underlying Treasury view revealed by 
Trevelyan in his 1852 letters to Disraeli. These two reasons explain the return to a 
non-interventionist model in the 1848 to 1863 period. As a result, the 1848 Act 
failed to increase the level of investment in the water and sewer infrastructure in 
the 15 years up to 1863.  
5.3 Changes after 1863 
After 1863, three significant changes had an impact on the level of water and 
sewer infrastructure investment, and on the PWLB share of its financing. The first 
was a series of legislative changes to the relationship between the General Board 
of Health (and its successors) and local boards of health. Over time the changes 
transformed the weak centre and strong localities model into a strong centre and 
weak localities model. These changes meant that local areas had to establish 
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local boards of health, and had obligations to improve water and sewer 
infrastructure. The second change was in the government’s attitude to spending. 
Before 1866, government spending rose more slowly than national income, after 
1866 spending grew faster than national income. The third change was that the 
government gave way to pressure for lower interest rates on some PWLB lending 
in the 1860s, and in 1872 allowed the PWLB to lend at 3.5 per cent for water and 
sewer loans. The result of these changes was that water and sewer infrastructure 
investment more than doubled, and the PWLB share of financing that 
infrastructure rose to 31 per cent.   
   
Table 5.6 shows that the legislative changes took place over a very long period. 
The first change was to the coverage of local boards of health. Originally, only 
urban areas were covered by the 1848 Act. The 1866 Act then allowed rural areas 
discretion to establish local boards. Only in 1872 did it become compulsory to 
Table 5.6 The changing nature of public health Acts 1848-76
Characteristic 1848 Act 1865-8 Acts 1871-5 Acts
Local body 
powers/duties
'May' supply 
water and build 
sewers
S49 held to make 
water & sewers 
obligatory duties
S55 & S15 duty to 
ensure adequate 
sewers & water 
supply
Legislation 
applies to which 
areas
S1 & S10 only 
apply to towns, 
& their 
application was 
voluntary 
S3 + Schedule, 
rural areas may 
adopt Act
S5 applies to all 
of England  & 
Wales
Central body 
power to 
intervene
Only to impose 
Act with deaths 
>23/1000
Intervention 
power exists, 
but held to be 
ineffective
S299 may 
compel work to 
be undertaken
Central body 
strength
S9 GBH to last 5 
years only, with 
limited 
influence
Limited powers 
rest with 
Secretary of 
State
LGB permanent, 
well staffed and 
powerful
Key
Note:   'S' indicates which section of the Act makes the provision.
Weak centre, strong locality relationship
Source: Analysis of individual Acts.
Transitional relationship
Strong centre, weak locality relationship
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have sanitary authorities (as local boards were renamed) covering the whole of 
England and Wales.55 The second change was to the powers and duties of the 
local boards/sanitary authorities. It was 1866 before local boards saw their 
discretionary powers replaced by compulsory duties. The critical change from 
powers to duties was implied in the 1866 Sanitary Act, but it was not explicitly 
stated.56 Section 49 gave the Local Government Act Office (the 1858 successor to 
the General Board of Health) power to compel the local body to undertake water 
and sewer works. However, Oliver MacDonagh judged that the section 49 power 
‘combined ineffectuality in practice with revolution in principle’, and the power to 
compel was only used three times.57 It took another nine years until the 1875 
Public Health Act placed on local boards a clear duty to ensure the provision of 
adequate water supplies and sewer facilities.58 Between 1866 and 1875, local 
areas had lost their substantial discretionary powers over the application of the 
Acts, and had become weaker as a result.  
Between 1866 and 1871, the weak and temporary General Board of Health of the 
1848 Act was transformed into the strong and permanent Local Government 
Board of the 1871 Act.59 A measure of the LGB’s greater strength was that in 
1873 it held over 130 special local public inquiries into public health provision.60 
The Board was also larger than its predecessors, because it combined the 
functions of the Privy Council and the Poor Law Commission with those of its 
public health predecessors. The LGB annual reports to Parliament make clear that 
the LGB had adopted the PLC culture of regular statistical returns from local 
sanitary authorities and regular inspections.61 In short, the LGB had begun to act 
like the PLC. The LGB was headed by a cabinet minister, and this extra influence 
allowed it to negotiate a doubling of the borrowing limit for all local boards, and a 
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trebling of the maximum period of loans from 20 to 60 years.62 The centre had 
been transformed from weak to strong, just as the localities were transformed 
from strong to weak. Section 5.4 shows that these changes led to a five-fold 
increase in water and sewer sanctions. 
    
At the same time as these changes to central and local government relationships 
occurred, the government became more willing to allow its spending to grow. 
Between 1856 and 1866, civil government spending (i.e. government spending 
excluding military spending and debt costs) rose more slowly than national 
income. This reflected the long held view that discretionary government spending 
needed to be reduced.63 Table 5.7 shows that between 1867 and 1876, civil 
government spending growth more than doubled, while national income growth 
barely changed. Jonathan Parry explains the increase in government spending 
growth in terms of changes in the balance of power inside Gladstone’s cabinets.64 
Parry maintains that by 1868 the ‘retrenchment’ views of Gladstone and his 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Robert Lowe, held sway. However, by the early 
1870s, Parry argues, Lowe was more inclined to support public health and 
education spending. Parry further suggests that Lowe’s views were shared by H. 
A. Bruce at the Home Office, Thomas De Grey as Lord President and William 
Forster at Education. Gladstone clearly felt in a minority in his own cabinet when 
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Table 5.7 Government spending and national income
Civil govt National  
spending  income Civil National
£m £m Govt spend income
1856 8.7 665
1866 10.3 846 1.7% 2.4%
1876 14.8 1099 3.7% 2.5%
Sources: Mitchell and Deane, pp. 367 & 397.
Note: Civil govt spending excludes debt and
military costs.
Annual growth in
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he wrote in 1872 that he had ‘given in considerably to the rest of the cabinet’.65 
This change in the balance of cabinet sentiment goes a long way to explain the 
growth in health and education spending in the 1870s.  
Governments in the 1860s also had to relax their anti-spending views in the light 
of pressures in Parliament. In these years, Parliament passed six Acts, which 
approved extra spending of £7m in total. Compared to annual civil government 
spending of £10-15m a year, these were substantial new spending commitments. 
Of these six Acts, the most important two were the 1861 Harbour and Passing 
Tolls Act, which authorised spending of £3.5m over 10 years, and the 1863 Public 
Works (Manufacturing Districts) Act, which authorised spending of £1.9m over a 
two year period.66 What links all six Acts is the fact that in each case the 
government was presented with an immediate problem, and was under pressure 
from backbench MPs and external pressure groups to provide some financial 
support. 
These six Acts were also linked because each would be financed by PWLB loans. 
In the case of four of the Acts, Parliament determined that PWLB loans would be 
advanced at interest rates of either 3.25 per cent or 3.5 per cent. However, in 
none of the parliamentary debates about these four Acts is there any reference to 
any principle justifying cheap loans, nor any indication that loans were not 
available at market rates. Furthermore, as Bellamy points out, no case was made 
that a ‘public interest argument’ justified the use of cheap loans.67 Instead, two 
Acts were responses to the emergencies of the cotton famine and cattle disease, 
where the cost of loan repayments would ultimately be met by local ratepayers.68 
MPs in the affected areas therefore had an interest in reducing the costs of the 
loan repayments. In the case of the Harbours and Passing Tolls Act, the 
government wished to get approval to abolish passing tolls for all ships sailing 
past four designated harbours of refuge, and ended up offering cheap loans to 
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construct or improve harbours.69 In summary, the case for cheap PWLB loans was 
not a rational one based on clear principles or public interest. Instead, cheap 
loans were a response to pressure on the government.  
The government faced similar pressure when Parliament debated the 1872 Public 
Health Act. The Act imposed the significant extra costs of a large-scale extension 
of water and sewer investment on local ratepayers. Bellamy recounts that ‘two 
hundred Liberals abstained and the government suffered a spectacular defeat’ on 
the Bill.70 As constituency members, MPs objected to local rates having to pay for 
nationally determined new services, without any central government financial 
support. In order to get the Bill passed, the Local Government Board offered a 
concession to reduce the normal 5 per cent PWLB loan rate to 3.5 per cent for 
sanitary loans. With this concession, the PWLB ceased to be a high cost lender 
for sanitary loans, and once again became a provider of low cost loans. Bellamy 
reports that both Gladstone and Lowe later said that they ‘frowned on’ the 
concession, even though they approved it in order to get the Bill through 
Parliament.71 This confirms the 1836 workhouse experience, and the Harbour and 
Passing Tolls 1861 Act, the Public Works (Manufacturing Districts Act 1863, and 
Cattle Diseases Act of 1866: that low interest rates were generally a response to 
pressure, not a rationally applied principle. 
Once the 1872 Act had been passed, there was a disagreement between the 
Local Government Board and the PWLB about the application of the 3.5 per cent 
rate. John Lambert, the LGB secretary, argued that all loans made under the 
powers of the 1872 Act should be at 3.5 per cent.72 William Willink, the PWLB 
secretary (almost certainly replying under the guidance of Hubbard, who was still 
the PWLB chairman), did not agree and reminded Lambert of the principle 
established by Hubbard in 1859 that 
                                            
69
 House of Commons debates, volume 161 15 March 1861, cc. 2117-30, Harbours and Passing Tolls 
Act. 
70
 Bellamy, Central-Local Relations, p. 34. 
71
 Bellamy, Central-Local Relations, p. 82. 
72
 National Archives, MH19/209 Treasury-LGB correspondence. Letter dated 11 June 1874 from John 
Lambert, secretary of the LGB, to the Treasury. 
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Advances at exceptional low rates of interest …. (are) only justifiable … 
for such works as (water) and sewerage … where works of great utility 
might not otherwise be carried out.73  
For the PWLB, loans for street improvements and markets, and loans for any 
other purposes under the 1872 Act, would all continue to attract 5 per cent interest 
rates. R. R. W Lingen, the Treasury permanent secretary, was left to arbitrate 
between the PWLB and the LGB. In a July 1874 letter, Lingen backed the PWLB 
view, and thereby stuck to the 1859 Treasury minute.74 The LGB eventually 
conceded, and thereafter only asked the PWLB to apply the 3.5 per cent rate to 
water and sewer loans. The disagreement between the LGB and the PWLB 
resurfaced at an 1875 Select Committee hearing on two PWLB Bills. Hubbard was 
probed about why the PWLB would make 5 per cent loans for street 
improvements, but 3.5 per cent loans for water supply. Hubbard argued that lower 
interest rates were only appropriate for ‘great national purposes … calculated to 
affect the security of life or property’.75 For Hubbard, the improvement of the 
nation’s water and sewer infrastructure was a ‘great national purpose’, and street 
improvements were not. The distinction was perhaps understandable, but appears 
to have had no legislative backing at all.  
However flawed the distinction was, it was nonetheless clear that the PWLB would 
fulfil two separate roles. The first was as a lender at 5 per cent for ordinary 
purposes, and the second was as provider of low cost loans for great national 
purposes. The legislative changes during the 1850s, 1860s and early 1870s had 
the effect of hugely expanding the demand for loans to finance the compulsory 
improvement of water and sewer infrastructure. The government’s greater 
willingness to see spending rise by more than national income was essential to 
both lower PWLB interest rates and legislation that effectively made sanitary 
improvements compulsory. Section 5.4 shows the scale of the increases in total 
investment in water and sewer facilities, and the share of that investment financed 
by the PWLB.   
5.4 Impact of the changes 
                                            
73
 National Archives, MH19/209. Letter dated 5 June 1874 from William Willink, PWLB secretary. 
74
 National Archives, MH19/209. Letter dated 27 July 1874 from R. R. W. Lingen to the LGB. 
75
 BPP 1875 (358) Select Committee on Public Works Loan Act Amendment Bill, Q385. 
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The impact of the legislative changes can be measured by the increase in 
sanitary investment. In a similar way, the impact of low interest rates can be seen 
in the increased scale of PWLB lending after 1863. Figure 5.5 shows a clear 
upward trend in the value of investment approvals by the successors to the 
General Board of Health. In the early 1860s, approvals were running at around 
£200,000 a year. Annual approvals doubled after the 1866 Act introduced the 
principle of compulsion in urban areas. In 1870-3 the value of sanctions 
increased to £600,000 a year as spending gained momentum. By 1874, local 
sanitary authorities were reacting to the 1872 Act and its increasing degree of 
compulsion and low interest rates. These two changes caused Local Government 
Board approvals to rise to a peak of £1.2m in 1875. The removal of local 
discretions had increased significantly the number of local areas making water 
and sewer investments. The fivefold increase in investment approvals was the 
clear result. 
   
Analysis of the LGB sanctions in figure 5.6 gives more evidence of the impact of 
legislative changes. Before the 1866 Act, there were no approvals for investment 
in rural areas, since the 1848 Act did not give rural areas the power to invest in 
water supply and sewers. Even after the 1866 Act gave rural areas that power, 
there was an average of only 10 approvals a year. After the 1872 Act established 
sanitary authorities in all rural areas, investment approvals rose to 70 a year in 
Figure 5.5
Source: HLG16 ledgers of sanctions granted by GBH/LGB etc.
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rural areas. A similar step change in the level of approvals for small towns is also 
clear in figure 5.6. Before 1863, only an average of 17 small towns were gaining 
investment approvals each year. After the 1866 Act, the number more than tripled 
to 58 a year as sanitary authorities realised that compulsion was on the way. 
Many small towns decided to act on their own volition, rather than be compelled to 
act. There was a further, but smaller increase after the 1872 Act. In summary, by 
the mid-1870s there had been a seven-fold increase in investment approvals for 
rural areas. There were also three- and four-fold increases for city and small town 
investments respectively. These increases were directly linked to the imperative 
for change implied in the 1866 Act, and the compulsory establishment of rural 
sanitary areas in 1872. 
  
The increase in LGB sanctions for large towns and cities was relatively small 
because these areas made greater use of local Acts to gain borrowing approvals. 
Small towns made virtually no use of local Acts, but cities and large towns 
increased their investment under local Acts five-fold, to £1.1m, after 1872.76 
                                            
76
 See figure 5.3. 
  Figure 5.6 
Sources: Sanction numbers from HLG16, rateable value data from
                 BPP 1878 (269) 1876 local tax return
Notes:    Cities and large towns have rateable values over £50,000
                 Small towns have rateable values over £15,000
                 Rural areas from Stones Manual of Unions , as unions
                 formed basis of rural sanitary authorities.
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These more populous areas had the same duties as all other sanitary districts: to 
provide adequate water supply and sewer facilities. They just chose to use local 
Act powers rather than the powers of the 1866 and 1872 Acts to discharge those 
duties. It was still the requirements of those two Acts that caused the increase in 
the level of investment in water facilities in cities. Investment by cities also 
increased because of the growing shift from private water company provision to 
municipal provision of household water supplies.77 Cities and large towns also 
saw their costs rise as average consumption per head rose, and local sources of 
water were exhausted or polluted.78 The large investment increases in cities were 
therefore needed to ensure adequate water supply to growing populations. 
Overall, 85 per cent of the nearly £2m a year increase in water and sewer 
investment after 1862 was the result of public sector investment, and therefore a 
response to the increased demands of the 1866 and 1872 public health Acts. The 
small balance of increased spending was caused by a small rise in spending by 
private water companies.  
The doubling of water and sewer investment after 1863 was the result of 
legislative changes. The second major change after 1863 was the reduction in the 
PWLB interest rate for some classes of lending, and in 1872 for water and sewer 
loans. Figure 5.7 indicates that insurance companies and individuals were 
charging an average 4.75 per cent interest to urban sanitary authorities between 
1863 and 1874.79 In these periods, the PWLB was acting as a high cost lender, 
and would only lend to those unable to get a lower cost loan from a private 
source. Figure 5.7 shows that when the PWLB charged 5 per cent, its market 
share of public sector borrowing was 10 per cent or less. Figure 5.7 also highlights 
that when PWLB interest rates were reduced to 3.5 per cent, the PWLB share of 
lending rose to around 50 per cent. At these times the PWLB was acting as 
provider of low cost loans. At different times during this period the PWLB was 
                                            
77
 John Hassan, A History of Water in Modern England (Manchester University Press, Manchester 
1998), pp. 18-19. 
78
 Robert Millward, Private and Public Enterprise in Europe: Energy, Telecommunications and 
Transport, 1830-1990 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 45. Applying estimated 
average populations to the debt data gives investment costs per head as follows: cities £5; large 
towns £2.50; small towns £1.30; very small towns £0.80; rural areas £1.50.   
79
 BPP 1874 (396). The graph is based on a 23 per cent sample of the loans.  
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fulfilling two roles, first as a high cost lender, and second as provider of low cost 
loans, and its share of lending rose as its interest rate fell.  
  
Figure 5.8 shows how the PWLB’s share of lending reacted to the interest rate 
charged on different streams of lending by the PWLB. The first example is PWLB 
lending to local authorities in Lancashire, Cheshire and Derbyshire in 1863 and 
1864. This was the period when these three counties were severely affected by 
the cotton famine caused by the American Civil War. Local authorities in these 
areas were able to borrow at 3.5 per cent from the PWLB, or at market rates from 
any private source. Loans had to be for capital investment purposes, and for 
activities covered by the various public health Acts. A total of £1.8m was borrowed 
over the following three years, and all of this came from the PWLB because of the 
3.5 per cent interest rate.80 Of the £1.8m, over £700,000 was spent on water and 
sewer provision. Here, the PWLB was acting as provider of low cost loans, and 
the cheap loans made borrowing much more attractive. This example also shows 
that cheap loans were an incentive to act quickly. 
                                            
80
 BPP 1868 (6) Report on the Public Works Act shows that approval was given for loans of £1.9m, 
but £100,000 of those loans were not taken up. PWLB 6/3 and 6/4 show that the PWLB made loans 
of £1.8m under this Act. 
Figure 5.7
Source: 1874 (396) Return of debts for Urban Sanitary Authorities
and Homer, History of Interest Rates  p. 195 for gilt yields.
Note:     Non-PWLB rates are a combination of insurance companies lending
                 at an average of 4.8% and individuals at 4.5% in the early 1870s.
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The second example is of water and sewer infrastructure investment in the period 
after 1872, when PWLB was charging 3.5 per cent. The 1878 Local Government 
Board annual report shows that the LGB issued sanctions for public health 
spending of £2.8m in 1877.81 Of this £2.8m, £1.6m was for water and sewers and 
£1.2m was for street improvement, markets and other investments authorised by 
the 1872 Act. In the case of water and sewer investments the PWLB was able to 
lend at 3.5 per cent. In the case of street improvements and other public health 
improvements the PWLB would only lend at 5 per cent. For water and sewer loans 
the PWLB lent £1.1m, or two thirds of the total. Here, it was acting as provider of 
low cost loans. Private sources lending at between 4.5 and 4.8 per cent only 
provided a third of the finance. The two thirds PWLB share is likely to be an 
underestimate, since it only includes LGB recommendations to the PWLB made in 
1877. It therefore excludes those recommendations where there was a delay 
before the PWLB was asked to make a loan in early 1878. 
                                            
81
 BPP 1878 (2130) LGB annual report pp. 504-519 lists loans sanctioned by the LGB for urban and 
rural sanitary districts, and recommendations made to the PWLB for 1877. Earlier LGB reports simply 
listed loans actually advanced by the PWLB during the year, making the comparison of sanction and 
PWLB loans less useful. 
Figure 5.8
Sources: Public Works Act spending. BPP 1868 (6); 1877 LGB sanctions,
                  BPP 1878 (241); Pre 1873 water & sewerage, Appendix 5.A; 1872-6
                  Corporation local Acts, Personal & Local Act volumes and PWLB 6.
Notes:     Figures in bars indicate the PWLB interest rate charged.
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In sharp contrast, the PWLB only made loans of just £7,000 towards the £1.2m of 
non-water and non-sewer LGB approvals. Here, the PWLB was lending at 5 per 
cent and acting as a high cost lender. Borrowers invariably preferred to go to 
insurance companies and individuals who were willing to lend at between 4.5 and 
4.8 per cent. The outcome was that the PWLB market share was less than 1 per 
cent of the total. The result was similar for PWLB lending for pre-1873 water and 
sewer sanctions given by the Local Government Board and its predecessors. 
Between 1848 and 1872 sanctions totalled £8m and PWLB lending totalled just 
over £800,000, or 10 per cent of the total. The PWLB share of lending for local 
Acts promoted by municipal corporations was similar, but a little more complex. 
Between 1872 and 1876 corporations were authorised to borrow £6.1m to 
improve water and sewer facilities. Of this, less than £300,000 was borrowed from 
the PWLB. The conclusion is that where the PWLB lent at 5 per cent as a high 
cost lender, it typically provided less than 10 per cent of the loans, and where it 
lent at 3.5 per cent it provided more than half of the loans. The PWLB could 
therefore fulfil different roles at the same time, for different lending streams. 
The change from permissive to compulsory legislation transformed the level of 
water and sewer investment. Dropping the PWLB interest rates to 3.5 per cent 
also transformed the PWLB’s share of lending. By 1874 the low interest rates 
were themselves increasing spending. This accounts for the near doubling of LGB 
sanctions, from £600,000 to an average of £1.1m a year over the next three 
years. This had also been the case with the 1863 Public Works Act: low interest 
rates had encouraged authorities to take advantage of them, when they might 
have invested less, or more slowly, at 5 per cent. It is also likely that the 1874-6 
increase was the result of a momentum effect similar to that noticed by Dan 
Bogart in the case of turnpike trust development.82 If a local board of health saw 
those around it investing in new water supplies, then the local board was likely to 
be encouraged to do the same. This was certainly the case with Chesterfield’s 
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 Dan Bogart, ‘Neighbors, Networks, and the Development of Transport Systems: Explaining the 
Diffusion of Turnpike Trusts in Eighteenth Century England’, Journal of Urban Economics, Vol 61, 
2007, pp. 238-262. 
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rural sanitary authority. In 1875 and 1876 it submitted 29 successful applications 
for loans to extend water supplies to the small villages surrounding Chesterfield.83                       
           
Despite the growth in water and sewer investment, and the PWLB’s low rates of 
interest, PWLB lending remained profitable because bad debts were very rare, 
and because the government’s borrowing costs were very low.84 There were, 
however, two bad debts worth a combined £6,900, from Bromyard and Epping 
rural sanitary authorities. Both were loans made following intervention in these two 
districts using the powers of the 1866 Act. Work was done against the will of the 
RSAs; only half the costs could be recovered, and the balances were written off. 
However, these write offs were exceptionally rare, and very small in scale. 
Because of the falling interest costs of government debt, and the very low write 
offs, the PWLB made a £454,000 profit on water and sewer lending, as shown in 
table 5.8.  
As was seen earlier, Gladstone opposed the use of low interest rates for PWLB 
lending. He believed that charging interest at rates below the market level meant 
subsidising the cost of lending.85 The opposing view would be that to charge 5 per 
cent, when the cost of borrowing to the government was around 3.25 per cent, 
would result in excess profits for the Treasury because the local tax payer would 
be subsidising the national tax payer. The middle ground is that a subsidy only 
occurs when the interest rate charged to borrowers fails to cover the costs of 
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 National Archives, PWLB  6/4-6 PWLB applications ledger 
84
 Sidney Homer, A History of Interest Rates (New Brunswick NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1963), pp. 
195-6. 
85
 Bellamy, Central–Local Relations, p. 34; British Library, Add MSS 44302 4 July 1873, Gladstone, 
Letters; House of Commons debates 1 August 1872 v 213 cc278. 
Table 5.8 Profit on PWLB water & sewerage lending 1848-76
£000 £000
Costs £5.85m borrowed for 30 years, 3.23% 2,833   
Expenses 0.4 per cent of £5.85m 24         
Write-off, two loans 7           2,864   
Income £4.75m lent at 3.5% for 30 years 2,493   
£1.10m lent at 5% for 30 years 826      3,318   
Profit 454      
Sources: Interest on borrowed money. Homer, History of Interest Rates
Expenses, see appendix 7.A. Write-offs BPP 1888 (200), p. 136
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borrowing, bad debts and expenses. On this basis, loans from the state to finance 
water and sewer infrastructure did not involve a subsidy. 
Conclusions 
The 1848 Public Health Act was a reaction against the strong centre and weak 
locality model of the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act. Parliament had seemed 
more concerned to avoid interfering in local affairs, and less committed to raising 
investment in water supply and sewer infrastructure. The 1848 Act was therefore 
permissive only, and created a weak central body – the General Board of Health. 
In contrast, the local areas were strong and had a great deal of discretion. As a 
result, the Act failed to raise investment materially above the pre-1848 levels. 
During the 1850s and 1860s insurance companies and individuals were willing to 
lend to local boards of health at less than the PWLB’s normal 5 per cent. This 
explains why, until 1872, the PWLB was financing less than 4 per cent of sanitary 
infrastructure spending. 
During the 1860s and 1870s, the legislative environment changed. By 1875, local 
discretion had largely disappeared. Sanitary authorities had been compulsorily 
established throughout England and Wales, and had duties rather than powers. 
The weak General Board of Health had been succeeded by the strong Local 
Government Board. The LGB adopted the strong centre culture of the Poor Law 
Commission, and made use of its powers to intervene in local affairs. The 1848 
weak centre and strong locality model had reverted to the poor law strong centre 
and weak locality model.  
Legislative change also affected the interest rate charged by the PWLB, and from 
1872, the PWLB was able to charge 3.5 per cent on loans for water supply and 
sewage infrastructure. In the four years 1873 to 1876, the PWLB lent an 
unprecedented £4m for these purposes, and provided nearly half the finance for 
local authority investment in these areas. The impact of both a degree of 
compulsion and low interest rates, had led to a more than doubling of the level of 
investment in water and sewers. For perhaps the first time, PWLB lending had a 
major impact on the living conditions of the population as local improvements in 
mortality rates followed wherever there was substantial local investment in water 
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and sewer facilities.86 But it would be the end of the century before there were 
material improvements in national mortality statistics.87 
The lesson of this chapter (and of chapter 4), is that to encourage local public 
infrastructure investment, two conditions had to be met. First, there needed to be 
a clear incentive for the local community to invest. This may be in the form of a 
legislative imperative, with a risk of central intervention in the case of inadequate 
investment. Alternatively, there needed to be a local financial or social benefit 
from the investment. The second condition was that cheap finance should be 
available to local public bodies. Once the PWLB was able to lend at 3.5 per cent, 
local communities were more likely to respond to the legislative compulsion. Low 
cost lending also gave the PWLB an important role in financing public 
infrastructure. In contrast, as a high cost lender the PWLB played an insignificant 
role in financing public infrastructure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
86
 BPP 1871 (281) Royal Sanitary Commission second report, Vol 2, p. 250 and p. 276. Evidence 
from Croydon and Merthyr Tydfil. Both were early adopters of the 1848 Public Health Act, and had 
invested £200,000 and £140,000 respectively. Croydon saw its mortality rates fall from 26 to 18 per 
1000 over 20 years, and Merthyr saw its fall from 30 to 20 per cent over the same period. 
87
 Mitchell & Deane, British Historical Statistics, pp. 36-7. In the 10 years 1839-48, deaths per 1000 in 
England and Wales averaged 22.2; in 1872-81 they were 21.0; and in 1896-1905, 16.9. 
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Chapter 6, The PWLB plays a major part in doubling school                  
provision, 1870-76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Above. The Sheffield 
School Board borrowed £22,000 
from the PWLB in 1872 to build 
four new schools. This is 
Netherthorpe school, the largest, 
with 937 places, costing £8,156. 
The crest in the top centre proudly 
says ‘Sheffield School Board 
1873’. It is still operating as a 
primary school, and is now a grade 
II listed building. 
Figure 6.2 Below. South Wingfield 
School Board was a typical small, 
rural school board. In 1875 it 
borrowed £3,400 from the PWLB to 
build a 310 place school. It was 40 
per cent larger than the village 
needed, and 80 per cent per place 
more expensive than it should have 
been. It still operates as a village 
primary school and has 107 pupils. 
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Before the passage of the 1870 Elementary Education Act, there were only school 
places for half of the children who should have been at school. Within ten years 
the number of school places had more than doubled, and the national shortage of 
school places had been eliminated.1 This transformation was achieved by 
establishing 1,600 school boards in areas where voluntary effort was judged 
unable to provide the extra school places needed. In such cases, the local school 
board was then able to borrow at a low, 3.5 per cent rate from the PWLB in order 
to build new schools. The loans were repaid by levying a local education rate. The 
Act left the existing voluntary schools substantially unchanged, and the numbers 
of voluntary schools continued to increase in the 1870s.  
The 1870 Act succeeded in eliminating the national shortage of school places 
within 10 years. The PWLB became the monopoly lender to school boards, and 
lent £10m to build schools in England, Scotland and Wales. However, the 
increased scale of the PWLB’s lending caused problems for the Treasury, and 
had an impact on the PWLB’s objectives. This chapter explores both of these 
wider issues. There are four sections to this chapter, with the first estimating the 
total investment in providing new school places, and showing the proportion of the 
investment financed by the PWLB. The second section uses the PWLB loan data 
to determine the different patterns of investment by large and small school boards. 
The third section explores the real and imagined problems caused for the 
Treasury by the scale of PWLB lending in the mid-1870s. The final section looks 
at the impact of the increased scale of PWLB lending on the PWLB’s role, and 
examines a realistic alternative that would have avoided the problems created by 
the PWLB’s success. 
6.1 Financing elementary school building 
The 1870 Elementary Education Act set both a quantitative and a qualitative 
target for the provision of school places. The quantitative target was developed by 
Horace Mann of the Registrar General’s Department. Using the 1851 Census 
data, Mann showed that there were 4.9 million children between the ages of 3 and 
15. Yet average daily attendances at school were fewer than 2 million children. 
                                            
1
 In 1869 there were 1.8 million school places in England and Wales. By 1879 there were 4.1 million 
places available. BPP 1870 (165) Committee of Council on Education annual report; BPP 1880 
(2562) Annual Report. 
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This statistic alone created pressure for government action. Mann went on to 
calculate that school places ought to have been available for 3 million children, or 
one in six of the 1851 population. The detail of Mann’s calculation is shown in 
table 6.1.2 Mann’s calculation, and the target of school places for one sixth of the 
population, became the long-lasting quantitative target for school place provision. 
By 1869, the target had risen to 3.8 million places, and, with 1.8 million places 
available in church and voluntary schools, the shortfall was 2 million school 
places.3 
    
Once the quantitative target had been established, attention turned to defining a 
standard for the quality of education. Many uninspected schools were seen as 
having little educational merit, so a qualitative standard was important.4 The first 
step had already been taken in 1839, by creating a regular system of school 
inspection, and this was improved and extended. The second step was taken in 
1862, with the ‘payment by results’ grant system introduced by Robert Lowe and 
                                            
2
 E. G. West, Education and the Industrial Revolution, 2nd edition (Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 2000), p. 
26. 
3
 BPP 1870 (165) Committee of Council on Education annual report. 
4
 House of Commons debates series 3, Vol 199, c441, 16 February 1870; Forster in the first reading 
debate on the Elementary Education Bill. 
Table 6.1 Mann's calculation of school places needed
Million Million
1851 Census population 18.00
1851 Census population between 3 and 15 4.91
Less those not expected at school
Incapacitated by sickness 0.10
Educated at home 0.05
Occupied at home or for wages 1.00
Kept at home by parents
under 5 0.57
over 12 0.07 -1.89
School places required: 1/6 of population 3.02
Average daily attendance 1.95
Source: E. G. West, Education and the Industrial Revolution , 
                p. 26, except for 1851 census total population, from
                Mitchell and Deane, and average daily attendance,
                from BPP 1852-53 (1692), pp. xiv and xxx.
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his top official, R. R. W. Lingen.5 Payment by results sought to create incentives to 
improve the proportion of certificated teachers, and improve attendance and 
examination results. Only schools that were inspected and received annual grants 
would be regarded as being of adequate quality. In contrast, non-inspected and 
non-grant-earning schools would be deemed as being of insufficient quality, and 
would not be counted towards the one in six target for school places. The key 
educational policy target was therefore to provide places in inspected and annual 
grant earning schools for one sixth of the population. The simplicity of the 
combined target meant that it was the measure against which the 1870 Act was 
judged.6 
Before 1870, elementary schools were provided by churches and other voluntary 
groups. These groups were encouraged to build new schools by capital grants 
from the government to meet up to 20 per cent of building costs. The remainder of 
the costs were met from locally raised voluntary contributions. Despite this, school 
place numbers remained well short of the one sixth target, and there was pressure 
on the government to find a means of increasing provision. In 1868 Robert Lowe 
argued that it would be necessary to supplement existing voluntary and church 
provision with rate aided schools.7 W. E. Forster came to share this view, and, as 
Liberal education spokesman, would later pilot the 1870 Education Bill through the 
House of Commons. 
The 1870 Elementary Education Bill provided for the whole country to be divided 
into 14,000 school districts. Each district would assess the number of grant aided 
and inspected school places available in their district. The shortfall between this 
number and one sixth of the district’s population would be the district’s need for 
new school places. School districts could voluntarily form a school board, or they 
could leave school provision to the churches and voluntary groups. Churches and 
voluntary groups would have a limited period in which to form plans to provide 
these places. If voluntary efforts failed to make good the shortage, then a school 
board would be formed to make up the shortfall, and would be able to borrow from 
                                            
5
 Lowe went on to be Chancellor of the Exchequer 1868-73, while Lingen went on to be Permanent 
Secretary of the Treasury 1870-85. 
6
 BPP 1888 (5485) The Final Report of the Cross Committee, p. 53. 
7
 Marjorie Cruickshank, Church and State in English Education (London, Macmillan, 1963), p. 22, 
quoting a Times report on 25 January 1868 of a speech by Lowe in Liverpool. 
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the PWLB at 3.5 per cent to build schools. The school board would be able to levy 
an education rate to repay the debt and meet net running costs. Although hard 
fought inside and outside Parliament, the Bill enjoyed sufficient support that none 
of these principles were changed in the parliamentary debate. The 1870 
Elementary Education Act gave churches and voluntary groups an incentive to 
establish more schools quickly, in order to avoid the need to create a school 
board.  
The PWLB lent £10.2m to newly established school boards between 1870 and 
1876. Of the £10.2m, £2.2m was lent to Scottish school boards, and is excluded 
from the analysis in the rest of this chapter.8 Even so, the remaining £8m was the 
most the PWLB had ever lent in any five year period. It was more than twice the 
sum lent to local sanitary boards in the same period. In addition, the PWLB had a 
virtual monopoly of lending to school boards. Only another £110,000 was lent to 
school boards from non-PWLB sources. Of this, £90,000 was in the form of two 3 
7/8 per cent loans from the Metropolitan Board of Works to the London School 
Board. The loan was specifically to finance the building of a headquarters that the 
PWLB was prohibited from lending for.9 There were just four loans between 1870 
and 1876 from insurance companies, banks and individuals, with a combined total 
of £20,000. These were at rates of 4-5 per cent.10 Not surprisingly, the PWLB 
interest rate of 3.5 per cent made the PWLB the monopoly provider of low cost 
loans to school boards. 
The PWLB was not able to lend to voluntary bodies, so all of the funding for 
building new voluntary schools had to come from either government grants or 
voluntary fundraising. In the parliamentary debate on the 1870 Bill, Gladstone, as 
Prime Minister, made clear that voluntary groups had just six months to submit 
applications for the last tranche of the grants.11 These grants would then cease to 
be available. In that short window, 5,000 applications were made, and over 3,000 
were accepted by the Education Department. Over the next 10 years the 
                                            
8
 Scotland was excluded because the data for Scottish school places was not so readily available, 
and because the legislation was different, and only passed in 1872. 
9
 London Metropolitan Archives, file SBL/1712, LSB mortgage register. Section 57 of the 1870 Act 
only allowed the PWLB to lend to build schools. 
10
 BPP 1875 (268) Return of School Board Loans (England).  
11
 House of Commons debates 16 June 1870, series 3, Vol 202, c281. Initially the ‘period of grace’ for 
grants was to be 12 months, but was reduced to six months in the Act. 
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government paid out £338,000 in grants to aid the provision of 300,000 new 
school places.12 Ninety per cent of the grants went to the Church of England’s 
National Society. Financially, these grants were on a very small scale when 
compared to the total of PWLB lending. However, because these grants only met 
up to 20 per cent of building costs, they encouraged the three large church groups 
to raise £1.5m in voluntary contributions.13 Table 6.2 shows the split between 
grants and voluntary contributions by denominational group. After the grants 
ended, church and voluntary groups continued to raise local contributions, and 
built a further 1.1 million school places without the incentive of government grants. 
   
In 1869, the Church of England provided nearly three quarters of all school 
places. The Church of England also provided one million, or three quarters of all 
the new voluntary school places in the 1870s.14 Table 6.3 shows that these one 
million extra places were provided in three different ways. The first group of 
266,000 places were those that were government grant aided, and appear in table 
6.2. The second group were 109,000 places, provided after the grant had ended, 
in schools affiliated to the Church of England’s National Society.15 These extra 
places were financed by voluntary contributions of £400,000, with at least part of 
these contribution collected by National Society fundraising activities.16 The 
remaining 640,000 extra places were again provided without the help of 
                                            
12
 BPP 1870 (165) p. lxxxi and 1880 (2562), p. 166, Education annual reports.  
13
 BPP 1870 (165) p. lxxxi and 1880 (2562), p. 166. 
14
 There was generally a gap of up to three years between the commitment to build a new school and 
its places appearing in the Committee of Council annual reports. This chapter therefore compares the 
new school places reported as being available between August 1869 and August 1879 with financial 
commitments made between 1870 and the end of 1876. Appendix 6.A has a fuller note on the 
methodology of dealing with school place statistics. 
15
 The Church of England set up the National Society in 1811 to build and run schools on its behalf. 
16
 Church of England Record Centre, Bermondsey, National Society Annual Reports 1870-77. .  
Table 6.2 Denominational share of gov't grant 1870-81
Places 
Grant Contribs Cost provided
£000 £000 £000 '000
National Society 301          1,294      1,594      266          
British & foreign etc 24            100          124          24            
Roman Catholic 13            59            72            13            
Total 338          1,453      1,790      303          
Source:  Committee of Council Annual Reports, BPP 1870 
                 (165), p. lxxxi and BPP 1880 (2562 ), p. 166.
Voluntary school funding
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government grant, but also without support from the National Society. They were 
therefore funded entirely by local fundraising activities and although they were 
Church of England schools, they were not affiliated to the National Society. It is 
not possible to provide any direct evidence about the total cost of these places. A 
reasonable estimate, based on a sample of local record offices files, is that a new 
church school place cost £4.17 The Committee of Council annual report for 1884 
supports this figure by reporting that 1.2 million voluntary school places were 
provided at a cost of £5m, or just over £4 per place.18   
                      
The Committee of Council described a large group of schools as ‘British, 
Wesleyan and other non-denominational schools’. In practice, this included all 
schools that were neither Church of England nor Roman Catholic.19 The British 
and Wesleyan societies were broadly content with the 1870 Act, and saw no need 
to expand significantly the number of schools they supported (see table 6.4). 
Based on a cost of £4 for each of the extra school places they provided, only a 
modest £200,000 was invested in new school places. The other schools in this 
category included company schools, parochial, free and ragged schools, and 
schools without any identifying indicators. In the 1870s these non-church schools 
nearly doubled their places, from 193,000 to 368,000. Assuming the same £4 per 
                                            
17
 Derbyshire Record Office, files D6546/4/5/1, D37/M/E385/1, D5215/1/3 and D3644/31/1, 
Subscription lists for Brassington, Brackenfield, Bakewell and Youlgrave schools, Church of England 
Record Centre files NS7/1/2917, NS7/1/2917a, NS7/1/3987.for Soresby and the national schools in 
Chesterfield and St Pauls school Derby. Of these seven lists, the Duke of Devonshire appears in four. 
18
 BPP 1884 (4483), p. xi, PWLB annual report.  
19
 Detailed analysis of a large sample of schools listed in the Committee of Council annual report was 
used to estimate the separate sizes of the British, Wesleyan and non-church components of the larger 
group. 
Table 6.3 Funding Church of England new school places 1870-76
New
places Grant Contri- Cost per
in 1870s butions place
'000 £m £m £
Grant aided schools 266         0.3 1.3 6.00
National Society schools 109         0.4 3.70
Other CoE schools 640         2.5 4.00
All CoE schools 1,015     4.2 4.50
Sources: Total grant aided places, and new CoE place from 
                  Committee of Council annual reports, BPP 1870 (165) 
                  and BPP 1880 (2562). National Society data from      
                  National Society annual reports 1870-77.   
Funding
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place capital cost, these schools would have raised voluntary contributions of 
£700,000. All of these funds appear to have been raised by local rather than 
national fundraising efforts. 
               
In 1870 the Roman Catholic Poor Schools Committee established a National 
Crisis Fund to raise money to provide an extra 80,000 school places.20 Its plan 
was that 55,000 new places would come from building new schools, and 25,000 
from turning existing unapproved Catholic schools into grant-earning schools. The 
National Crisis Fund quickly collected £259,000, and used this to build an extra 
57,456 school places (see table 6.5).21 A further 74,000 places were provided 
without national fundraising. It is assumed here that half of these 74,000 places 
were the result of local fund raising. At £4 a place, this would have needed 
£148,000. It is assumed that the other half of the 74,000 places came from 
previously unapproved schools, and that no capital was invested to bring these 
schools up to standard. An extra 144,000 Roman Catholic school places were 
therefore provided at a cost of £479,000, including grant funded places. 
                                            
20
 The Catholic Poor Schools Committee was chaired by Lord Ripon, who (as Lord De Grey), had 
been a member of Gladstone’s government until 1873, and had been Forster’s boss. Anthony F. 
Denholm, ‘Robinson, George Frederick Samuel, first Marquess of Ripon (1827-1909)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004. Online edn, May 2009 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35792, accessed 18 Sept 2013. The 80,000 target is derived 
from the Catholic Poor Schools Committee CEC/1/5, annual report 1870, p. 32. in the archive of St 
Mary’s University College, Twickenham. 
21
 Catholic Poor Schools Committee CEC/1/6, Annual Report for 1873, p. 13.  
Table 6.4 Funding British, Wesleyan and other school places 1870-76
New
places Grant Contri- Cost per
in 1870s butions place
'000 £m £m £
Grant aided B & W schools 24           <0.1 0.1 5.20
British & Wesleyan schools 17           0.1 6.00
Non church schools -          0.7 4.00
All non-CoE & non-RC schools 41           <0.1 0.9 4.20
Sources: Total grant aided places, and new school places from 
                  Committee of Council annual reports, BPP 1870 (165) 
                  and BPP 1880 (2562).
Funding
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Table 6.6 summarises the estimates in the previous paragraphs, and shows that a 
total of £14m was invested in schools between 1870 and 1876. The PWLB 
provided 57 per cent of this finance, with 40 per cent coming from voluntary 
contributions. The balancing 3 per cent came from government grants, and 
borrowing through the Metropolitan Board of Works.  Because of the 3.5 per cent 
interest rate, the PWLB was the major provider of finance for infrastructure 
investment in schools, just as it had been for post-1872 sanitation investment and 
workhouse investment before 1844. However, on this occasion there were no 
effective alternative sources of loans for school boards. 
   
Table 6.5 Funding Roman Catholic Church new school places 1870-76
New
places Grant Contri- Cost per
in 1870s butions place
'000 £m £m £
Grant aided RC schools 13           <0.1 0.1 5.50
National Crisis Fund 57           0.3 4.50
Voluntary effort 37           0.1 4.00
Non-grant earning schools 37           
All non-CoE & non-RC schools 144         <0.1 0.5 3.30
Sources: Total grant aided places, and new RC school places from 
                  Committee of Council annual reports, BPP 1870 (165) 
                  and BPP 1880 (2562). Contributions from Catholic Poor     
                  Schools Committee annual report 1873. 
Funding
Table 6.6 Investment in new school provision 1870-6
£m £m share
School board investment
PWLB lending England & Wales 8.0 57%
Metropolitan Board of Works etc 0.1 1%
Church & voluntary school investment
Government grant 0.3 2%
Voluntary contributions
Church of England schools 4.2
British & Wesleyan schools 0.2
Roman Catholic schools 0.5
Non-church schools 0.7 5.6 40%
Total 14.0 100%
Sources: PWLB, Analysis of PWLB 6/1-6 application ledgers
                 Other loans:BPP  1875 (268) School Board Loans. And LSB 
                 Mortgage Ledger. Church of England National Schools 
                 annual reports. Others assumed to be at £4 per place.
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The PWLB’s monopoly of lending to school boards only lasted another three 
years, as can be seen in figure 6.3. Investment in new schools by school boards 
ran at £1.6m a year between 1877 and 1879, and all of this was financed by 
PWLB loans.22 In the early 1880s, investment in schools fell to around £1.1m, and 
the PWLB only financed £600,000 of this. The PWLB lost its monopoly because 
the government limited lending to individual borrowers to £100,000 a year. The 
London Schools Board therefore started to borrow from the Metropolitan Board of 
Works instead.23 In 1885 and 1886, investment in new schools was stable, at 
£1.2m a year, but the use of stock issues by large cities was growing, and raised 
£300,000 a year.24 The LSB’s borrowing from the MBW remained at £500,000 a 
year, pushing PWLB lending down to £400,000 a year. The PWLB’s share of 
school board borrowing therefore fell from 100 per cent in the years up to 1879, to 
just 33 per cent in 1886. The decline in PWLB lending was not due to the entry of 
competitors; instead, it was the result of the development of financial markets. 
  
                                            
22
 Committee of Council Annual Reports. BPP 1880 (2562), BPP 1881 (2948), BPP 1882 (3312), BPP 
1883 (3706), BPP 1884 (4091), BPP 1885 (4483), and BPP 1886 (4849).  
23
 MBW Annual Reports BPP 1880 (212), BPP 1881 (240), BPP 1882 (188), BPP 1883 (169), BPP 
1884 (186), BPP 1884-5 (186), and BPP 1887 (157). 
24
 Henry Burdett, Burdett’s Official Intelligence for 1884 (London, Effingham Wilson, 1884), p. 963 
charts the rise of stock issues by the largest cities. 
       Figure 6.3
      Sources: Committee of Council Annual Reports, and Metropolitan Board
                     of Works Annual Reports.
     Note:        MBW is Metropolital Board of Works. 'Other' is stock issues.
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6.2 PWLB lending to school boards 
In 1869, 3.8 million school places were needed, but only 1.8 million, or less than 
half the target, were available. Table 6.7 indicates that there was a clear 
difference in the provision of school places between those areas where school 
boards were formed and those where school boards were not formed. In the 
former, only a third of the target number of places were available; in the latter, two 
thirds of the required school places were available in 1869. This distinction 
demonstrates that the Education Department was able to target the compulsory 
formation of school boards in the areas of greatest need. The problem was worse 
in the parish areas where school boards were later formed. Here, 674,000 school 
places were needed, but only 163,000 places, or 24 per cent of the target, were 
available. Worst of all, two thirds of these parish areas had no schools at all in 
1869.25 The position in London was nearly as bad, because London had only 34 
per cent of the school places it needed. The parish areas that did not have to 
establish school boards were best off, and they had 66 per cent of the school 
places they needed. This section examines how the areas with school boards 
used PWLB loans to provide an extra 1 million school places in the 1870s.  
    
                                            
25
 Analysis based on a comparison of parish school board areas listed in the Committee of Council 
annual reports BPP 1878 (2048) and the list of schools in BPP 1870 (165). 
Table 6.7 The shortfall in school places in 1869
School
places Shortfall
target number as share
000s 000s of target
School board areas
544          London 185          34% 360          
986          Boroughs 399          40% 587          
674          Parishes 163          24% 511          
2,204      Sub total 747          34% 1,457      
Non-school board areas
225          Boroughs 119          53% 105          
1,357      Parishes 902          66% 455          
1,582      Sub total 1,021      65% 560          
3,785      Totals 1,768      47% 2,017      
Sources: Analysis of BPP 1870 (165) for school place data
                  BPP 1878 (242) for population data.
1869 school places
Available
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The 1,500 parish school boards were very small, with average populations of just 
2,200 (see table 6.8). Nearly half of these 1,500 parish boards were formed by the 
Education Department using its compulsory powers.26 With such small 
populations, most parish school board areas only needed one or two schools. In 
the 220 boroughs, average populations were nearly 50,000, and between 10 and 
15 schools would be required.27 Because most larger boroughs formed school 
boards, the 119 boroughs with school boards covered over 80 per cent of the 
population living in borough areas. Only 20 per cent of these borough boards were 
set up compulsorily by the Education Department. The 1870 Act established the 
London School Board, creating a school board sixty times the size of the average 
borough board. The clear pattern outside London was that the larger an area’s 
population, the more likely it was to voluntarily form a school board. The 
willingness of the Education Department to form school boards demonstrates that 
it was acting as a strong central body, in the manner of the Poor Law 
Commission.  
   
It normally took around six months to establish a school board – longer if the 
Education Department had to compel its formation. It would then take another 12 
months to be ready to submit a building plan for approval and make a loan 
application to the PWLB. The first two applications to the PWLB were in August 
1871, from the London School Board, for £100,000, and then in November 1871 
from the Bradford School Board for £21,450. By 1872, the number of applications 
accelerated sharply, and the PWLB fell into a routine of processing them. The 
PWLB relied on the Education Department to have vetted applications from school 
                                            
26
 The Committee of Council annual reports 1870-80 list 758 compulsorily formed parish school 
boards. 
27
 This is based on an average parish school of 180 places, and an average borough school of 460 
places. These averages are derived from the 1882 annual report BPP 1882 (3312). 
Table 6.8 Formation of school boards, 1870-76
Population
Number Average 1871 No. of Averagein school
pop. pop. boards pop. board areas
London 1 3.3m 3.3m 1          3.3m 100%
Boroughs 220 32,000 5.7m 119     48,000 81%
Parishes 14,000 800 3.3m 1,514 2,200 30%
All 14,221 12.3m 1,634 54%
Source: School board populations BPP 1878 (2342), pp. 1-44.
School districts School boards
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boards, and to issue a sanction recommending that the PWLB make the loan. The 
PWLB minute books show that, at each meeting, the PWLB solicitor would report 
a list of new school board applications, indicating that a set of standard questions 
would be sent. At the next meeting he would report on the applications for which 
the paperwork was complete, and where the Board could therefore grant the 
loan.28 At a later meeting the solicitor would then report that the school board had 
signed building contracts, and was incurring costs. The Board would then 
authorise the solicitor to make the loan advance.  
The PWLB’s processing approach was inevitable, given the average of 50 school 
applications a month throughout the period up to 1876. The outcome of the 3,000 
applications confirms the Board’s lack of a real role in sifting applications. No 
applications were rejected by the PWLB, and 97 per cent were granted, with 3 per 
cent being withdrawn by applicants. The PWLB did not have to consider the 
security for the loan, since this was guaranteed by the ability of the school board 
to levy a school rate.29 Nor did they have to consider the terms of the loans; these 
were standard at 3.5 per cent over 50 years. They were not, therefore, using the 
discretion of a bank manager to assess the merits of loan applications. Instead, 
the PWLB was simply processing applications for loans, acting as an agent of the 
Education Department and as a provider of low cost loans.    
In spite of this much reduced role in decision making, the PWLB loan data shows 
a very clear pattern of spending by large and small school boards. The far right 
hand column of table 6.9 shows that the larger the board population, the higher 
the cost per school place. The PWLB was lending £11 for every London School 
Board place provided, while in parishes the cost was £6 per place. There are two 
reasons for this relationship. Land in London and the five largest cities had to be 
bought at residential or industrial prices per acre, whereas in rural parish areas, 
land would generally be bought at much lower agricultural prices. In addition, the 
designs of the London School Board architect E. R. Robson provided nearly 10 
                                            
28
 National Archives, PWLB 2/56 and 57. The minutes for the meeting on 30 June 1875 cover 78 
pages, split over two volumes, and list 16 new school board applications, 37 new school loans agreed 
and 42 boards listed as having completed the paperwork to allow advances to be made. 
29
 Also in s57 of the 1870 Act. 
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square feet per pupil.30 In contrast the parish board would be more likely to 
provide 5-8 square feet per place, giving a low £6 per place cost. Borough school 
boards fell between the two extremes, with median populations and an average 
£8 a place costs.31 Even so, there was still a clear relationship between population 
and cost per place, as larger boroughs were spending £9 a place, and smaller 
boroughs £7 a place. 
         
There was also a clear relationship between the size of a school board’s 
population and its reliance on the PWLB. The largest and the smallest school 
boards relied more on PWLB loans, while medium sized boards relied least on 
PWLB loans. Table 6.9 shows that parish school boards relied entirely on PWLB 
loans to provide all of their new school places.32 At the other extreme of size, 
London relied on PWLB loans to provide 77 per cent of its new places. In contrast, 
                                            
30
 D. E. B. Weiner, Architecture and Social Reform in Late Victorian London (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1994), pp. 58, 104; T. A. Spalding, The Work of the London School Board (London, 
Forgotten Books 2012, first published 1900), pp. 62-70. 
31
 In 2013 the expected cost for a large primary school was £11,000 a place, a 1370-fold increase. 
However, the standard of accommodation was 10 square feet per place in the 1870s, and about 50 
square feet per place in 2013. Source: DfE Basic Need Update 22 July 2013, and Building Design 
Bulletin 99. Both at: www.education.gov.uk/schools/adminandfinance/schoolscapital/b00226896 
accessed 3 October 2013. 
32
 Table 6.6 shows the smaller parishes providing 111 per cent of their extra places from PWLB 
funding. This is because some of their voluntary schools closed in the 1870s, and were replaced with 
PWLB-funded schools or were transferred to school board management. 
Table 6.9                         School Board size and the cost of schools 1870-76
Avg. board PWLB % of new PWLB PWLB
population loans places borrowing borrowing
PWLB per head per school
funded population place
'000 £m £.p £
London 3267 2.3 77% 0.69 11
Largest 5 boroughs 338 0.9 68% 0.51 9
Other large boroughs 90 0.9 57% 0.40 8
Small boroughs 18 0.8 65% 0.41 7
Larger parishes 11 1.3 101% 0.63 6
Smaller parishes 1 1.8 111% 0.91 6
All school boards 7 8.0 82% 0.60 8
Sources:        See appendicies 6.A and 6.B for sources and detail.
Notes:            Largest 5 boroughs are Liverpool, Manchester,
                         Birmingham, Leeds and Sheffield. Large boroughs are those
                         with populations over 50,000. Larger parishes are those with
                         populations over 5,000.
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the larger boroughs used PWLB funding to provide only 57 per cent of their extra 
school places. The cause of the variation was the absolute lack of voluntary 
contributions to build new voluntary schools in parish areas, and the relative lack 
of new voluntary investment in London and the five largest boroughs. In the larger 
borough areas, voluntary contributions provided over 40 per cent of new places, 
so reliance on PWLB loans was much lower. The result of this pattern was that 
small parishes borrowed 91p per head of population from the PWLB, while 
London borrowed 69p per head. In the middle, all but the five largest borough 
school boards borrowed 40-41p per head. The resulting ‘U shaped’ relationship 
between population and PWLB borrowing per head is shown clearly in figure 6.4. 
    
The ‘U shaped’ relationship of figure 6.4 is explained by the different ways large 
and small school boards used the PWLB. The six largest boards relied heavily on 
the PWLB, and made large multiple applications because they needed to build 
large numbers of schools. They also saw a relatively low level of voluntary school 
building. As a result, their borrowing per head was high, and their ambitions 
resulted in high costs per place. At the other extreme, parish school boards had 
even greater needs, because they had been formed in areas where no voluntary 
contributions were available, so the PWLB was their only source of funding. Their 
desire for low cost schools led to the lowest cost per place, but this was not 
enough to reduce their borrowing per head below the level in London. The 
Figure 6.4
Sources: As table 6.9.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1
10
100
1000
10000
London 5 largest
boros
Other
large
boros
Small
boros
Larger
parishes
Smaller
parishes
P
W
LB
 le
n
d
in
g 
£
 p
e
r 
h
e
ad
 o
f 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
A
ve
 b
o
ar
d
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
  
(l
o
g 
sc
al
e
)
School board borrowing 1870-6
average population PWLB lending/head
 175 
 
majority of boroughs enjoyed higher levels of voluntary school provision, and so 
relied less on the PWLB, and their levels of borrowing per head were therefore 
half those in smaller parishes.  
The individual examples of Sheffield, Derby and Chesterfield in table 6.10 confirm 
these U shaped relationships.33 In 1869 Sheffield was the fifth largest borough in 
England, but had only 26 per cent of the school places it needed. The city 
therefore borrowed £165,000 from the PWLB to build 25 new schools.34 Yet, even 
with the building of 19 new voluntary schools, Sheffield still had a 14 per cent 
shortfall of places in 1879. Derby was a medium sized borough with a population 
of just under 50,000, and in 1869 had a school place shortfall of just 7 per cent. In 
spite of this, the Derby School Board borrowed £15,000 from the PWLB for six 
new schools. Derby also saw six new voluntary schools built, and by the end of 
1879 had a 46 per cent surplus of places. Chesterfield was smaller, with a 
population of 11,000, and started with just under half of the school places it 
needed. Chesterfield borrowed £8,000 from the PWLB to build four new schools, 
ending 1879 with a 30 per cent place surplus. Table 6.10 shows that the ‘U 
shaped’ relationship appears again, with large Sheffield and small Chesterfield 
having borrowed twice as much per head of population as medium sized Derby. 
Sheffield’s schools were also twice as expensive to build per place as those in the 
smaller localities of Derby and Chesterfield. 
   
The data in table 6.10 raise a value for money issue about the behaviour of Derby 
and Chesterfield school boards. Both borrowed more from the PWLB than they 
needed to, and built more school places than they needed to, leading both to have 
substantial surpluses of places by the end of the decade. Derby in particular had 
                                            
33
 Derby and Chesterfield were the only boroughs in Derbyshire in the 1870s. 
34
 All of the data in this paragraph comes from BPP 1880 (2562), pp. 571, 737-8, Education annual 
report. 
Table 6.10 Derbyshire and Sheffield Borough school boards
popu PWLB loans per
lation 1869 1879 head place
000 shortfall sch brd vol sch deficit £ £
240 Sheffield 74% 15,265  8,604 14% 0.69 11
50 Derby 7% 2,822    1,515 -46% 0.30 5
11 Chesterfield 53% 1,333    269     -31% 0.71 6
Sources: As table 6.9.
School places 1869-79
added by
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no need to build board schools, and could have avoided borrowing altogether. The 
addition of a single voluntary school would have meant that Derby would have had 
sufficient school places in 1879. Instead, the voluntary sector built an extra six 
schools. The most likely explanation of this behaviour is that the school board was 
taking advantage of low cost loans, and the voluntary sector of readily available 
gifts, in order to act competitively and seek to dominate school provision. 
Chesterfield’s position was less extreme than Derby’s, but it could have halved its 
borrowing and still met its target number of school places.  
Value for money concerns also appear in an examination of the four parish school 
boards formed within the area of the Belper Poor Law Union (shown in table 6.11). 
All four started in 1869 with large shortfalls of school places, with two of the four 
having no school places at all. By 1879, Morley still had no school places, while 
South Wingfield had borrowed £3,400 from the PWLB and built a school 40 per 
cent larger than it needed. Heage had borrowed £2,000 from the PWLB to build 
two schools, when a single school would have met its places target. Belper, the 
largest of the four boards, had a PWLB loan of £7,275 to build three new schools, 
but still had a shortfall of places in 1879. Marion Johnson, in Derbyshire Village 
Schools, observes that one Belper board school was poorly attended because it 
was a mile out of town and up a steep hill. The older voluntary school supported 
by the Strutt family continued to be more popular, because it was in the centre of 
town.35 Of the seven local examples, six can be criticised on value for money 
grounds: four provided far too many school places; two had high costs per place; 
and the remaining board did nothing at all.  
              
                                            
35
 Marion Johnson, Derbyshire Village Schools in the Nineteenth Century (Newton Abbott, David and 
Charles, 1970), p. 130. 
Table 6.11 Parish school boards in Belper Union, Derbyshire
Popu PWLB loans per
lation 1869 1879 head place
deficit sch brd vol sch deficit £ £
8,527     Belper 85% 785     162   19% 0.85 9
2,195     Heage 64% 269     156   -52% 0.91 7
226         Morley 100% -      -    100% 0.00 0
1,330     S Wingfield 100% 310     -    -40% 2.56 11
12,278   Totals 83% 1,364 318   1% 1.03 9
Sources: BPP 1870 (165) & BPP 1880 (2562).
School places 1869-79
added by
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By 1879, the national outcome was that the 53 per cent shortage of school places 
in 1869 had been turned into a 9 per cent surplus, (see table 6.12).36 There were, 
though, significant disparities. The PWLB loans of £8m had provided an extra 1 
million school board places, while voluntary contributions had added 228,000 
extra places in school board areas. Despite this, there was still a 10 per cent 
shortage of places in school board areas. In areas without school boards the 
outcome in 1879 was very different, with a 36 per cent surplus of places. In 
parishes without school boards just over 1 million school places were added, 
leading to a 43 per cent surplus of school places. In effect, too much money had 
been raised in non-school board parish areas, and twice as many school places 
as were needed had been built. Nationally there were enough school places in 
1879, but there were too many school places in rural areas, and not enough in 
urban areas. 
   
This section has provided three important conclusions about the PWLB. First, the 
PWLB’s role in lending to school boards was completely different to its role as a 
market rate lender to mine owners or turnpike trusts. The PWLB in the 1870s was 
                                            
36
 Both 1869 and 1879 shortages of places are measured against the 1871 census population. If the 
1881 census population is used for 1879, the surplus was 1 per cent.  
Table 6.12 Provision of extra school places 1869-79 
School 1869 %age Extra school places in 1879
places shortage 1869-79 provided by shortage
needed surplus(-) school brds voluntary surplus(-)
000s 000s 000s
School board areas
544         London 66% 210             64              16%
986         Boroughs 60% 318             193           8%
674         Parishes 76% 487             29-              8%
2,204     Sub total 66% 1,016          228           10%
Non-school board areas
225         Boroughs 47% -              81              11%
1,357     Parishes 34% -              1,052        -43%
1,582     Sub total 35% -              1,133        -36%
3,785     Totals 53% 1,016          1,361        -9%
Sources: Analysis of BPP 1870(165) for 1869 school data, BPP 1880 (2562)
                  for 1879 school data, BPP 1878 (2342) for school board formations 
                  and population data.
Note:      Voluntary school numbers in parish areas with school boards fell as
                 schools  closed or were transferred to school board management.
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predominantly a provider of low cost finance, with no discretion about who it lent 
to, or the terms on which it lent. However, the PWLB was far more important in the 
1870s than it was in the 1820s. In the 1870s it was virtually the monopoly provider 
of finance to school boards, and provided more than half the finance to build new 
school places. PWLB loans were particularly important to parish school boards, 
and to the six largest school boards in the country, but were less important to 
medium and small boroughs. 
6.3 Real and imagined problems for the Treasury 
Between 1870 and 1876, the PWLB lent £10.2m to local school boards in 
England, Scotland and Wales. This amounted to a quarter of all PWLB lending 
over the 60 years after 1817, and was on a much larger scale than even sanitary 
lending. Its scale caused some real problems for the Treasury in predicting annual 
changes in the level of the national debt. The Treasury was not able to reduce 
PWLB lending to schools, (and so reduce the upward pressure on the national 
debt), because it could not increase the 3.5 per cent interest rate. The Treasury 
also had a real problem with the rapidly increasing cost of annual grants to 
schools. The low 3.5 per cent interest rate caused the Treasury some significant 
imagined problems about potential losses on school board loans. These problems 
for the Treasury were largely the result of the success of the Education 
Department in promoting new school building by school boards.  
The Treasury’s role on the setting of interest rates for PWLB lending changed 
over time. At the 1875 Select Committee, Reginald Welby, the future permanent 
head of the Treasury, was asked about the setting of interest rates.37 He 
professed no desire for the power to change the PWLB’s interest rates or the 
ability to write off unrecoverable loans.38 This was a change to the pattern before 
1860. Then, both the Treasury and the PWLB believed that decisions on interest 
rates and write offs were made by the Treasury.39 After 1860, the reality was that 
even if the Treasury had wanted to be able to control interest rates, it did not. After 
1860, the PWLB interest rates were mostly set by legislation, not by the Treasury. 
                                            
37
 Welby was being questioned by the Select Committee on the Public Works Loan Act Amendment 
Bill and the Public Works Loan Act Consolidation Bill. The Select Committee was formed to combine 
the two technical housekeeping Bills into a single Bill. 
38
 BPP 1875 (358) Select Committee report, qq. 830-832. 
39
 In chapter 2 the debts of Adams and Hunt involved repeated consultation with the Treasury. 
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It was true that the 1872 Act gave the Treasury a specific power to increase the 
3.5 per cent interest rate for sanitary loans if it was necessary to prevent a loss on 
sanitary loans.40 As there was never a loss or a threat of a loss, the power was 
never used. Welby was right to conclude that major interest rate policy was set by 
Parliament in the 1870s.41  
Welby’s evidence to the committee then turned to the Treasury’s imagined 
problem with interest rates. Welby argued that a 3.5 per cent rate would end with 
a loss to the government; as he stated, ‘my belief is that … the State is a loser by 
it’.42 The ‘Treasury mind’ assumed that all PWLB loans were subject to a level of 
bad debts, and that an interest rate of 3.5 per cent offered too little profit to 
compensate for inevitable bad debts.43 Under further questioning, Welby was 
forced to modify his views on the loss-making potential of 3.5 per cent loans.44 
Eventually, Welby conceded that loans made at 3.5 per cent by the PWLB, acting 
on its own discretion, ‘might come out even’, but added ‘I do not think there is any 
gain to the State’ in lending at 3.5 per cent.45 
Welby further modified his view by saying:  
the view of the Treasury has been that … a uniform rate of 4 per cent 
… would in all probability save the State from loss, and be a 
sufficient boon to the localities to enable them to obtain the objects 
which the legislature has had in view; but I think that has not been 
quite the view of the Legislature.46 
Alexander Whitelaw MP was not convinced by Welby’s argument, replying that, ‘I 
do not understand why you wish to increase the rate of interest charged from 3.5 
per cent to 4 per cent, in order to cover losses where there had not been losses’.47 
It is clear from these exchanges about interest rates in the case of sanitary and 
schools loans that the Select Committee did not share the Treasury fear of losses 
                                            
40
 Public Health Act 1875 s243. There appears to be no such provision in the 1870 Education Act. 
41
 BPP 1875 (358) Select Committee Report, qq. 828-9. 
42
 BPP 1875 (358) q. 826. 
43
 BPP 1875 (358) q. 855. 
44
 BPP 1875 (358) q. 850-856. 
45
 BPP 1875 (358) qq. 850, 851 and 853. 
46
 BPP 1875 (358) q. 880. 
47
 BPP 1875 (358) q. 888. Whitelaw was chairman of the Glasgow School Board, so spoke with some 
experience. 
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on these loans. The Select Committee recognised that loans to school boards and 
local boards of health had not generated bad debts. They also recognised a 
significant degree of confusion in Welby’s arguments about interest rates and 
losses on PWLB loans. 
   
Table 6.13 demonstrates that the Select Committee was correct in its assumption 
that there were no bad debts on school loans. The table also shows that Welby’s 
fears of losses on school loans were misplaced. School loans were in fact very 
profitable. When the government were borrowing at under 3.25 per cent and 
lending at 3.5 per cent, with no bad debts, and with expenses running at a trivial 
level, substantial profits were inevitable.48 PWLB lending which produced such a 
significant profit, actually involved a subsidy from local ratepayers to national tax 
payers, not the reverse, as Welby feared. Like Trevelyan in 1852, Welby appears 
to have taken the view that because the PWLB had suffered from bad debts in the 
past, it would also suffer in the future. This view ignored the fact that most past 
bad debts were on loans where Parliament not the PWLB had made the lending 
decision. Losses on school and sanitary loans were extremely rare because they 
were backed by rate income, and borrowing limits were in place. Welby’s fears of 
losses on 3.5 per cent rate backed loans were therefore imaginary not real. 
Treasury fears were more justified on the Treasury’s inability to predict the annual 
impact of PWLB lending on the national debt.49 Until 1862, PWLB lending had 
                                            
48
 Subsequent PWLB annual reports (BPP 1888 (200) appendix D, and BPP 1898 (228) p12) show 
that there were no bad debts from school loans. 
49
 BPP 1875 (358) q. 845. 
Table 6.13 Profit on PWLB school lending 1870-76
£000 £000
Costs £10.2m borrowed for 50 years at 3.22% 8,211    
Expenses at 0.4% of £10.2m 41          8,252   
There were no write-offs on school loans
Income £10.2m lent at 3.5% for 50 years 8,925   
Profit 673       
Sources: Interest on borrowed money: Homer, History of Interest Rates .
                  Expenses, see appendix 7.A. Write-offs, BPP 1888 (200), p. 316.
Note:       The £10.2m PWLB lending includes loans to Scottish schools.
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generally been less than £250,000 a year. In terms of managing the national 
finances and the £738m national debt, this was an insignificant sum.50 Even when 
PWLB lending doubled in the 1860s, this was still manageable. While PWLB loans 
did not count against annual government spending, they did increase the national 
debt by the total of the sums lent, less loan repayments from borrowers. Before 
1871, the average effect on the national debt of net PWLB lending had been less 
than £100,000 a year, and had only exceeded £300,000 in six years. PWLB 
lending did not, therefore, have any material impact on national debt forecasting. 
After 1872, this predictability ended, and in 1875 and 1876 PWLB advances, net 
of repayments, led to £6m a year increases in the national debt. These increases 
had not been forecast, and thus ‘expose(d)’ the Chancellor of the Exchequer to 
‘some difficulties’.51  
It is no surprise, therefore, to see that in 1874, Northcote, the new Tory Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, wrote four times to Disraeli expressing concern about the level 
and treatment of PWLB loans.52 In the last letter, Northcote wrote that cheap 
PWLB loans would force the government to ‘borrow, while our policy ought to be 
in the direction of reducing debt’. There is no recorded response from Disraeli to 
Northcote. The Chancellor will have recognised that, without a positive response 
from the Prime Minister, he had little chance of limiting PWLB lending, or of 
increasing interest rates. The Treasury attempted to reduce the uncertainty about 
future levels of PWLB advances by asking all potential borrowers to tell the PWLB 
how much they wished to borrow from the PWLB in the following year.53 The 
result was predictable, with local school boards telling the PWLB that they wished 
to borrow £3.6m, and then only submitting applications for £2m.54 These 
estimates did not provide the chancellor with a good predictor of borrowing in the 
coming 12 months. 
In 1878 Northcote raised his concern again in a Commons debate, declaring that  
                                            
50
 See appendix 1.A for totals of PWLB advances. National debt in 1870. Mitchell and Deane, British 
Historical Statistics, p. 403. 
51
 BPP 1875 (358) q. 857. 
52
 British Library Additional Manuscript MSS50016, Iddesleigh Papers, f189, 215, 251 and 
254.(Northcote was made Lord Iddesleigh). 
53
 BPP 1875 (33) late draft of Public Works Loans Act, section 4. 
54
 BPP 1877 (276), p. 7, PWLB second annual report and BPP 1878 (241), p. 4, PWLB third annual 
report. 
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The Education Department will naturally desire to carry on and promote 
the work of education, and they have pressed for loans to be made on 
terms which certainly appear to be unrenumerative to the exchequer.55 
The result was a Treasury minute dated 16 August 1879, which increased PWLB 
rates for loans over 40 years to 4 per cent. The same minute also imposed a limit 
of £100,000 on loans to an individual authority in a single year.56 The first change 
was ineffective, since loans for 20 years or less could still be made at 3.5 per cent. 
The £100,000 limit was also ineffective, since it would only affect the London 
School Board.57 In the event, PWLB lending to school boards fell sharply in the 
1880s, but this was not because of the Treasury minute.58 Instead, the fall partly 
reflected the near completion of the main building programme, and partly the fact 
that four of the largest borrowers ceased to use the PWLB. The London School 
Board started to borrow from the Metropolitan Board of Works in 1880.59 In 
addition, Sheffield, Leeds and Birmingham ceased to use the PWLB in the 1880s, 
relying instead on stock issues raised by their local councils.60  
The Treasury loss of control over PWLB lending was repeated in their loss of 
control of Education Department spending generally. Table 6.14 shows that 
education spending increased fivefold, from £600,000 in 1869 to £3.3m in 1879.61 
There were three causes of the increase. First, the volume of PWLB loans, at over 
£1m a year, to school boards was much higher than the previous level of capital 
grants. Second, there had been a four-fold increase in annual grants payable to 
schools, and third, a minor difficulty was that Education Department running costs 
had doubled. R. R. W. Lingen was now the permanent head of the Treasury, 
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 House of Commons debates, 11 April 1878, series 3 Vol 239 c1171.  
56
 BPP 1880 (208), PWLB Annual Report 1879-80, p. 3. 
57
 BPP 1880 (208), p. 3.  
58
 PWLB annual reports. For 1877 to 1881, BPP 1877 (276), BPP 1878 (241), BPP 1878-79 (339), 
BPP 1880 (208), 1881 (261), and BPP 1882 (281).  
59
 The LSB began to borrow from the Metropolitan Board of Works, which issued stock at 3.5 per cent 
and lent at the same rate to the LSB. 
60
 The PWLB annual reports show no schools advances to these cities, even though they both 
continued to build more schools in these years. 
61
 BPP 1870 (165), p. lxxvi for grants in 1869. BPP 1880 (2562), p. 164 for grants in 1879. BPP 1880 
(208), p. 6 for PWLB cash advances in 1879.  
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having previously occupied the same position in the Education Department. Yet 
he failed in many attempts to control education spending in the 1870s.62 
    
In 1878, Northcote, as Chancellor increased the pressure on the Education 
Department, when he told Prime Minister Disraeli that ‘I am going to make a push 
for a reduction of the education grant’.63 The Treasury made two proposals for 
grant reductions, first of 6 per cent and then of 3 per cent, but both were rejected 
by the Education Department.64 The battle over the scale of annual grant 
spending culminated in Disraeli calling a meeting of the Committee of Council on 
Education. At this meeting, Disraeli decisively sided with the Education 
Department, not with his Chancellor of the Exchequer.65 The substantive battle 
over grants was over, and annual grant spending continued to increase 
throughout the 1880s. The Treasury had failed completely in its attempt to control 
education grant spending, and its efforts to limit PWLB lending were ineffective. 
The volume of PWLB lending for schools caused the Treasury major problems. 
The Treasury could not raise PWLB interest rates in order to reduce demand for 
PWLB loans. Nor could the Treasury control Education Department spending on 
annual grants, as this rose even faster than the number of schools. Nor could the 
PWLB ‘reinterpret’ the 1870 Act in order to restrict the availability of low cost 
loans. Instead, the Education Department controlled the volume of lending by 
compulsorily forming around 800 school boards and not preventing the significant 
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 Maurice Wright, ‘Treasury Control 1854-1914’, in Gillian Sutherland ed, Studies in the Growth of 
Nineteenth Century Government (London, Routledge Keagan and Paul, 1972), pp. 213-7. 
63
 British Library Add Ms 50018 ff. 129-33, letter from Northcote to Disraeli, 9 January 1879.  
64
 Sutherland, Policy Making, p. 214. 
65
 Sutherland, Policy Making, pp. 218-9, quoting from Lord George Hamilton’s Parliamentary 
Reminiscences and Reflections 1868-85 (1928). Hamilton was the vice president of the council. 
Table 6.14 Education costs increased five fold in 1870s
1869 1879
£000 £000
Capital grants 36
PWLB capital advances 1,095           
Annual grants to schools 503 2,022           
Inspection/HQ costs 85 179              
Total 624 3,296           
Sources:    Committee of Council annual reports for
1869 and 1879, except for PWLB advances
from PWLB annual report for 1880.
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over-provision of schools in parish areas. When Northcote pressed for spending 
reductions, he was comprehensively outvoted by the Prime Minister and his 
cabinet colleagues. There was more cabinet support for increasing elementary 
education provision than there was for spending and debt reductions. In this 
environment it is hardly surprising that the Treasury focussed on the problems 
caused by the PWLB’s success. 
Finally, the Select Committee recommended that the PWLB should produce an 
annual report to Parliament. The first was produced in 1874-75, and they have 
been produced annually since. They represent the key way that the Board is 
accountable to Parliament. By 1876 most of the many agencies that governments 
had established were producing annual reports for Parliament. Only a few like the 
Crown Agents and the Ordnance were not meeting this basic standard of 
accountability. Even with the hugely increased volume of loan applications, the 
governance of the PWLB remained sound, and it managed to successfully 
process the applications. Given the Treasury view of the education department’s 
inability or lack of willingness to control its spending, the governance of the 
education department can be questioned. Its willingness to sanction the massive 
over provision of schools in rural areas also questions its decision making. 
However, the sheer size of the Ordnance, the Post Office and the naval dockyards 
still appear to make their governance a much larger problem. 
6.4  A changed role for the PWLB 
The PWLB’s £10m lending to school boards was so large that it meant that the 
PWLB’s main role in the 1870s was providing low cost loans. Figure 6.5 shows 
that, in the five years to 1876, just 15 per cent of its lending was made at 5 per 
cent in the role of high cost lender. A full 85 per cent of its lending was as provider 
of low cost loans. The change of role had started in 1836, with the reduction to 4 
per cent of the interest rate for workhouse loans. However, by 1857, the PWLB 
rate had reverted to 5 per cent, and the insurance companies came to dominate 
workhouse lending. A second wave of low cost lending began in the 1860s, and 
table 6.6 indicates that without lending to school boards, low cost lending would 
have stabilised at a little under 40 per cent of PWLB lending. However, the scale 
of lending to school boards was so great that the five year average rose to 85 per 
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cent after 1872, and to 93 per cent in 1876. School lending had changed the 
entire focus and role of the PWLB.  
  
Hubbard was questioned at some length by the 1875 Select Committee about the 
role of the PWLB, providing him with the first opportunity since 1859 to have his 
view recorded. Hubbard’s starting point was that ‘the State has no business to be 
a money lender at all’.66 Despite this, Hubbard recognised that there was a 
valuable role for the PWLB as lender at 5 per cent.67 Hubbard had much more 
difficultly supporting the provision of high volumes of loans at less than market 
rates. He accepted that government lending could be ‘justified by some great 
necessity which has to be dealt with immediately … on terms not available in the 
money market’.68 Hubbard also accepted that loans for sanitation and elementary 
education fell within the definition of ‘great necessity’.69 Even so, Hubbard’s view 
of ‘necessity’ was limited, and in response to another question, he replied that:  
it is with very great regret that I have seen that the tendency of 
legislation of late years has been to suggest a vast number of new 
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 BPP 1875 (358) Select Committee Report q. 388. 
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 BPP 1875 (358) q. 336. 
68
 BPP 1875 (358) q. 480. 
69
 BPP 1875 (358) q. 389. 
Figure 6.5
Source: PWLB application ledgers and appendix 1.A
Notes:   All other loans nearly always carried interest at 5 per cent
                Low cost loans varied between 3.25 per cent and 4 per cent
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necessities which are to be satisfied by making the government the 
medium of supplying capital.70 
The making of these loans at 3.5 per cent, and the resulting boom in school 
lending, seemed entirely alien to Hubbard, and not something that he could 
support at all: 
If the purpose of the PWLB was to enable borrowing authorities to 
obtain money at lower terms than they would on the open market, I 
should consider that our existence was a public disaster.71  
Hubbard rightly saw the provision of low cost loans as removing the PWLB’s 
independence and discretion.72 The PWLB had always valued its independence of 
action, and saw a great benefit in removing the government, Parliament and the 
Treasury from decision making.73 Equally important to the Board was its discretion 
to decide on the adequacy of the borrower’s security. In theory, the Board had 
discretion about the interest rate and the terms of the loan, but in practice it chose 
not to use its discretion.74 In the cases where the PWLB was acting as a provider 
of low cost loans, it had no discretion, because the interest rate and the security 
were laid down in the relevant Act. Nor did it act independently; instead, a 
government department made a recommendation that the PWLB should advance 
a loan. All the PWLB board had to do was satisfy itself that the provisions of the 
relevant Act had been complied with. Hubbard therefore saw loans to schools as 
requiring that the PWLB be no more than a ‘mere channel through which a certain 
operation is to be performed’.75  
Members of the Select Committee described the PWLB’s new role as being 
‘agents of the public departments in the advancement of money’.76 Hubbard was 
asked if this was the case ‘would it not then be better to move the loan making 
function to the Treasury’. Hubbard at first agreed, on the grounds that the PWLB 
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 BPP 1875 (358) q. 483. 
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 BPP 1875 (358) qq. 389, 388. 
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 BPP 1875 (358) q. 379. 
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 BPP 1875 (358) qq. 357, 365, 398. 
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 BPP 1875 (358) q. 348. 
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 BPP 1875 (358) q. 379. 
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 BPP 1875 (358) qq. 467, 511. 
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would have no substantive role.77 Hubbard then considered the practicalities of 
lending, and argued that the PWLB was best placed to manage any government 
lending, stating that it had  
all the mechanisms required for the making of loans, for collecting 
interest, for receiving instalments, and for enforcing payment if payment 
is not made.78 
Hubbard’s focus, not surprisingly, was on his preferred role as a lender at 5 per 
cent, a rate that in the 1860s and 1870s was above market rates. This satisfied 
Hubbard’s view of the PWLB as lending when the market would not. Hubbard also 
spoke repeatedly about his distaste for the new general practice of making most 
loans at below market rates. In contrast, the Select Committee’s view was more 
positive, and a member distanced himself from Hubbard’s view, saying: 
but is not the object of the PWLB to advance the interests not of the 
State, but of localities where great public works are required by 
enabling them to obtain loans upon better terms than they could obtain 
on the open market.79 
The Select Committee was of course made up of MPs who had passed the 1870 
Elementary Education Act and the 1872 Public Health Act, creating the power for 
localities to borrow at 3.5 per cent. They could therefore be expected to support 
the role of the PWLB as a provider of low cost loans. The Select Committee’s 
views appeared positive and forward looking, while Hubbard’s appeared negative 
and backward looking. The difference invites the question whether there was a 
financing option that would have met both views. To do so, it would have had to 
support the legislative requirement to see a rapid and universal provision of 
education. But it would have needed to avoid causing the Treasury difficulties over 
national debt forecasting, and yet allow local bodies access to loans at 3.5 per 
cent. 
The first option would have been for the PWLB to have stuck to the high cost 
lender principle, and only lent at 5 per cent. This would have satisfied Hubbard’s 
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 BPP 1875 (358) q. 368. 
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dislike of lending at below market rates. It would also have attracted insurance 
companies into the market, and made loans available at around 4.5 per cent. The 
main disadvantage of this approach is that it would have been unlikely to result in 
such a rapid increase in investment by school boards. After all, borrowing at 5 per 
cent for sanitary purposes before 1863 had been very slow. A second 
disadvantage of 5 per cent loans was that, with no bad debts, loans would have 
looked too profitable to the government, with a 1.75 per cent margin between 
government’s borrowing and lending costs. As with workhouse loans and public 
health loans, this would have led to pressure from school boards for a reduction in 
the 5 per cent rate. In addition, the absence of 3.5 per cent loans would have 
significantly slowed down the growth of elementary school building and created a 
campaign for lower rates. 
A different approach would have been to encourage larger local school boards to 
raise investment capital through stock issues. The Metropolitan Board of Works 
had raised £17m at 3.5 per cent between 1869 and 1880 through stock issues, so 
it was a tried and tested approach.80 J. H. Clapham reveals that the MBW stock 
issues benefited from a government guarantee, effectively removing virtually all 
risk from the investor.81 Manchester Corporation had also gained local Act 
approval for a successful £3m stock issue in 1872 to fund its waterworks 
investments.82 Once a local body had gained the power to make a stock issue, it 
would invite individuals to buy stock in multiples of £20, which could be freely 
traded on the stock market. The advantage to the government was that the lending 
contract was between the local authority and the individual, not with the 
government. This form of borrowing did not, therefore, count against the national 
debt. The advantage to the local body was that the interest rate was far below the 
PWLB’s default 5 per cent rate, and below the 4.5 per cent that insurance 
companies would offer.  
However, the stock option would not deliver low cost loans to medium and small 
school boards. Between 1880 and 1883, municipal stock issues by seven large 
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city corporations raised £15m.83 The stock was invariably issued with interest 
payable at 3.5 per cent. For the very large authorities this route was no more 
expensive than PWLB loans at 3.5 per cent, and loans were often for 60 years. 
However, this route was only used for raising sums of more than £500,000 
between 1869 and 1880. For smaller sums, the costs of promoting a local Act and 
promoting a stock issue would have made the option too expensive. In 1874, W.H. 
Smith, who was Financial Secretary to the Treasury, suggested to Northcote that 
local government should be encouraged to make more use of stock issues. Smith 
argued that this option would remove ‘the inconvenience to the exchequer … of 
large increases … in PWLB funding’.84 He was right for larger authorities, but 
wrong for smaller ones. Northcote chose not to pursue this initiative, and chose to 
develop his own, more radical approach. 
Northcote wrote to Disraeli in November 1874 to outline a nine point plan.85 He 
proposed that the PWLB would issue £5m of stock and lend it on to smaller 
authorities. There would be several advantages to this approach. First, it had been 
successfully tried with the MBW in the 1870s. Second, money raised in this way 
would not count against the national debt, and the Chancellor would not be 
accountable for its scale or variations. Third, it would solve the problem of stock 
issues being too expensive for smaller authorities. The 1880s experience of larger 
authorities suggests that there were sufficient investors to make the scheme work 
at an interest rate similar to the PWLB’s 3.5 per cent. With Parliament continuing 
to dictate the purposes for which local authorities could borrow, the rates at which 
they could borrow and setting borrowing limits, most of the necessary safeguards 
could have been retained. 
The disadvantage was that it would have required a very different PWLB. In order 
for the debt not to count as part of the national debt, the PWLB would have 
needed to be more independent from government, and more like the MBW. A 
more independent PWLB would have led to local authorities that were more 
independent from government, and able to raise their own funds. Northcote went 
so far as to write outlining the idea to George Sclater-Booth, as President of the 
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 Burdett, Official Intelligence, p. 963. 
84
 British Library Add MSS 50016, f. 256, Northcote to Disraeli,14 October 1874. Iddesleigh papers 
Vol IV.  
85
 Northcote to Disraeli, 6 November 1874. Iddesleigh papers vol IV f. 263. 
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Local Government Board, to Welby at the Treasury, and to Hubbard at the PWLB. 
None of the three appeared enthusiastic, and the idea was dropped.  
Why did this idea not take off? The replies of Sclater-Booth, Welby and Hubbard to 
Northcote do not appear to have survived. Even so, it is possible to speculate 
about their likely responses, and to understand why the proposal was not pursued. 
First, Sclater Booth at the LGB was in the middle of promoting the 1875 Public 
Health Act, and this maintained the existing mortgage based PWLB and insurance 
company lending pattern. Sir Harry Page argues that the LGB and the Treasury 
had very different ideas about how to finance local capital spending. In particular, 
the Treasury’s 1875 Local Loans Act was more sympathetic to more complex 
financing methods. Page notes, however, that the Act was little understood, and 
little used.86 For the LGB, the loan sanction regime, with local government bodies 
dependent on LGB approval for a loan application, made the LGB a powerful 
body. In contrast, a stock issue based regime would depend on local Acts, and 
these gave the LGB no role at all, and therefore no power. In a similar way, Welby 
at the Treasury exercised considerable power over local government borrowing 
under the PWLB regime. With a properly independent PWLB raising money and 
lending it on, the Treasury powers and controls would diminish. In short, neither 
the LGB nor the Treasury would have welcomed a more independent PWLB or 
more independent local authorities. 
Hubbard’s objections are more speculative still; by 1875, Hubbard was close to 
retirement; he had been at the PWLB for 20 years, and had very traditional views 
about government lending. This could have made him interested in a proposal that 
would take financing local public infrastructure back to lending from individuals to 
local bodies via stock issues. On the other hand, it would have been a very large 
change for the PWLB, and perhaps too much for Hubbard’s traditional outlook. It is 
also likely that all the participants in the debate would have seen the sharp rise in 
sanitary and education lending as a short term issue. Once the investments were 
complete, lending would fall to earlier, more manageable levels. There was 
therefore no real need to develop difficult new solutions. Finally, Northcote had 
other problems as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 1870s, as the government’s 
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 Page, Local Authority Borrowing, p. 146. 
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finances got worse as spending rose and income ceased to rise as fast. The 
development of a solution to the PWLB problem may simply have fallen down the 
agenda, under the pressure of other larger problems. 
While there was a clear change in the PWLB’s role between 1817 and 1876, there 
is also a sense in which the PWLB role had always been to compensate for a 
changing range of market failures. In 1817 (and in 1793 and 1811), the market 
failure was assumed to be the banks’ inability to provide liquidity in a credit crisis. 
Between 1817 and 1836, the PWLB was a lender at market rates, making up for 
the market’s failure to offer loans to individual public works projects. This role 
continued after 1836, but as a declining proportion of the PWLB’s lending. The 
PWLB’s final role was as a low cost lender, and this role came to dominate by 
1876. However, the PWLB can still be seen as lending because of a market 
failure. In this case the market failure was an inability to lend at interest rates low 
enough to encourage local authorities to borrow in order to deliver the 
government’s social and welfare policies. The PWLB was therefore essential as a 
means of financing public infrastructure when the market was unwilling to lend on 
terms that were attractive to local communities. 
Conclusions 
Between 1870 and 1876, the PWLB lent £10m to school boards, and was virtually 
the monopoly provider of loans during these years. Without doubt, the PWLB’s 
role was a major contributor to the more than doubling of the number of 
elementary education school places over just ten years. This was the largest 
impact on the lives of the majority of the population of any stream of PWLB 
lending over the period 1817 to 1876. The three other main causes of this success 
were: the 1870 Act set a very clear and measurable objective; the Education 
Department used its powers to compel the formation of school boards in areas of 
high unmet need; and voluntary fund raising increased substantially, to provide 
more than half the extra school places. However, the Act had two shortcomings. 
First, the sheer scale of voluntary fundraising in parish areas meant that far too 
many school places were provided in rural areas where school boards were not 
needed. Second, the £10m scale of PWLB lending to school boards and the 
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continuing annual costs of increased educational provision caused problems for 
the Treasury. Nationally, the successes far outweighed the shortcomings.  
By 1876, the PWLB had completed its transformation from a market rate lender to 
a provider of low cost loans. In this second role, the PWLB had become 
recognisably the body that exists in 2014. In the 1870s the PWLB was focussed 
on low cost, low risk lending to local government to finance public infrastructure 
investment in sanitation and elementary education.87 In both areas, the PWLB 
was the major provider of finance to local government bodies. However, the price 
of this important role for the PWLB was that, in practice, the PWLB had little 
independence and little discretion over lending decisions. Decisions over which 
schemes to support were taken by government departments, and the PWLB was 
primarily acting as their agent. The PWLB’s role in 2014 is also as an agent of 
central government, with very little decision making discretion. The PWLB is also 
the major provider of financing for local government infrastructure investments in 
2014. 
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 BPP 1876 (396), p. iv, and BPP 1878 (269), p. v; Local Taxation returns for 1874/5 and 1876/7. 
Comparison of outstanding debt totals. 
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Chapter 7, Conclusion: was the PWLB a success? 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Symbols of 
success… 
The PWLB lent £2.3m to 
the London Schools Board 
between 1870 and 1876 to 
build over 200 new schools. 
Each bore the LSB crest 
and the date of completion. 
This one is Wyvil Street 
School in South Lambeth 
Road, London. It is still a 
primary school in 2014. The 
LSB was an enormously 
capable school board, 
although it was criticised for 
extravagance. 
Figure 7.2, Symbols of 
failure… 
The Thames Tunnel was 
an engineering first. But 
it was a financial failure 
for the PWLB. It lost 
£150,000 of the 
£250,000 loan that 
Parliament voted on, 
overruling the PWLB’s 
rejection of the scheme. 
Since 1860, the tunnel 
has been part of the 
London rail network. 
 194 
 
 
This chapter starts by returning to the five aims of the thesis, as they were set out 
in the first chapter. The first was to determine the objectives the government and 
Parliament set for the PWLB, and how these objectives changed over time. The 
second aim was to evaluate the importance of PWLB lending to the financing of 
capital investment in each of the five case studies. The third aim was to analyse 
the PWLB’s lending activity in each of the five areas. The fourth aim was to 
determine which factors dictated whether the PWLB’s lending in each area was 
successful. The final aim was to use the PWLB case studies to demonstrate how 
central and local government relationships changed over time. The main purpose 
of this final chapter is to demonstrate how these aims have been met. The 
structure of the chapter therefore follows the aims of the thesis, with the addition 
of a final section looking at the implications of the research. 
7.1 Changing objectives and activity 
Over the 60 years covered by this study, it is possible to discern four distinct sets 
of objectives for the PWLB. These were the pre-1817 objectives, those set in the 
1817 Act, those operating in practice from 1826 and those applying from 1836, 
when the PWLB started to offer low cost loans. The first objective was that of the 
PWLB’s predecessor commissions of 1793 and 1811 with the objective of being 
lenders of last resort in response to credit shortages in the economy as a whole. 
These were short lived commissions, expected to provide a boost to commercial 
confidence over three or six months, and to have completed their work within a 
year or two. This objective of lender of last resort was also part of the rationale 
behind the 1817 Act establishing the PWLB. However, this objective did not last 
long, and the lender of last resort role passed to the Bank of England in 1826. 
This followed the government’s decision not to advance loans to the agricultural 
sector in 1822, and then more broadly to industry after the credit crisis of late 
1825 and early 1826.1  
Although the government’s rationale for the 1817 Act was that there was a credit 
shortage, the PWLB never operated as a lender of last resort in the sense that it 
                                            
1
 Boyd Hilton, Corn, Cash, Commerce: The Economic Policies of the Tory Governments 1815-30 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 157, 224.  
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did not provide liquidity to the banking system or to merchants. The second set of 
objectives was articulated in the 1817 Act to establish the PWLB. These were to 
lend to assist mines and fisheries, to finance public works and to provide loans for 
parishes to help the poor unemployed. By 1826, lending to mine owners had 
effectively ended. No fishery loans were made after 1826, and only three loans 
were ever made to parishes.2 The result was that by 1826, the second set of 
objectives had narrowed into a single objective. Effectively the PWLB had become 
a lender to public works schemes that were unable to borrow from ordinary market 
sources. The PWLB lent at 5 per cent, the same as market rates at the time.  
The PWLB’s third objective was therefore to be a market rate lender at 5 per cent, 
financing public works, adopting a commercial approach, demanding good 
security for its loans, and avoiding losses. This was the objective that appeared in 
Charles Grant’s renewal letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1821. ‘Public 
works’ quickly came to include two main activities: the first was to cover transport 
infrastructure projects, and the second was to cover civic improvements. Between 
1817 and 1834, the PWLB saw over 90 per cent of its lending go to finance public 
works projects; with two thirds going to transport projects such as harbours, 
railways, roads, canals and bridges (see figure 7.3). In all cases, loans were 
repayable from charges to users, and so loans bore a degree of risk. As a result, 
the PWLB acted as a bank manager would, with a main concern being for the 
security of its loan. This approach naturally limited the PWLB’s lending 
opportunities. If commercial lenders had declined to lend to a project because the 
security was poor, then the security conscious PWLB board was also likely to 
reject the application. 
                                            
2
 See appendix 1.A and BPP 1851 (512) PWLB report to Parliament, p. 15. 
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Most of the PWLB’s non transport lending before 1834 went to finance civic 
improvement projects. These included the building of gaols, a number of Fens' 
drainage projects, and street improvement schemes.3 What was common to them 
all was that the applications were made by ‘not for profit’ bodies, such as 
municipal corporations, county justices and drainage boards, or, in a few cases 
only, central government. In all but the very few cases of loans to central 
government, loan repayments were made from rate income, and were therefore 
lower risk. In both transport and civic improvement projects, the authority to 
borrow was granted by a local Act of Parliament. The PWLB’s market interest 
rate, its bank manager approach to lending and the need for applicants to have 
individual legislative borrowing approvals all tended to limit the volume of loans 
the Board made before 1834. In the period before 1834, the PWLB’s activity was 
focussed mainly on lending to support transport infrastructure and civic 
improvement projects. 
After 1834, PWLB lending to support transport projects declined significantly. 
Between 1835 and 1847 more than half the PWLB’s lending went to finance 
workhouse building. This lending had two new features. First, the majority of the 
                                            
3
 See appendix 1.A. 
Figure 7.3
Source:  Analysis of PWLB 6/1-6 applications ledgers.
Notes:    Transport etc included mining and fishery loans.
                 High cost loans made at 5% interest;  low cost loans made at 3.25-4%.
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finance was provided at 4 per cent – below normal market rates.4 Second, the 
lending was authorised by a single general Act, the 1834 Poor Law Amendment 
Act, rather than by individual local Acts of Parliament. Lending to build 
workhouses at 4 per cent created a fourth objective for the PWLB. The new 
objective was to provide low cost loans to build the infrastructure necessary to 
deliver government social and welfare policies. After 1836, the PWLB offered two 
types of loans, the first was at 5 per cent, mainly to finance civic improvements. 
The second type of loan was low cost loans to deliver government social and 
welfare policies. It was this second type of loan that was to grow substantially in 
later years. 
In the 1860s, the PWLB’s lending was almost equally divided between low cost 
loans made to finance the delivery of government policies, and 5 per cent loans 
made to civic bodies. Workhouse loans had ceased to be made at below market 
rates, and, like public health loans and other civic improvement lending, were 
made at 5 per cent, slightly above prevailing market rates. With the exception of 
Irish rail loans, there was virtually no transport related lending after 1860. The 
number of national social or welfare policies authorising PWLB lending at 3.25 to 
3.5 per cent grew in the 1860s.5 The scale of the PWLB’s lending in the 1860s 
was double the level of its lending in the 1835 to 1847 period, with all the growth 
being in civic improvement lending. In the period 1870 to 1876, PWLB lending 
increased threefold over the 1860s level to over £20m. By 1876 the low cost 
lending objective had come to dominate, with more than 85 per cent of the 
PWLB’s lending being at interest rates below market levels. The vast majority of 
the PWLB’s lending was to bodies that were delivering government policies, with 
very little lending being to voluntary bodies or businesses. The PWLB therefore 
saw its objectives change materially over 60 years, as did the purposes for which 
loans were made.  
7.2 Importance of PWLB lending 
The second aim of the thesis is to show how important PWLB lending was in each 
area. Over the sixty years from 1817 to 1876, the PWLB lent £42m to finance 
                                            
4
 BPP 1851 (512), pp. 18-28. 
5
 See chapter 5, section 5.3. 
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capital investment. During this period, gross fixed capital formation totalled £3.3 
billion, so the PWLB financed just 1 per cent of the total.6 However, this thesis is 
concerned only with the financing of public infrastructure. It is therefore necessary 
to divide C. H. Feinstein’s list of sectors between public infrastructure and all other 
capital. The division in table 7.1 is not Feinstein’s, but comes from Hirofumi 
Uzawa.7 His definition of public infrastructure includes roads, bridges, public 
transport systems, public utilities, schools and hospitals. Even using this broad 
definition, PWLB lending was still only 3 per cent of the public infrastructure fixed 
capital formation, and so still lacked any real impact. 
    
Table 7.2 narrows the comparison down to the five case study areas. However, 
water and sewers have been split into two because the pattern of the PWLB’s 
                                            
6
 C. H. Feinstein & Sidney Pollard, Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom 1750-1920 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 429.  
7
 Hirofumi Uzawa, Economic Analysis of Social Common Capital (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), p. vii. 
Table 7.1     PWLB's share of capital formation financing
1817-76 1817-76
capital PWLB PWLB
formation lending share
£m £m
Public infrastructure
Rail 500           0.5 0%
Other transport 432           3.4 1%
Gas, water & electricity 100           8.5 8%
Public & social services 166           20.9 13%
Ireland 98             7.1 7%
Sub total 1,296       40.5 3%
Other capital formation
Manufacturing 644           0.0 0%
Dwellings 606           0.8 0%
Agriculture 417           0.6 0%
Distribution 249           0.0 0%
Mining 72             0.3 0%
Sub total 1,988       1.7 0%
Total 3,284       42.1 1%
Source: Capital formation, Feinstein and Pollard, p. 429.
                PWLB, see appendix 1.A.
Notes:   Ireland is 3% of all categories, and is
                treated as public because it was all transport 
                or workhouse loans.
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lending was so different before and after 1872. There are two ways of measuring 
the significance of the PWLB’s lending. ‘Scale’ measures the size of PWLB 
lending; ‘impact’ measures its share of total investment in the sector. To be 
significant, PWLB lending needs to have been of a significant scale - say, more 
than £150,000 a year. To make a significant impact, PWLB lending needs to have 
been more than, say, 20 per cent of the total sector investment.8 PWLB lending to 
the mining sector was small in scale, at £300,000 over the ten years, 1817 to 
1826. The impact of the PWLB’s lending to mine owners was also small, at 2 per 
cent of all mining investment, which was £16m over the ten years. As a result, 
PWLB lending made no material difference to the level of mining investment in the 
period, or to the level of employment in the sector.  
   
Loans to turnpike trusts were on a slightly larger scale, at £430,000 over ten 
years. Total investment in turnpike trusts from all sources was £2.8m, so the 
PWLB financed 16 per cent of the total in the ten years 1817 to 1826. The scale of 
PWLB lending to turnpike trusts was therefore too small to be significant, and its 
impact was also below the 20 per cent level. In addition, chapter 3 showed that 
the 1820s was a boom time for turnpike investment, and more trusts investing in 
                                            
8
 Both limits are a little arbitrary, but £50,000 and 10 per cent feels too low, and £500,000 and 30 per 
cent feels too high. 
Table 7.2  Proportion of capital formation financed by the PWLB
Fixed
capital PWLB PWLB
formation lending share
£m £m
Mines 16.0 0.3 2%
Roads 2.8 0.4 16%
Workhouses 2.8 1.7 61%
Water & sewerage pre-1872 49.9 1.6 3%
Water & sewerage post-1872 13.0 4.3 33%
Schools 14.0 8.0 57%
Totals 98.5 16.3 17%
Sources: Mines table 2.3, roads table 3.3, workhouses table 4.2,
                  water & sewerage appendix 5.A, schools table 6.6.
Notes:    Mines, roads & workhouses cover 10 year periods, 
                  pre-1872 water & sewerage covers 25 years and post 
                  1872 covers 4 years. Schools cover a 7 year period.
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these years became insolvent than in other periods.9 In effect, PWLB loans were 
fuelling a boom, lending to poor schemes that did not deserve support. There 
would have been no material loss if the PWLB had made no loans to mine owners 
or to turnpike trusts. The same conclusion is true of the PWLB’s lending to finance 
canals, railways and bridge building. All three were too small in scale, and the 
PWLB’s lending was too small as a proportion of all investment in each area, for 
the PWLB to have had much of an impact. 
PWLB loans to poor law unions marked a major change in the importance of 
PWLB lending. In the ten years 1835 to 1844, the PWLB lent £1.7m to unions, 
and financed 61 per cent of the total £2.8m union investment in that period. PWLB 
lending therefore easily passed both the scale and impact tests, and made a 
significant contribution to the financing of workhouses. Chapter 4 argued that 
without PWLB lending it would have taken much longer to finance the building of 
the 400 workhouses. In turn, without the PWLB, savings in annual poor relief 
costs would have been delayed and smaller. PWLB lending delivered a 
government policy within a timescale that the ordinary money market would not 
have managed. It would have failed because the market would not have been 
willing to lend at 4 per cent. In addition, until unions had shown that they were 
creditworthy bodies, the market would not have been willing to lend on a large 
scale. Lending to poor law unions was the PWLB’s first real success. 
Between 1848 and 1872 the PWLB lent only £1.6m to local boards of health, or 
less than 4 per cent of all water and sewer investment. This was a return to pre-
1834 levels of insignificance, and the PWLB made no material difference to the 
total investment in water and sewer facilities before 1872. In the four years after 
1872 the picture changed dramatically, and the PWLB lent £4.3m for water and 
sewer projects. This was lending on a much larger scale than anything in the 
PWLB’s first 55 years. The £4.3m lent after 1872 provided 33 per cent of all 
sanitary infrastructure financing and thus had a major impact. PWLB lending to 
school boards then doubled the scale and impact of PWLB sanitary lending. In 
just seven years, the PWLB lent £8m to English and Welsh school boards, and 
financed 57 per cent of all school investment. Without PWLB lending it is highly 
                                            
9
 See figure 3.3 and table 3.12. 
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unlikely that the number of elementary school places would have more than 
doubled by the end of the 1870s. 
   
Table 7.2 can be seen as under-representing the importance of PWLB lending to 
finance workhouses, water and sewers and schools. In all three cases the critical 
period for the success of the legislation was the first five or so years after the 
legislation was passed. In this period the legislation would succeed or fail. In 
addition, the PWLB was unable to lend in order to finance private water company 
investments or investments in voluntary schools. Table 7.3 concentrates on the 
PWLB share of investment by poor law unions, local health boards and school 
boards in these five year periods. The result is that PWLB lending financed 71 per 
cent of all local authority infrastructure investment in these three areas in the 
indicated years. The conclusion to this section is that PWLB lending was essential 
to the financing of public infrastructure of workhouses, sanitary facilities and 
schools. Without PWLB lending during these critical periods, the three Acts would 
have failed to deliver the desired changes. In the cases of loans to mine owners, 
turnpike trusts, and for water and sewer purposes before 1872, PWLB lending 
failed to be of either sufficient scale or impact to be considered important.  
7.3     What made the PWLB successful? 
What was it that caused PWLB lending for the building of workhouses, water and 
sewer facilities and schools to be important in scale and impact? The conclusion 
here is that the level of PWLB lending was dictated by the interest rate charged by 
the PWLB and the level of demand for loans. Equally important to the success of 
the PWLB was its ability to avoid making losses, and there were two drivers 
Table 7.3 PWLB share of local authority investment
Period Capital PWLB
covered investment lending
£m £m Share
Workhouses 1835-9 2.2 1.4 61%
Water & sewerage 1873-6 9.0 4.3 47%
Schools 1870-6 8.1 8.0 99%
Total 19.3 13.6 71%
Source: Table 4.2, appendix 5.A and table 6.6.
Notes:   Borrowing by private water companies and 
                 voluntary school managers is excluded from the table.          
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leading to success here. If the PWLB could make all its lending decisions 
independently of any political pressure, and ensure that good security existed for 
all its loans, then it would avoid making losses. If all four factors – low interest 
rates, high demand, independent decision making and good security – were 
present, then PWLB lending would play a major role. The reverse was also true: if 
more than one of these four factors were absent, then the role of PWLB lending 
would be modest.  
Before testing the five case study areas against the four criteria, it is necessary to 
examine the PWLB’s losses. On each occasion when an attempt was made to set 
out the aims for the Board, it was always clear that loans should be profitable, or 
at least avoid making a loss for the government.10 Over the 60 years considered 
in this thesis the PWLB was profitable, making a £1.1m surplus on lending of 
£42m.11 This surplus was achieved with bad debts equivalent to 5.8 per cent of all 
lending. However, the PWLB’s loans can be split into three groups, depending on 
whether the decision to lend was taken by Parliament, the PWLB or a government 
department. Bad debt rates for the three were startlingly different, as table 7.4 
shows. 
  
Table 7.4 shows that decisions on loans worth £4.2m were not made by the 
PWLB, but by Parliament. These loans were often made against the advice of the 
PWLB, and more than half were never recovered, leaving the PWLB with losses 
                                            
10
 The 1821 renewal letter from the PWLB, Hubbard’s 1859 letter to the Treasury and Hubbard’s 
evidence to the 1875 Select Committee all took the view that losses should be avoided. 
11
 Appendix 7.A shows the detail of the calculation. 
Table 7.4              Written off loans by decision maker, 1817-76
Sums Written 
lent off Losses
£m £000
Loan recommendations made to the PWLB 29.7 70             0.2%
All other loans made at PWLB's discretion 8.2 101           1.2%
Loans made at Parliament's direction 4.2 2,289       54.5%
All loans 42.1 2,460       5.8%
Sources: Appendices 7.A and 7.B
Notes:     Sums written off include forgone interest. 'Loan recommendations
                  made to the PWLB' include workhouse, water and sewerage, 
                  schools, harbours and other loan recommendations from the LGB.
 203 
 
of £2.3m. There were only 16 of these loans, so they were all much larger than 
the PWLB’s normal loans. A full list of the 16 is shown in appendix 7.B, and this 
highlights that £1.8m was lost on three Irish loans. Table 7.4 reveals that the 16 
loans Parliament directed the PWLB to make accounted for 94 per cent of all of 
the PWLB’s losses. Grant, in 1821, and Hubbard, in 1875, saw the PWLB’s 
independence as essential.12 Table 7.4 shows the very high cost of decision 
making by Parliament. In these cases, lending decisions were based on political 
or social grounds, and not on an independently assessed business case.  
In contrast, lending decisions made by the PWLB board on loans worth over £8m 
incurred bad debts of only £101,000, or 1.2 per cent. Many of these loans were 
secured on the future trading income of borrowers. Such a low write off rate is 
creditable when the shaky finances of mines and turnpike trusts are recognised. 
The performance of loans recommended to the PWLB by the Poor Law 
Commission, the Local Government Board (or its predecessors) or the Education 
Department was even better. On loans worth nearly £30m, bad debts were just 
£70,000. There were three major reasons for this very good performance, first that 
these loans were secured against rate income and not against future trading 
income. Second, the 1834, 1848 and 1870 Acts set limits for borrowing by local 
authorities; they could not over borrow as the turnpike trusts had. Lending under 
these three Acts therefore enjoyed higher levels of security than did lending under 
the general Acts governing PWLB lending. Finally, PLC, LGB and Education 
Department sanctioned loans were all free of ministerial or parliamentary 
interference. 
                                            
12
 The 1821 renewal letter and the 1875 Select Committee. 
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Table 7.5 shows that three of the case study areas -- loans to build workhouses, 
water and sewer facilities and schools -- were all profitable, despite the low 
interest charges to borrowers. However, loans to turnpike trusts were heavily loss-
making because £156,000 was lost on a single loan that Parliament directed the 
PWLB to make. Two safeguards needed to be in place to avoided losses on 
loans. First, decision making on loans needed to be independent of government or 
Parliament and rest either with the PWLB or with specialist officials such as those 
of the PLC, the LGB or the Education Department. There are no examples of any 
of these bodies being directed to recommend individual loans to the PWLB. 
Indeed, the logic dictates that political influence was more likely to be used to stop 
these centralising bodies using their powers to compel local action that would 
result in local borrowing. Second, good security and borrowing limits needed to be 
in place. Table 7.6 shows the extent to which these two safeguards were in place 
for loans in the five case study areas. Table 7.6 also includes the two tests of the 
impact and scale of PWLB lending in each case study area. 
Table 7.5 Profits and losses from five case studies
Sums Sums Interest Profit 
lent written forgone or loss (-)
off
£m £000 £000 £000
Mines 0.3 9 -1
Turnpike trusts 0.4 51 128 -138
Workhouses 1.7 0 125
Water & sewerage 5.9 7 454
Schools 10.2 0 673
Totals 18.5 67 128 1,113
Sources: Mines table 2.10, turnpikes table 3.13, workhouses
                  table 4.9, water etc table 5.8, schools table 6.14.
Notes:    Loans made relate only to the period dealt with
                  in the relevant chapter.
                  Schools includes loans to Scottish boards.
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Table 7.6 provides a useful summary of PWLB activity during its first 60 years. It 
shows that, on all four criteria, turnpike loans were unlikely to be successful. 
Interest rates were high; demand was low; PWLB independence was 
compromised in several cases; and the security offered by trusts was poor. In the 
Table 7.6 Factors determining the success of PWLB lending
Interest rate
Demand for 
loans
Decisions made 
independently
Security for loans
Mines             
1817-26
5%. Market 
rate was also 
5%
Very low
Yes, by PWLB. 
No directed 
loans
Poor. Heavy reliance on 
personal security. 18% 
of applicants went 
bankrupt
Turnpike trusts      
1817-26
5%. Market 
rate was also 
5%
Low, and 
fuelled by 
boom
Yes, but with 
one directed 
loan, & some 
ministerial 
pressure
Poor. Income in long 
term decline. 28% of 
trusts technically  
insolvent
Workhouses       
1835-44
Nearly all 
loans 
reduced to 
4%. Market 
rate was 5%.
Medium. 
Strong centre, 
increasing 
demand
Yes, by PLC. No 
directed loans
Very good. Provided by 
compulsory rate 
income. Borrowing 
limits in place
Water and 
sewerage       
1848-72
5%. Market 
rate was 4.5-
5%.
Low. 
Permissive 
legislation 
covering only 
part of 
country
Yes, by LGB & 
predecessors. 
No directed 
loans
Very good. Provided by 
compulsory rate 
income. Borrowing 
limits in place
Water and 
sewerage       
1873-76
3.5%. Market 
rate was 
4.5%
High. 
Universal & 
compulsory 
target 
imposed
Yes, by LGB & 
predecessors. 
No directed 
loans
Very good. Provided by 
compulsory rate 
income. Borrowing 
limits in place
Schools             
1870-76
3.5%. Market 
rate was 
4.5%
Very high. 
Universal & 
compulsory 
target 
imposed
Yes, by 
Education 
Department. No 
directed loans
Very good. Provided by 
compulsory rate 
income. Borrowing 
limits in place
Sources:
Notes:
instructed the PWLB to make a loan.
Impact and scale of lending Avoiding losses
Individual chapters.
Conditions tending to increase success of the PWLB
Conditions tending to reduce success of the PWLB
'Directed loans' are those where Parliament
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case of mines, interest rates were high and demand was low, and security was 
also poor. The major problems for mining and turnpike loans were that demand 
was low because the government’s analysis of the problem in 1817 was flawed. 
The problem in 1817 was not a shortage of credit, rather it was a shortage of 
security to reassure the lender that any loan was a low risk. Twenty per cent of 
mining applicants became bankrupt within ten years of their application to the 
PWLB.13 The solvency of turnpike trusts was even more problematic, with 28 per 
cent of all trusts in 1834 being technically insolvent.14 The result was that PWLB 
lending to mines and turnpike trusts was not successful in terms of its scale and 
impact, and, in the case of turnpikes, PWLB lending incurred heavy losses.  
The turning point for the PWLB came in 1834, with the Poor Law Amendment Act. 
Table 7.6 shows that even though loans were offered at 5 per cent, the rate was 
reduced to 4 per cent for nearly all borrowers, and was at below market rates, so 
encouraging borrowing from the PWLB. Demand for loans was high because the 
1834 Act established a clear aim to build new, larger workhouses in 616 unions 
throughout England and Wales. In addition, there was a strong central body – the 
Poor Law Commission – set up to ensure that the unions built new workhouses. 
Unions had an incentive to borrow because they expected that the new, larger 
workhouses would reduce annual poor relief costs. There was no parliamentary or 
ministerial interference in the decision-making processes of the PWLB or the PLC. 
The final reason for lending success was that the security of loans was 
guaranteed by the ability to levy a poor rate, and by the cap on the borrowing of 
every union. The result was that the PWLB lent £1.7m in ten years, financed 61 
per cent of all workhouse investment and made a profit on the loans. The 1834 
Act ensured that by 1844, 91 per cent of unions had plans to build a workhouse, 
and this led annual poor relief costs to fall by 31 per cent. PWLB lending was 
critical to this success. 
Two crucial elements of this winning formula were dropped in the 1848 Public 
Health Act. First, PWLB loans were only available at 5 per cent, slightly above 
market rates, and the demand for PWLB loans was therefore low. Demand for 
loans was also low because the Act did not compel the formation of local boards 
                                            
13
 See appendix 2.A. 
14
 See table 3.9. 
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of health, or compel them to invest in better water and sewer facilities. In addition, 
the Act only applied to urban areas, and not to rural areas. Most parts of the 
country therefore ignored the water and sewer provisions in the Act. The result 
was that the Act delivered very little benefit in the 15 years up to 1863, and PWLB 
lending under the Act was very low. With the 1872 Public Health Act, the two 
factors discouraging investment were changed. Interest rates were reduced to a 
below market rate of 3.5 per cent, and all urban and rural parts of the country 
were given a duty to ensure adequate water supplies and sewer facilities. 
Demand for PWLB loans increased sharply because of the two changes. The 
1872 Public Health Act effectively repeated the winning formula of the 1834 Poor 
Law Amendment Act.  
The winning formula of workhouse lending was also repeated with the 1870 
Elementary Education Act. The same four factors were in place. Three and a half 
per cent interest was charged on loans, encouraging borrowing. The demand for 
loans was high because school boards could be compulsorily formed, and 
compelled to increase the provision of school places. Once the Act was passed, 
there was no government or parliamentary interference in the lending decisions 
made by either the Education Department or the PWLB. Finally, the security of 
loans was guaranteed by the local education rate, and by a cap on an individual 
board’s borrowing. As with the 1834 Act and the 1872 Act, the result was that the 
demand for PWLB loans was high, and losses non-existent. Once again, PWLB 
loans were essential to the achievement of the 1870 Act’s objectives. 
The conclusion is that the PWLB was successful when four factors were in place. 
First, the PWLB had to be lending at an interest rate below market rates, but high 
enough to cover borrowing costs, bad debts and office expenses. Second, there 
needed to be a high demand for PWLB loans. This was normally true were 
national legislation was in place, compelling local authorities to invest in order to 
deliver government social and welfare policies. Third, decision-making on loans 
needed to be independent from government or parliamentary influence. Lastly, 
good security for loans was essential, and it was hard to avoid local rates; and 
maximum borrowing limits provided excellent security. With these four factors in 
place, PWLB lending made a major contribution to the financing of public 
infrastructure investment and delivering government social and welfare policies. 
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This winning formula was achieved with workhouse lending, water and sewer 
lending (after 1872) and schools lending. Most other areas of PWLB lending were 
much less successful. 
7.4     Central and local relationships 
The final aim of the thesis is to chart the changes in central and local government 
relationships over the 60 years. This section shows that there are two different 
models of central and local relationship (see table 7.7). The first model can be 
seen in the case of turnpike trusts, but also applied in the case of bridge trusts, 
drainage commissioners, improvement commissioners, harbour boards and 
others. This model can be characterised as having a weak central power, and 
strong local bodies. The centre had only two powers. First, Parliament had to 
approve the local Act establishing the turnpike trust, and this gave Parliament an 
ability to avoid competition between neighbouring trusts. While the local Act gave 
a turnpike trust the power to borrow, it placed no limits on borrowing. There was 
therefore no control of capital investment, nor was there an ability for the centre to 
compel a local area to form a turnpike trust. The only exceptions to this very weak 
central role were the five Acts to improve the Holyhead to London road, invest in 
Highland Roads and Bridges, and create the South Wales and North London 
trusts.15 The centre’s second power was that of regulator, and was exercised by 
Select Committees that repeatedly investigated ways of limiting damage to 
turnpikes by excess traffic. However, this regulatory power was limited because 
the government did not always legislate to implement Select Committee 
recommendations. The centre had no other powers over turnpike trusts.  
In contrast to the weak centre, local communities were very strong. They had the 
power to form a turnpike trust, and decide where to invest and how much to 
invest. They were not accountable either to Parliament or to any other central 
body – at least until the 1830s, when they had to make annual returns to 
Parliament. Trusts were only accountable to their local community and to turnpike 
users. A trust’s relationship with its lenders was entirely unregulated, and this 
                                            
15
 1 & 2 Geo IV c30 and 6&7 William IV c35 for the Holyhead road, 1 Geo IV c84, 7 & 8 Vic c91 for the 
South Wales Trust and 7 Geo IV c142 for the creation of a combined North London trust. 
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caused many lenders to lose significant sums of money in the 1850s and after.16 
With minor variations, this model also applied to water and sewers before 1872. 
  
                                            
16
 See table 3.15. 
Table 7.7 Different models of central and local relationships
Turnpike trusts
Water & sewerage 
pre-1872
Workhouses, water 
& sewerage post 
1872 & schools
Governing 
legislation
Local Acts of 
Parliament
Single national Act Single national Act
Ability to 
compel local 
action
None. Select 
Committees try to 
regulate, but 
government does not 
always act on 
recommendations
None until 1858, & 
then very limited
Yes, through PLC, 
LGB or its 
predecessors, & 
Education 
Department
Control of 
capital 
investment, 
and regulation
None. Select 
Committees try to 
regulate, but 
government does not 
always act on 
recommendations
Through either 
LGB predecessors, 
or through local 
Acts of Parliament
Yes, through PLC, 
LGB or its 
predecessors, & 
Education 
Department. They 
also controlled 
access to low cost 
capital
Extent of local 
discretion
Considerable, 
including whether to 
establish a trust
Considerable, 
including whether 
to establish a local 
board of health
Limited to day to 
day matters
Local elected 
body
No, appointed locally Yes Yes
Meeting 
annual cost
Revenue & capital 
costs met locally
Revenue & capital 
costs met locally
Revenue & capital 
costs met locally
Character 
isation of 
relationship
Weak centre and 
strong localities
Weak centre and 
strong localities
Strong centre and 
weak localities
                  promoted by local boards of health.
Central powers
Local powers
Sources: Individual chapters.
Notes:    After 1872 the LGB had the right to comment on local Acts of Parliament
 210 
 
In 1834, the turnpike trust model of central and local relationships was turned on 
its head by the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act. The Poor Law Commission was a 
strong, central body with the power to inspect the activities of all local unions and 
compel them to act if it thought necessary. The Act imposed a single and 
universal service standard on all unions, and required the PLC to approve every 
union’s capital investments. In 1836 the centre also gained some control over who 
local unions borrowed from by reducing the PWLB interest rate to below market 
levels. The power to create, intervene in and approve the capital spending of a 
body invariably meant that all the essential powers rested in the centre. In 
contrast, local unions had little discretion, even though they were locally elected 
and met all of the costs of the poor law. This was a model of a strong centre and 
weak localities.  
The 1848 Public Health Act essentially returned to the turnpike trust model of 
central and local government relationships. As chapter 5 argued, MPs saw the 
1834 model as too centralised and as leaving too little discretion to local unions. 
The main difference from the turnpike trust model was that the 1848 Act created a 
weak central body in the form of the General Board of Health. The GBH had no 
power to inspect or intervene in the affairs of a local board of heath; and, other 
than in limited circumstances, it had no power to compel the formation of a local 
board of health. The Act also gave local areas discretion on whether they formed 
a local board of health. Once established, a local board of health had discretion 
about whether it invested in better water and sewer facilities. Many areas 
continued to operate under local Acts, and chose not to use the powers of the 
1848 Act. This ability to decide locally whether to form a local body, and to 
determine the extent of the body’s activity, was similar to the powers of a turnpike 
trust. 
In hindsight, the departure from the long term trend was the 1848 model, not the 
1834 strong centre and weak locality model. The 1870 Elementary Education Act 
and the 1872 Public Health Act both created strong central bodies, and left local 
authorities with little discretion. Chapter 5 argued that the obvious explanation for 
this about turn was that the 1848 Act simply did not deliver sufficient 
improvements in sanitation. So, over a period of twenty years, a series of small 
but progressive steps were taken back towards the 1834 model of a strong centre 
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and weak localities. As in 1834, the belief (of those in the centre!) was that only a 
centrist solution would deliver the national aim of universal better sanitation. 
However, in 1872 MPs rejected the new Public Health Bill because they were 
unconvinced by its strong central powers.17 They were only persuaded to vote for 
the 1872 Public Health Act by the promise of 3.5 per cent loans from the PWLB.  
The conclusion is that the 1834 strong centre and weak locality model established 
the dominant pattern of central and local relationships for the 60 years. Support 
for the weak centre and strong locality model of pre-1834 years and 1848 was 
largely ideological, while support for the strong centre and weak locality model 
was largely pragmatic. A strong centre was simply seen as the best way of 
delivering national policy objectives. It is noticeable that, for all models, all the 
revenue and capital costs were met locally. Theodore Hoppen reports that 
Gladstone and the Treasury were relaxed about extending the power of the state 
‘so long as the costs remained a local responsibility’.18 Pragmatism and 
Gladstone’s view do a great deal to account for the shift of power from local areas 
to the centre between 1817 and 1876.  
7.5      Implications of the research 
The first achievement of the thesis is to respond to the calls of Flinn and Prest for 
a history of the PWLB.19 But the thesis also demonstrates that the history of the 
PWLB reflects the impact of the many changes in the social, economic, financial 
and political environment between 1817 and 1876. In the early years, there was a 
recognition that public infrastructure investment needed to increase beyond the 
capacity of the market to finance it, and that new means to finance the increase 
were needed. The PWLB was an essential part of both changes. Without the 
PWLB, banks, insurance companies and individuals would have been unlikely to 
have the capacity to finance sanitation and education changes on the necessary 
scale. The thesis has also charted how the PWLB established itself as a 
government agency, and made its decisions. Unlike other government agencies, 
                                            
17
 Christine Bellamy, Administering Central-Local Relations 1871-1919: The Local Government Board 
in its Fiscal and Cultural Context (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1988), p. 34.  
18
 K. Theodore Hoppen, The Mid-Victorian Generation 1846-1886 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 
123. 
19
 M. W. Flinn, ‘The Poor Employment Act of 1817’, Economic History Review 1961,Vol 14, no. 1, pp. 
82-92, and John Prest, Liberty and Locality: Parliament, Permissive Legislation and Ratepayers’ 
Democracies in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 184. 
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the PWLB was small and well governed, with its Board making all decisions. 
Chapters 2 and 3 showed that its lending decisions were very similar to those 
made by banks, and were dominated by concerns for the security of its loans. 
Successive chapters show that like other agencies of the period, the PWLB had 
no formal accountability mechanisms in its early years. However, like other 
agencies, by 1876 the PWLB had established good annual reporting processes to 
Parliament. The development of the PWLB therefore both responds to the 
changing environment over 60 years, and illustrates the nature of the changes.  
The second achievement of this thesis has been to revise and materially improve 
the estimates of capital investment in each of the five case studies. This has 
provided much more detail and robustness to the estimates of C. H. Feinstein and 
Sidney Pollard in Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom 1750 to 
1920.20 It has also provided, for the first time, estimates of how public 
infrastructure in each case study was financed before the 1880s. This advance 
would allow new chapters to be written in the works on the financing of 
investment. Much of the new data on local authority borrowing could also be used 
to extend the start year of John Wilson’s ‘The Finance of Municipal Capital 
Expenditure’ back from 1870 to 1835.21 However, such a task is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
The third achievement is that the individual case studies can claim to add 
something to the literature on each area. Chapter 2 provided quantification of 
mine financing, supporting Flinn’s view that most came from retained profits.22 
Chapter 3 drew attention to the high levels of indebtedness of turnpike trusts 
because of the absence of any control on their borrowing. The resulting major 
losses to individual lenders do not appear in the turnpike literature. Chapter 3 
therefore significantly develops the views of William Albert in The Turnpike Road 
System in England 1663-1840.23 The episode showed the government slowly 
                                            
20
 C. H. Feinstein and Sidney Pollard, Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom 1750 to 
1920 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988) pp. 192-202, 302-307, 355-368. 
21
 John F. Wilson, ‘The Finance of Municipal Capital Expenditure in England and Wales, 1870-1914’, 
Financial History Review, Vol 4, no. 1, 1997, pp. 31-50. 
22
 M. W. Flinn The History of the British Coal Industry Volume 2 1700-1830: The Industrial Revolution 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 61. 
23
 William Albert, The Turnpike Road System in England 1663-1840 (London, Cambridge University 
Press, 1972), pp. 230-245. 
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accepting the need to regulate the relationship between private lenders and trusts. 
Chapter 3 provided a financial perspective to the development of turnpikes. It also 
highlighted the wealth of useful financial data in the parliamentary returns of the 
1830s. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 highlighted the wealth of data in the PLC archive and in 
annual reports in parliamentary papers about the financing of workhouses, public 
health and schools. In these chapters the data have largely been used to show 
the scale and financing of capital investment. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the 
financial data do not support the received wisdom of northern opposition to the 
1834 Act, particularly in Felix Driver’s Power and Pauperism: The Workhouse 
System 1834-84.24 Chapter 5 added the lack of cheap finance to the reasons for 
the ‘halting and fractious process’ of sanitary reform.25 Chapter 5 also provides 
much more detailed support for John Hassan’s view of the changing ownership of 
water supply undertakings in A History of Water in Modern England.26 The data 
are surely open to many more uses to aid understanding of these sectors. The 
PWLB data could also be used for far more purposes than have been shown in 
this thesis. 
The fourth third achievement of the thesis is the insight into the opportunities and 
risks of government lending. The main opportunity is that government’s ability to 
borrow cheaply could be passed on to borrowers as below market levels of 
interest rates. As chapters 4, 5 and 6 showed, governments gained a much 
greater ability to promote their own policies when they offered low cost borrowing. 
Chapter 3 and table 7.4 make clear that there were also substantial risks in 
government lending. As in the case of the 1861 Harbours and Passing Tolls Act, 
lending rates could be set too low to cover costs, resulting in automatic losses. 
The second risk was larger, and was realised if lending decisions were based on 
political or social grounds, rather than on the grounds of the security offered by 
the borrower. The £2.3m losses on the 16 loans Parliament directed the PWLB to 
make demonstrate the scale of the risks. The risks are as great in 2014 as they 
                                            
24
 Felix Driver, Power and Pauperism: The Workhouse System 1834-84 (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) p. 81 
25
 Philip Harling, The Modern British State: An Historical Introduction (Cambridge, Polity, 2001), p. 
107. 
26
 John Hassan, A History of Water in Modern England (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1998) pp. 10-50. 
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were in 1817 or 1876. The material here could be used to provide historical 
evidence to support the views of the World Bank in Lessons for the Urban 
Century: Decentralized Infrastructure Finance in the World Bank.27 
There is much more work that could be done on the PWLB’s first 60 years. It 
would be fascinating to tell the stories of the larger loans the PWLB made: to 
finance the Thames Tunnel, various London bridges, Trafalgar Square and 
Battersea Park. Often these were very high profile loans, supported by 
Parliament, two of which lost a combined £240,000. Interesting as these individual 
stories were, they were not central to the Board’s history or its importance. A 
chapter on the PWLB’s lending to build churches and provide burial grounds 
would no doubt yield interesting insights. A chapter on loans to harbours could 
make interesting use of a wealth of trading volume data submitted to the PWLB by 
applicants for loans. It would surely shed light on the extent to which public 
infrastructure investment really promoted trade. Finally, a chapter on the PWLB’s 
lending to Ireland for social and political rather than commercial reasons would 
hold much interest. All these remain areas for future study. 
It is fifty years since Flinn’s article, and nearly 25 years after Prest suggested it 
was time for a history of the PWLB.28 In writing that history, this thesis has shown 
how important the PWLB was in financing public infrastructure. This was 
particularly true in the critical early years of financing new government policy. The 
history of the PWLB’s first 60 years also provides very good examples of the 
advantages and pitfalls of government lending. It is hoped that this thesis shows 
that an understanding of the first 60 years of the PWLB is capable of adding 
significantly to the existing literature on the case study areas. Finally, it is clear 
that the vast quantity of PWLB loan data and the annual parliamentary returns are 
capable of being used to meet many more research needs than are dealt with 
here.
                                            
27
 World Bank, Lessons for the Urban Century: Decentralized Infrastructure Finance in the World 
Bank (New York, World Bank, 2008) 
28
 M. W. Flinn, ‘Poor Employment Act’,pp. 82-92, and John Prest, Liberty and Locality, p. 184. 
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Appendix 1.A
PWLB Loans Made 1817-1876
1817 1822 1827 1832 1837 1842 1847 1852 1857 1862 1867 1872 Totals
1821 1826 1831 1836 1841 1846 1851 1856 1861 1866 1871 1876
£000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000
Fisheries 32            2               -           -           -           0               -           -           -           -           -           -           34            
Mines 200          72            -           32            -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           304          
Canals, rivers etc 423          228          185          35            -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           871          
drainage 250          32            90            -           10            150          532          
Roads 240          185          71            214          21            45            -           -           -           776          
Rail 36            118          100          179          -           50            -           -           -           -           44            3               529          
Emigration -           -           -           13            3               1               3               0               -           -           -           -           19            
Bridges 92            103          13            4               3               37            60            7               4               -           -           2               324          
Workhouses 5               -           -           575          878          458          215          311          204          273          596          160          3,673      
Harbours & hpt 118          141          95            120          159          64            57            1               23            1,687      252          365          3,080      
Churches 5               54            17            14            22            42            73            42            55            95            34            -           453          
Gaols 2               200          10            27            16            59            175          34            94            71            48            18            754          
irish poor law & canals 10            50            146          -           -           1,275      -           -           520          20            -           2,021      
Water & sewerage 20            7               -           8               -           -           120          120          121          1,230      251          6,445      8,322      
Others -           -           5               344          -           -           -           20            2               12            31            118          531          
Lunatic asylums 6               -           -           -           -           22            99            3               104          160          328          1               724          
Improvements 5               513          -           -           -           60            71            84            849          40            1,421      3,043      
Housing -           88            20            -           -           -           -           -           -           22            110          553          794          
irish rail 126          1,401      574          254          147          565          30            3,097      
Recreation -           -           -           -           -           40            100          -           -           31            1               36            208          
Burial grounds 2               -           -           -           -           -           -           398          229          156          65            111          962          
Bath houses -           -           -           -           -           -           15            28            15            10            13            49            129          
Gas & lighting -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           20            9               -           111          139          
Markets -           1               -           -           -           -           -           -           -           37            1               28            67            
Disease -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           300          3               -           303          
Schools -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           122          10,123    10,246    
Transport -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           -           133          133          
Totals 1,435      1,752      656          1,710      1,111      1,095      3,653      1,609      1,208      5,610      2,523      19,706    42,067    
Source: Analysis of PWLB 6/1-1a and PWLB 6/2-6 application ledgers
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BIOGRAPHICAL DETAIL OF COMMISSIONERS Appendix 1.B
Name & dates birth death evangelic
al city politics
relative also 
comm'snr.
source
1817 John Delafield Phelps 1764 1842
1811 1817 John Smith 1767 1853 family banker MP relative Lewis
1817 Henry Swann 1760 1824 merchant MP Parl on line
1817 Thomas Grimston Estcourt 1775 1853 extreme MP Parl on line
1817 Robert Matthew Casberd 1772 1841 MP Parl on line
1817 Thomas Sherlock Gooch 1767 1851 MP Parl on line
1817 Edward John Littleton 1791 1863 MP Parl on line
1817 Lord Robert Seymour 1748 1831 MP Parl on line
1817 John Julius Angerstein 1774 1858 merchant MP Parl on line
1817 Sir Thomas Dyke Acland 1787 1871 Follower MP Lewis
1817 Sir Charles Edmonstone 1764 1821 MP Parl on line
1817 Joseph Berens 1774 1853 Hudsons Bay relative Hudsons
1817 Thomas Reid 1762 1824 East India Co relative EIC
1811 1817 Hon William Lamb 1779 1848 minister Parl on line
1811 1817 Sir John Perring 1765 1831 banker MP Parl on line
1811 1817 Sir James Shaw 1764 1843 Director MP Parl on line
1811 1817 John Christian Curwen 1756 1828 MP Parl on line
1811 1817 Benjamin Harrison 1771 1856 Clapham S Hudsons Bay Lewis
1811 1817 Charles Bosanquet 1769 1850 family Merchant relative lewis
1811 1817 John Thornton 1783 1861 officer Lewis
1811 Charles Pole 1757 1830 BoE MP BoE
1811 George Ballas Greenough 1778 1855 MP Parl on line
1811 William Beauchamp Lygon 1782 1823 MP Parl on line
1811 Thomas Lord Binning 1780 1858 Follower MP Hilton
1811 Harvey Christian Combe 1752 1818 Lord Mayor MP relative Parl on line
1811 Thomas Bainbridge 1830 officer banker Lewis
1811 Job Matthew Raikes 1767 1833 family BoE relative BoE
1811 John Josiah Holford BoE relative BoE
1811 John Inglis family East India Co EIC
1811 Joshua Jonathan Smith Lord Mayor London
1795 Benjamin Savage
1795 Gabriel Tucker Steward 1768 1836 banker MP Parl on line
CoŵŵissioŶer iŶ…
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1795 William Curtis 1752 1829 Lord Mayor MP Parl on line
1795 Thomas Plummer 1749 1818 merchant MP Parl on line
1795 Henry Hobart 1738 1799 MP Parl on line
1795 Charles Townshend 1728 1810 MP Parl on line
1795 Joseph Nutt 1805 BoE BoE
1795 Robert Hunter 1731 1812 merchant parl on line
1793 1795 1811 1817 Charles Grant 1746 1823 Clapham S East India Co minister relative Lewis
1793 Edward Foster
1793 1811 James Brogden 1840 merchant MP Parl on line
1793 1795 Sir Grey Cooper 1726 1801 minister Parl on line
1793 Robert Smith 1752 1838 follower banker MP relative Lewis
1793 1795 Richard Muilman Trench Chiswell 1735 1797 banker MP Parl on line
1793 Robert Barclay 1755 1839 banker MP Parl on line
1793 William Manning 1763 1835 family BoE MP Lewis 
1793 John Whitmore 1750 1826 BoE MP BoE
1793 1795 Sir William Pulteney 1729 1805 investor MP Parl on line
1793 1795 Sir John Sinclair 1754 1835 family MP Lewis
1793 1795 Sir Francis Baring 1740 1810 family banker MP  relative Lewis
1793 1795 John William Anderson 1735 1813 Lord Mayor MP Parl on line
1793 John Sheffield 1735 1821 MP Parl on line
1793 Samuel Bosanquet 1768 1843 follower BoE relative lewis
1793 Thomas Boddington BoE BoE
1793 Jeremaih Harman 1763 1844 BoE BoE
1793 Gilbert Innes 1751 1832 banker clapham V1 p264
1793 Robert (lionel) Darell 1742 1803 Merchant MP Parl on line
1793 William Raikes 1738 1800 family South Sea Co relative Lewis
Sources Lewis Donald Lewis, Blackwell Dictionary of Evangelical Biography , (London, Blackwell, 1995)
BoE www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Pages/history/default.aspx List of Governors. Accessed January 2013
Hilton Boyd Hilton, Age of Atonement , (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988)
Clapham J. H. Clapham, Bank of England, A History, Vol I (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1944)
Parl on line www.historyofparliamentonline.org/research/members Accessed January 2013
Hudsons http://www.hbcheritage.ca/hbcheritage/history/people/governors/ Accessed January 2013
EIC
London www.cityoflondon.gov.uk list of lord mayors Accessed January 2013
C H & D Philips, 'Alphabetical l ist of Directors of the East India Company', Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, October 1941
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MINING APPLICATIONS 1817-26, DATA SET Appendix 2.A
Applicant year region decisio
n time 
weeks
payme
nt 
issued
reason 
for 
app
type of 
mine
amount 
applied for
granted rejected withdra
wn
abandon
ed
jobs 
mentio
ned
why 
rejcted
repaym
ent 
difficult
ies?
£000 £000 £000 £000 £000
0.002 Warren Maud Lamb 1817 ne 1 0 6 1             6,000               -         6,000               -                 -             -   4 0 LG 24-1-1826 I18
0.004 Hon John Lindsay 1817 CI 1 0 6 9                700               -             700               -                 -             -   4 0
0.018 David Mushet 1817 sw 2 0 7 2             5,000               -         5,000               -                 -             -   4 0
0.026 James Adam 1817 w 2 13 2 2          40,000      35,000              -                 -                 -      1,000 0 5
0.043 Joshua Rowe 1817 sw 5 0 4 6          30,000               -                -        30,000               -             -   2 0 LG 26-6-1824, I18
0.059 Thomas Halford 1817 sw 1 13 9 1             2,000        2,000              -                 -                 -             -   0 3 LG 20-2-1821, I17
0.061 Henry Hunt & others 1817 w 8 14 3 4             7,000        7,000              -                 -                 -          300 0 5
0.064 John Ikin 1817 y 15 40 2 1          17,000      17,000              -                 -                 -             -   0 1 LG 25-5-1819, I17
0.068 George Firmstone 1817 wm 6 0 1 1             1,000               -                -                 -          1,000           -   5 0
0.073 John Scott 1817 w 7 13 3 1             3,500        3,500              -                 -                 -             -   0 3
0.074 J Firmstone 1817 wm 1 0 4 2             5,000               -                -                 -          5,000           -   5 0
0.080 Abraham Favene & John Heaver 1817 sw 1 5 9 5             5,000        4,000              -                 -                 -             -   0 2
0.087 Benjamin Fayle 1817 sw 2 8 2 9          30,000      30,000              -                 -                 -             -   0 2
0.113 W James 1817 wm 0 0 9 1             5,000               -                -                 -          5,000           -   2 0
0.115 Messers Roscoe 1817 w 1 0 4 1          70,000               -       70,000               -                 -             -   4 0
0.116 Benjamin Frankland for John Clarke 1817 nw 1 0 4 1          80,000               -       80,000               -                 -             -   4 0
0.118 Charles Perkins 1817 ne 7 11 3 1          15,000      15,000              -                 -                 -             -   0 2
0.122 Joseph Griffin 1817 wm 0 0 4 1             2,000               -                -                 -          2,000        300 5 0
0.136 Geo Jackson 1817 wm 1 0 4 2             3,000               -         3,000               -                 -             -   4 0
0.147 Thomas pinkerton 1817 wm 2 8 9 1             1,200        1,200              -                 -                 -             -   0 4 LG 27-7-1819, I17
0.151 J D Jones 1817 w 1 0 6 4             1,000               -         1,000               -                 -          100 3 0
0.152 Joseph Partridge 1817 wm 0 0 7 1             2,000               -         2,000               -                 -             -   4 0
0.159 R Gibbon 1817 ne 8 0 4 1             3,500               -         3,500               -                 -             -   4 0 LG 25-1-1828, I18
0.164 Moses teague & chas evans 1817 sw 1 0 4 1             4,000               -         4,000               -                 -             -   4 0
0.207 Rees jones 1818 w 2 0 7 1             1,400               -         1,400               -                 -             -   4 0
0.208 Joshua Rowe 1818 sw 10 0 4 6          30,000               -                -        30,000               -             -   2 0
0.211 Thomas Tinson 1818 sw 0 0 4 6             2,000               -                -                 -          2,000           -   5 0
0.233 Moses Teague 1819 sw 0 0 3 1             2,000               -                -                 -          2,000           -   5 0 LG 10-1-1824, I17
0.239 John Reed 1819 ne 1 2 2 1          80,000      80,000              -                 -                 -    10,000 0 2
0.241 T Gisborne later mp. See dnb 1819 em 1 2 3 1          14,000        5,000              -                 -                 -          220 0 2
0.247 Joseph Devey coal exchange 1819 ne 0 0 4 1          12,000               -                -                 -        12,000           -   5 0 LG 12-10-1819, I1
0.258 Frederick Gardner 1819 sw 3 0 3 1             2,000               -         2,000               -                 -             -   3 0
continued on next page
loan 
number
,     see 
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bankruptcy 
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0.269 Frederick Hall 1820 sw 0 0 4 5             5,000               -                -                 -          5,000           -   5 0
0.281 Chasewater tin & copper mine 1820 sw 26 0 2 6          20,000               -       20,000               -                 -             -   1 0
0.301 Thomas Hopper 1820 ne 0 0 9 1          40,000               -                -        40,000               -             -   5 0 newcstle couran
0.308 Chasewater tin & copper mine 1820 sw 1 0 2 6          12,500               -       12,500               -                 -             -   1 0
0.310 Joseph Griffin 1820 wm 0 0 4 1             1,000               -         1,000               -                 -             -   4 0
0.317 Frederick Hall 1820 sw 1 0 4 5          15,000               -       15,000               -                 -             -   4 0
0.340 William James 1821 wm 0 0 9 1             3,000               -                -                 -          3,000           -   5 0 LG 30-4-1824, I 1
0.384 Mason, Harper & co 1822 sw 1 0 4 4             1,000               -         1,000               -                 -             -   6 0
0.388 Thomas Tickell 1822 wm 1 0 4 3          25,000               -       15,000               -                 -      2,000 2 0 lg 17919 p718
0.389 Wainwright Jones etc 1822 wm 1 0 9 2          10,000               -       10,000               -                 -             -   2 0
0.396 Wainwright, Jones & Fereday etc 1822 wm 0 0 9 2             4,000               -                -                 -          4,000           -   2 0
0.403 Brandling Bros 1822 ne 0 0 9 1          10,000               -                -                 -        10,000           -   5 0
0.410 James White 1822 se 2 0 7 9             1,000               -         1,000               -                 -             -   3 0
0.425 George elwell jackson 1822 wm 4 22 9 2          10,000        8,000              -                 -                 -             -   0 1 LG 19-7-1831 I18
0.426 Consolidated mines co 1822 sw 0 0 9 5             3,000               -                -                 -          3,000           -   5 0
0.430 Thomas Jones 1822 w 0 0 4 2          15,000               -                -                 -        15,000           -   5 0
0.433 W Hallett 1822 sw 8 10 4 5             3,000        2,000              -                 -                 -             -   0 1
0.437 Edward Bagnall 1822 wm 2 0 2 1             4,000               -         4,000               -                 -             -   1 0
0.440 John Taylor 1822 s 6 0 4 1             6,000               -         6,000               -                 -             -   2 0
0.445 Edward Bird, Cardiff Iron foundary 1822 w 4 0 4 3                600               -             600               -                 -             -   4 0 LG 6-6-1828, I184
0.446 John Jones 1822 w 8 0 3 1                600               -             600               -                 -             -   3 0
0.447 Sir W Cunningham Fairlie MP 1822 s 2 0 4 1             3,000               -         3,000               -                 -             -   4 0 LG 13-2-1827, I18
0.452 William Simons 1822 w 8 0 4 1                500               -             500               -                 -             -   2 0
0.461 John Corrie 1823 wm 0 0 4 1             8,000               -                -                 -          8,000           -   5 0
0.462 Lt gen george warde 1823 w 2 0 4 1          10,000               -                -                 -        10,000           -   2 0
0.464 William Holloway 1823 wm 6 9 9 1             2,000        2,000              -                 -                 -             -   0 1
0.467 Thomas Claughton mp 1823 nw 6 0 9 1          20,000               -       20,000               -                 -             -   2 0 LG 12-5-1824, I18
0.478 Broomfield & Stevenson 1823 wm 4 0 7 1             5,000               -         5,000               -                 -            60 4 0
0.479 Thomas Jones 1823 w 4 0 4 2          15,000               -       15,000               -                 -          200 4 0
0.495 Marquis of Londonderry 1823 ne 0 0 4 1          40,000               -                -                 -        40,000           -   2 0
0.523 Sir James Jelf 1823 sw 4 0 4 9             8,000               -         8,000               -                 -            60 4 0
0.530 John Cottingham 1824 nw 7 11 2 1             5,000        5,000              -                 -                 -          150 0 4
0.554 Hetton colliery Durham 1824 ne 1 0 4 1          67,000               -       67,000               -                 -             -   4 0
0.629 Sam Walker (Walker & Yates) 1825 wm 1 2 1 2          40,000      40,000              -                 -                 -    10,000 0 3
continued on next page
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0.633 Harford Bros Bristol 1826 sw 0 0 2 1        120,000               -    120,000               -                 -      3,000 1 0 1841
0.642 William Aston B'ham 1826 wm 0 0 1 1          15,000               -                -        15,000               -      1,500 5 0 LG 25-4-1826, I18
0.645 Jones & Faraday windmill end works 1826 wm 0 0 2 2             8,000               -                -          8,000               -          650 1 0
0.647 George Bishton colliery 1826 wm 0 0 2 2          30,000               -                -        30,000               -          600 5 0 LG 3-11-1835, I19
0.651 William Hanbury Sparrow 1826 wm 2 3 1 2          12,500      12,000              -                 -                 -      1,000 0 1
0.653 Hetton coal co 1826 ne 1 0 7 1          50,000               -       50,000               -                 -             -   4 0
0.662 Thomas edwards 1826 w 2 0 4 1             5,000               -         5,000               -                 -          100 4 0
0.670 Robinson & Fincraft Newport Mon 1826 w 2 0 7 1             1,500               -         1,500               -                 -             -   4 0
0.671 London United mining co 1826 sw 2 0 4 6          12,000               -       12,000               -                 -          400 4 0
0.672 henry Hunt & other Hunts 1826 w 0 0 4 2             7,000               -         7,000               -                 -             -   4 0
0.695 Richard brinton 1826 wm 2 7 1 2             6,000        3,000              -                 -                 -          350 0 2
0.697 Gen George Warde 1826 w 2 0 4 1          10,000               -       10,000               -                 -             -   3 0
0.751 James Elder Fintshire 1826 w 0 0 4 4             5,000               -         5,000               -                 -             -   5 0
Totals    1,177,500   271,700  625,800    153,000   127,000  31,990 
Note.   PWLB  numbered applications consequetively as they were received. They got to around 2,000 by 1842, when a new Act was passed. They then started a new sequence, starting
again at number 1. To ensure that each application has a unique number, the first series have been rendered here as 1=0.001, 100=0.100, 430 =0.430 etc. -        
Key 
Regions ne=North East, nw=North West, Y=Yorkshire, wm=West Midlands, em=East Midlands, e=East Anglia, se=South East, L=London, sw=South West, s=South, w=Wales, s=Scotland
Reason for Application.   1=Short term credit need, 2=Repay debt, 3=Overcome physical problem, 4=Development of mine, 5=Employment, 6=Open new mine, 7= Reopen old mine,9=unclear re
Type of mine.    1=Coal, 2and 3=Coal and Iron, 4=Lead, 5=Tin, 6=Copper, 9=Quarries
Reason for rejection.  1=Debt, 2=Insufficient security, 3=Weak business case, 4=Speculation, 5=Abandoned, 5=Withdrawn, 6=Manufacturing, 7=Unclear
Repayment difficulties. 1=Repaid on time, 2=Sought extension, 3=Instalment payment missno
Bankruptcy . Date of notice published in London Gazette.
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Derivation of 1817-26 fixed capital formation estimates for turnpike trusts Appendix 3.A
Source data from turnpike trust returns to parliament
Year 1819 &21 1823 1829 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838
£000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000
Income
Toll & other income 1,089      1,471      1,408      1,600      1,631          1,646   1,599     1,574      
Borrowing -           206          -           153          165              130       134         97            
Total income 1,089      1,677      1,408      1,754      1,797          1,777   1,733     1,670      
Spending
Running costs 1,002      1,235      1,141      1,057      1,094          1,121   1,119     1,058      
Land -           -           56            30            37                24         28           24            
Improvements -           -           -           217          212              205       208         155          
Debt interest 182          164          237          289          302              313       303         301          
Dept repayments 69            60            244          108          133              117       122         132          
Total spending 1,285      1,459      1,678      1,702      1,777          1,780   1,781     1,670      
Debt
Mortgage debt 4,517      3,675      6,579      7,068      7,117          7,188   7,263     7,261      
Unpaid interest 559          462          822          1,002      1,019          1,031   1,051     1,124      
Other debt 255          199          385          383          382              358       356         351          
Total debt 5,330      4,336      7,785      8,453      8,518          8,577   8,670     8,735      
Source: BPP 1821(747) 1824 (470) 1833(733) 1836 (2) 1837 (328) 1837/38 1839 (447)1840 (289)
(529)
Assumptions Workings
1817-26 1827-34 1835-38 1817-26 1827-34 1835-8
Debt repaid as %age of income 5.1% 5.1% 7.8% All costs £000 £000 £000
Cost uplift to Ginarlis 25% 37% 34% ginarlis 10,256 9,431     5,007      
Borrowing as %age of capex 90% 80% 59% non cash 500       400         200          
Residual capex as % of income 14.5% 13.5% 12.6% land 500       344         113          
Investment per new Act, £000 8 8 8 debt P+I 2,591   3,510     1,724      
No. of new Acts in period 95 28 10 all costs 13,847 13,685   7,043      
Capital spend & borrowing
Results new acts 760       224         80            
total residual 2,008   1,848     812          
ginarlis spend new Acts residual All all cap ex 2,768   2,072     892          
£000 £000 £000 £000 £000 income funded 277       414         365          
1817 880 1,188      56 172 228 borrowing 2,491   1,657     527          
1818 877 1,184      80 172 252
1819 937 1,265      40 183 223 Verification against debt levels
1820 921 1,243      24 180 204 open debt 4,517   5,915     7,068      
1821 928 1,253      8 182 190 less '18-19 350-       
1822 1042 1,407      24 204 228 debt repay 700-       698-         551-          
1823 1115 1,505      56 218 274 borrow 2,491   1,657     527          
1824 1174 1,585      152 230 382 error 43-         194         217          
1825 1219 1,646      184 239 423 close debt 5,915   7,068     7,261      
1826 1163 1,570      136 228 364 add '27-8 debt 664       
1827 1164 1,689      32 228 260 1829 debt 6,579   
1828 1182 1,715      40 232 272 1834 debt 7,068     
1829 1160 1,683      24 227 251 1838 debt 7,261      
1830 1154 1,675      24 226 250
1831 1169 1,696      48 229 277 Method
1832 1179 1,711      32 231 263 1 derive assumptions from BPP source data
1833 1194 1,733      16 234 250 2 Turn Ginarlis numbers into estimates of
1834 1229 1,783      8 241 249 all trust costs, by adding estimates for non
1835 1264 1,778      24 224 248 cash costs, debt, and land costs
1836 1321 1,858      32 234 266 3 calculate FCF on basis of £8,000 @ new Act, 
1837 1209 1,701      0 214 214 and 12.6-14.5% for residual FCF, depending
1838 1213 1,706      0 215 215 on period
Concl 4 verify results by comparing to known debt 
usions levels for 1829, 1834 and 1838.
5 revise assumptions  and repeat until
verification is achieved.
The test of the validity of the assumptions made is 
their ability to generate the known mortgage debt 
figures for 1829, 1834 and 1838. For 1829, the error 
is less than 1 per cent, and under 3 per cent for the 
later years.
Capital spending
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Turnpike Trusts. Archive material on subscribers and mortgagees Appendix 3.B
Turnpike Trust source place source ref
Total 
raised        
£ year
PWLB 
lending        
£
No of 
subscribe
rs
no of 
mortgage
es
lords
/bart
s
gentl
eme
n/Esq
merc
hants
manu
factu
rers
bank
ers
profe
ssion
als
farm
er/ye
oman
trade
smen
wom
en
estat
es
churc
hme
n
unkn
own
Instit
ution
s
1 Rotherham & Pleasley 4,141      1812 24 2 1 4 5 Wakefield WRT 77/4
2 Gomersal & Dewsbury 6,851      1830-8 3,500    18 3 3 6 3 Wakefield WRT 37/17
3 Leeds & Tong Lane 9,838      1825 13 4 1 10 2 Wakefield WRT 63
4 Colne & Broughton 1,021      1826 2,500    5 1 2 2 Wakefield WRT21/11
5 Blaby & Worksop 3,427      1831 12 5 2 1 1 Doncaster Boro Wakefield WRT 3/27
6 Shepley Lane Head & Barnsley 900          1845 3 2 1 Wakefield WRT 8/2
7 Shepley Lane Head & Barnsley 4,500      1823 48 1 7 1 5 2 11 1 1 1 3 0 Wakefield WRT 8/2
8 Leeds (Quebec) to Holmfield Lane En 11,085    1817 48 2 4 8 2 5 8 5 Wakefield WRT 60
9 Leeds Dewsbury 2,310      1815 9,000    13 4 1 1 1 1 2 Wakefield WRT 24/1
10 Collingham & York 2,375      11 1 7 Wakefield WRT 20/73
11 Rotherham Barnby 7,353      1822 22 3 12 1 5 1 Wakefield WRT 4/1
12 Doncaster Thorne 3,300      1826 20 1 12 3 2 Doncaster Boro Wakefield WRT 29/6
13 Oldham Ripponden 2,900      1758 20 4 10 1 5 Wakefield WRT 70
14 Dewsbury & Horbury Bridge 3,075      1821 23 2 1 6 7 1 0 Wakefield WRT 23/1
15 Holme Lane End & Heckmondwike 3,520      1826 3,400    14 Wakefield WRT 46/16
16 Wadsley & Langsett & Sheffield 5,537      1833 8 3 1 Wakefield WRT 100/3
17 Wadsley & Langsett & Sheffield 3,629      1823 3,500    29 2 2 3 2 Wakefield WRT 100/3
18 Rotherham & wortley 2,400      1821 13 2 1 1 1 2 Wakefield WRT 80
19 Ilkely Skipton Kirstall 14,200    26 15 1 5 5 Bradford 5D76/3/1
20 Bradford Thornhill 3,600      5 1 1 1 2 Bradford 5D76/2/2
21 Chapel en le Frith & Enterclough 5,790      1834 28 1 2 2 1 1 6 Benevolent Soc Sheffield ACM D58
22 Glossop & Marple Bridge 965          1805 17 1 3 1 Sheffield
23 Campden & Clifford 1,200      1824 1 1 Warwick CR446/46
24 Wootton Rd 1,800      1814 8 1 4 2 1 Warwick CR446/9
25 Arrow & Pot hooks End Rd 2,600      11 1 4 2 Warwick CR446/11
26 Evesham & Alcester 1,820      1817 4 1 2 1 Warwick CR446/24
27 Banbury Bailes 3,490      1802 67 1 25 1 2 30 8 5 Warwick CR/580/b53/8
28 Heywood 4,515      1798 35 13 1 4 2 10 1 3 2 1 Lancs TTH
29 Bury Haslingden 11,800    30 2 5 1 6 charity sch Lancs TTA/6
30 Greenwood & Carnforth 9,550      46 1 19 1 2 7 2 Lancs TTK/8
31 Clitheroe Blackburn 9,186      17 3 1 4 5 2 1 borough Lancs TTB/2
32 mkt harboro' Coventry 7,300      1755-70 17 5 4 6 2 Leicester T/X/16/1
33 Tamworth Sawley Ferry 3,964      59 20 2 5 23 15 2 Leicester T/X/19/1
34 Moira Gresley 3,185      43 2 14 2 11 2 4 8 1 Leicester T/X/9/1
35 Melton Mowbray Leicester 2,200      11 5 1 1 4 Leicester T/X/3/1
36 Leicester Hinckley 5,100      28 1 11 1 1 5 2 7 1 parish Leicester T/X/4/1
37 Chester Frodshaw rd 5,020      1789 31 14 2 1 5 1 8 1 Chester LTB/2
38 Chester Northrop rd 4,300      1828 11 4 3 4 sheff corp Chester LTD/2
39 Duffield Sheffield 16,740    32 2 6 1 1 2 6 3 1 2 Matlock D7/3
40 Brimington Chesterfield 2,087      6 2 3 1 Matlock D1A/TA 156-169
41 Chesterfield Worksop 7,300      7 2 1 1 1 Matlock D3/A/TA1
totals 205,874  21,900  565 283 55 231 23 39 1 25 55 87 100 16 27 21 14 10
Borrowing Type of borrowing Borrowing from whom
non 
local
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Turnpike Trusts. Debt write off 1850 to 1883. Losses to non PWLB lenders Appendix 3.c
Source 
documents 
BPP ref
outstandi
ng debt
mortgage 
debt
of which 
unpaid 
interest
Principal 
repaid
Interest 
repaid
Reduct'n 
in 
mortgage 
Written 
off 
principal
interest 
due @ 
5.00%
forgone 
interest
p in £ 
paid on 
principal
p in £ 
paid on 
interest
£000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000
1852-3(1573) 1850 8,154       6,454       1,574       134          257          246          112          323          66             0.54 0.80
1854(1805) 1851 7,749       6,211       1,415       113          246          243          130          311          65             0.47 0.79
1854(1851) 1852 7,257       6,031       1,127       131          239          180          49             302          63             0.73 0.79
1854-5(2000) 1853 6,921       5,881       943          142          226          150          8               294          68             0.95 0.77
1856(2146) 1854 6,661       5,724       841          136          218          157          21             286          68             0.87 0.76
1857-8(2400) 1855 6,428       5,586       756          117          210          138          21             279          69             0.85 0.75
1859(2509) 1856 6,244       5,399       754          119          186          187          68             270          84             0.64 0.69
1860(2731) 1857 6,124       5,272       767          118          182          127          9               264          82             0.93 0.69
1861(2868) 1858 5,991       5,128       783          131          176          144          13             256          80             0.91 0.69
1862(3044) 1859 5,844       4,973       796          139          172          155          16             249          77             0.90 0.69
1863 (3210) 1860 5,654       4,822       760          143          165          151          8               241          76             0.95 0.68
1864(3413) 1861 5,450       4,660       711          143          154          162          19             233          79             0.88 0.66
1865(3561) 1862 5,205       4,459       672          148          160          201          53             223          63             0.74 0.72
1866(3743) 1863 4,865       4,232       556          147          135          227          80             212          77             0.65 0.64
1866(3743-1) 1864 4,620       4,046       498          161          130          186          25             202          72             0.87 0.64
1867(3935) 1865 4,363       3,852       437          176          121          194          18             193          72             0.91 0.63
1867-8(4002) 1866 4,067       3,624       383          188          112          228          40             181          69             0.82 0.62
1868-9(4219) 1867 3,753       3,371       325          208          103          253          45             169          66             0.82 0.61
1870(53) 1868 3,567       3,184       332          167          90             187          20             159          69             0.89 0.57
1871(454) 1869 3,289       2,944       302          183          87             240          57             147          60             0.76 0.59
1872(623) 1870 3,066       2,723       304          181          78             221          40             136          58             0.82 0.57
1873(835) 1871 2,839       2,497       308          186          73             226          40             125          52             0.82 0.58
1874(1051) 1872 2,580       2,295       256          149          69             202          53             115          46             0.74 0.60
1875(1344) 1873 2,202       2,057       117          150          57             238          88             103          46             0.63 0.55
1876(1619) 1874 1,905       1,792       91             153          44             265          112          90             46             0.58 0.49
1877(1844) 1875 1,631       1,544       64             142          36             248          106          77             41             0.57 0.47
1878-9(2365) 1876 1,355       1,283       52             120          26             261          141          64             38             0.46 0.41
1880(2516) 1877 1,051       1,010       28             117          18             273          156          51             33             0.43 0.36
1880(2647) 1878 751          713          26             117          16             297          180          36             20             0.39 0.45
1881(2966) 1879 581          550          21             68             9               163          95             28             19             0.42 0.33
1882(3214) 1880 449          426          21             55             8               124          69             21             13             0.44 0.38
1883(3750) 1881 370          342          20             36             6               84             48             17             11             0.43 0.35
1884(4168) 1882 250          276          19             36             5               66             30             14             9               0.55 0.36
Lenders expected to be paid 6,454       1,574       5,668       13,696   
What they were paid 4,454       3,814       8,268     
What they lost 1,574       1,970       1,854       5,398     
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Workhouses. Basic data by county and region Appendix 4.A
Adjustments to PLC sanctions
county
regi
on
Pop 
1831
pop 
1841
spend 
1834
spend 
1844
Pre 
1834 
wkhses
Gilbert 
& local 
unions
1845-6 
capital 
spend
Capital 
stock at 
end 1844
Capital 
stock end 
1844
Poor 
relief 
1834
Poor 
relief 
1844
payback 
period, 
years
col 1 col 2 col 3 col 4 col5 col 6 col 7 col 8 col 9 col 10 col 11 col 12 col 13 col 14 col 15 col 16
000 000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £.p £.p £.p £000
beds e 95 108 78 41 35 34 4 38 0.40 0.82 0.38 54% 48 0.7 beds
berks se 145 162 100 74 35 60 12 72 0.50 0.69 0.46 34% 38 1.6 berks
bucks se 147 156 124 76 34 57 57 0.39 0.84 0.49 42% 56 1.0 bucks
cambs e 144 164 96 70 28 58 58 0.40 0.67 0.43 36% 39 1.5 cambs
cheshire nw 334 396 93 84 43 46 4 2 4          56 0.17 0.28 0.21 24% 26 1.7 cheshire
cornwall sw 301 342 93 75 28 55 55 0.18 0.31 0.22 29% 31 1.8 cornwall
cumberland nw 170 178 43 36 14 17 12 29 0.17 0.25 0.20 20% 9 1.9 cumberland
derbys em 237 272 72 58 22 42 4 7          53 0.22 0.30 0.21 30% 25 1.7 derbys
devon sw 494 533 211 181 14 92 8 6 106 0.21 0.43 0.34 20% 47 2.0 devon
dorset sw 159 175 84 79 25 56 4 60 0.37 0.53 0.45 15% 13 4.1 dorset
durham ne 254 308 79 81 14 28 28 0.11 0.31 0.26 15% 15 1.9 durham
essex e 318 345 240 160 84 139 4 1          144 0.45 0.75 0.46 39% 100 1.4 essex
gloucs sw 387 431 161 135 64 89 12 2 18        121 0.31 0.42 0.31 25% 44 2.0 gloucs
hants se 314 355 203 137 72 86 28 10 124 0.39 0.65 0.39 40% 93 0.9 hants
hereford wm 111 113 57 43 12 29 2          31 0.28 0.51 0.38 26% 15 2.0 hereford
herts e 143 157 86 61 27 60 12 72 0.50 0.60 0.39 35% 33 1.8 herts
hunts e 53 59 36 24 13 13 13 0.25 0.68 0.41 40% 16 0.8 hunts
kent se 479 540 344 194 142 189 8 2 199 0.42 0.72 0.36 50% 194 1.0 kent
lancs nw 1337 1667 253 330 88 116 12 2 11        141 0.11 0.19 0.20 -5% -15 -8.0 lancs
leics em 197 216 101 79 39 56 56 0.28 0.51 0.37 29% 32 1.8 leics
lincs em 317 363 161 113 41 90 4 1          95 0.30 0.51 0.31 39% 71 1.3 lincs
middx l/m 1358 1601 582 457 62 124 176 4 10        314 0.23 0.43 0.29 33% 229 0.5 middx
norfolk e 390 413 308 189 52 92 28 4 124 0.32 0.79 0.46 42% 137 0.7 norfolk
northants em 179 199 140 89 54 69 4 73 0.41 0.78 0.45 43% 67 1.0 northants
northumberlandne 223 266 72 71 19 32 8 1          41 0.18 0.32 0.27 17% 15 2.1 northumberland
notts em 225 250 66 69 29 49 12 61 0.27 0.29 0.28 6% 4 11.3 notts
oxon se 152 163 121 77 45 58 8 2 68 0.44 0.80 0.47 41% 53 1.1 oxon
Poor relief saving
Poor relief 
saving
Populations Poor relief spending
pwlb 
loans
PLC 
snctn
Per head of population
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rutland em 19 21 9 8 4 7 7 0.38 0.47 0.38 20% 2 3.7 rutland
salop wm 223 226 82 69 7 30 28 4 1          63 0.28 0.37 0.31 17% 14 2.1 salop
somerset sw 404 436 176 159 55 121 1          122 0.30 0.44 0.36 16% 31 3.9 somerset
staffs wm 411 509 121 114 71 83 12 4 1          100 0.24 0.29 0.22 24% 36 2.3 staffs
suffolk e 296 315 246 136 32 70 28 98 0.33 0.83 0.43 48% 126 0.6 suffolk
surrey se 486 570 262 199 92 140 16 4 1          161 0.33 0.54 0.35 35% 108 1.3 surrey
sussex se 272 300 247 142 68 106 44 10 160 0.59 0.91 0.47 48% 130 0.8 sussex
Wales w 904 1045 316 304 120 160 5          165 0.18 0.35 0.29 17% 61 2.6 Wales
warwicks wm 337 402 158 102 13 35 20 4 59 0.17 0.47 0.25 46% 86 0.4 warwicks
westmoreland nw 55 56 22 19 0 2 8 10 0.18 0.40 0.34 15% 3 0.6 westmoreland
wilts sw 240 256 174 136 41 72 8 2 8          90 0.37 0.73 0.53 27% 50 1.4 wilts
worcs wm 211 248 82 67 32 53 4 1          58 0.28 0.39 0.27 30% 29 1.8 worcs
yorks e y 204 194 91 74 11 26 2 3          31 0.15 0.45 0.38 14% 13 2.0 yorks e
yorks n y 191 203 76 62 5 18 12 2 32 0.17 0.40 0.31 23% 19 0.9 yorks n
yorks w y 976 1195 252 306 34 58 8 6 12        84 0.09 0.26 0.26 1% 3 22.8 yorks w
totals 13892 15908 6318 4980 1718 2816 552 72 88 3528 0.25 0.45 0.31 31% 2255 1.2 totals
Region
Pop 
1831
pop 
1841
spend 
1834
spend 
1844
Pre 
1834 
wkhses
Gilbert 
& local 
unions
1845-6 
capital 
spend
Capital 
stock at 
end 1844
Poor 
relief 
1834
Poor 
relief 
1844
payback 
period, 
years
000 000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £.p £.p £.p 0 £000
East   e 1439 1561 1090 681 269 465 76 4 1 546 0.38 0.76 0.44 42% 501 0.9 East   
South East se 1995 2246 1401 899 489 695 116 28 1 840 0.42 0.70 0.40 43% 678 1.0 South East
East Midlands em 1174 1321 549 416 189 314 24 0 8 346 0.29 0.47 0.31 33% 202 1.6 East Midlands
South West sw 1985 2173 899 765 228 484 32 10 27 553 0.28 0.45 0.35 22% 219 2.2 South West
London l/m 1358 1601 582 457 62 124 176 4 10 314 0.23 0.43 0.29 33% 229 0.5 London
West Midlands wm 1293 1498 500 395 134 231 64 12 5 312 0.24 0.39 0.26 32% 184 1.3 West Midlands
Wales w 904 1045 316 304 120 160 0 0 5 165 0.18 0.35 0.29 17% 61 2.6 Wales
North East ne 477 574 151 152 33 60 8 0 1 69 0.15 0.32 0.26 16% 30 2.0 North East
Yorkshire y 1371 1592 419 442 50 101 20 10 15 146 0.11 0.31 0.28 9% 45 2.3 Yorkshire
North West nw 1896 2297 411 469 145 181 36 4 15 236 0.12 0.22 0.20 6% 29 6.3 North West
totals 13892 15908 6318 4980 1718 2816 552 72 88 3528 0.25 0.45 0.31 31% 2255 1.2 Totals
Sources PLC 4th 
Ann Rpt
Mitchell 
& Deane
Morris
on Driver
Sum 
cols 5-8
col 9 /    
col 1
col 3 /   
col 1
col 4 /   
col 2
col 13/   
col 12
Poor relief 
saving
PWLB/PLC 
records
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Derby
208
Marc
h 
1837     25,484 
Jan 
1837       350     5,360       300      6,460 
s ent pwlb 
applctn
£2K s a les , 
bank £4K 
may '38      5,470     4,164      35,015 0.21 0.12 -45% 1.9 22
MH12/1
984-6
Bakewell
110
July 
1838     25,879 
Dec 
1838       250     6,500 1841       200      7,900 
pwlb out of 
cas h, 5/'39, 
6/'39 REA 
offer, as k 
Arkwright
pwlb £6500 
July '40, 
£1400 REA 
Jan '42      6,392     6,969      31,319 0.25 0.22 -10% 10.3 40
D521/W
1
MH12/1
799-1800
Belper
120
May 
1837     33,388 
May 
1837       250     3,700 
Sept 
1840       300      9,450 
Derby bank 
treas , but no 
loan
PWLB £7550 > 
aug 1838, 
£2000 Jan 
'41, pvte      6,161     5,865      46,235 0.18 0.13 -31% 3.5 32
D19/C/
W1
MH12/1
840-2
Chesterfie
ld
168
Oct 
1837     34,246 
Oct 
1837       300     6,240 
Dec 
1839       300      9,500 
1900 pwlb no 
cas h. Cld 
la ter have 
had pwlb
PWLB £6900, 
7/'38, £2600 
REA s ept '40      8,874     9,253      39,379 0.26 0.23 -9% 10.0 32 D522
MH12/1
921-2
Chapel en 
le Frith 140
Dec 
1837     10,488 
April 
1839       100     2,000       100      3,160 pwlb no cas h
Nov '39 £2160 
REA, Oct '41 
£1000 REA      2,344     2,404      11,349 0.22 0.21 -5% 23.9 32
D442//C/
W2-3
MH12/1
891-2
Hayfield
Dec 
1837        9,493 
Dec 
1837       100     1,750 
mid 
1841       120      2,700 
£2000 econ 
l i fe, 2/'39      1,500     2,195        9,516 0.16 0.23 46% -3.9 23
D441/C/
W1-2
MH12/2
040-1
Shardlow
Marc
h 
1837     29,812 
marc
h 
1837       230     1,500 
may 
1839       230      3,400 
as k derby 
bank for loan 
terms
robert s torer 
£2800 + 
hepworth 
£600      6,318     8,041      32,640 0.21 0.25 16% -3.0 15
D523/C
/W1/1
MH12/2
060-2
Ashbourn
e 150     20,658       200     5,000 1848       160      8,000 
appl  REA for 
£1.5K, audtr 
REA agent
2/'46 pwlb 
£6500, £1500 
6/'48 pwlb      5,567      20,658 0.27 0.00 50 D520
MH12/1
772
Glossop
Dec 
1837        9,631 1834       100      1,500 
£1000 Robert 
Shepley      1,075     1,288      14,575 0.11 0.09 -21% 4.4 15
D2125/
2
MH12/2
021-2
totals 896 178,421 1,780 32,050 1,810 52,070  62% 29,650        38,134  40,179 220,028 0.21 0.18 -15% 7.6 29
Sources
www.
work
hous
es.or
g
PLC Ann 
Rpts
PLC 11th 
ann rpt 
1845 
(660) 
app c
Shaw's 
Union 
Officers 
Manual 
1850
PLC annual 
Reports
Union minute books in Derbyshire Record Office and 
Derby local studies library, plus MH12 files for each Union
PWLB loan 
ledger & 
MH34
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Appendix 5.A
Annual water and sewer spending authorisations, and PWLB lending
Local 
bodies
Water 
companies  
£000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000 £000
1845 73 516              589           -          0%
1846 65 1,213          1,278            - 0%
1847 1130 603              1,733        -          0%
1848 -            335              335           -          0%
1849 49              205              50              304           -          0%
1850 41              91              415              58              605           -          0%
1851 66              555           86                96              803           -          0%
1852 205           52              1,917          33              2,207        -          0%
1853 487           367           1,109          130           2,093        6              0%
1854 557           344           945              268           2,114        88           4%
1855 369           315           1,136          1,820        48           3%
1856 318           190           591              80              1,179        61           5%
1857 284           13              623              62              982           62           6%
1858 338           620           238              41              1,237        17           1%
1859 157           12              304              212           685           3              0%
1860 209           335           757              374           1,675        32           2%
1861 216           137           687              704           1,744        45           3%
1862 188           155           789              852           1,984        54           3%
1863 213           248           403              917           160           1,941        167         9%
1864 220           537           1,580          1,083        570           3,990        585         15%
1865 588           340           448              1,280        17              2,673        62           2%
1866 396           285           2,245          1,120        4,046        147         4%
1867 397           1,414        1,591          722           4,124        59           1%
1868 464           662           1,539          653           3,318        46           1%
1869 346           560           1,587          352           2,845        35           1%
1870 714           1,005        395              305           2,419        22           1%
1871 851           580           655              179           2,265        20           1%
1872 341           1,138        783              215           2,477        18           1%
1873 586           366           684              274           1,910        524         27%
1874 1,033        422           401              175           2,031        725         36%
1875 1,221        1,734        1,923          149           5,027        1,692     34%
1876 1,079        1,800        1,176          -            4,055        1,331     33%
1848-76 -            
total 11,886     14,326     25,547        10,384     747           62,890     5,849     9%
Sources: Sanctions from HLG16, Local Acts from British Library, Local & Personal Act annual vols,
                  except for 1871 &73, from BoT reports. MBW from annual reports. PWLB, PWLB 6/1-6.
Notes:    The PWLB granted applications worth £8.1m between 1848 and 1876. But £0.8m of these
                 where from Scotland, and are excluded or the above table which covers England and
                  Wales only. In addition, £1.5m of applications granted in 1875 and 1876 were not paid 
                  until five or more years after 1876. They are therefore excluded from the above table.
PWLB 
share
GBH/LGB 
etc 
sanctions
Metro. 
Board of 
Works
Manuf 
districts
total, all 
sources
PWLB 
lending
Local Acts
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Appendix 5.B
Number £000 Number £000 No.
Year
1848 4 107        0 -        0% 0
1849 3 8             0 -        0% 0
1850 4 52          0 -        0% 0
1851 2 10          0 -        0% 0
1852 5 44          0 -        0% 0
1853 7 269        2 6            29% 2
1854 14 170        7 88          50% 7
1855 19 182        9 48          47% 9
1856 9 66          6 61          67% 6
1857 7 68          5 62          71% 5
1858 3 23          2 17          67% 2
1859 2 4             2 3            100% 2
1860 3 32          3 32          100% 3
1861 4 45          4 45          100% 4
1862 5 54          5 54          100% 5
1863 26 167        26 167       100% 26
1864 71 646        66 585       93% 66
1865 10 62          10 62          100% 10
1866 34 176        27 147       79% 27
1867 35 155        23 59          66% 23
1868 22 154        17 46          77% 17
1869 22 59          17 35          77% 17
1870 15 29          11 22          73% 11
1871 14 21          12 20          86% 12
1872 13 25          10 18          77% 10
1873 84 570        77 524       92% 77
1874 125 738        121 725       97% 121
1875 439 2,665    398 1,692    91% 398
1876 363 1,520    348 1,331    96% 348
Totals 1,364       8,121    1,208     5,849    89% 1208
Source: Analysis of PWLB applications register, PWLB 6/1a, 6/2-6
Notes: See note in Appendix 5.A
Applications Success rateLoans Granted
Number and value of water and sewer applications 
to the PWLB, and their outcome
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Basic national level school data on places and financing Appendix 6.A
BPP Borrowing pwlb govt implied implied implied
number pwlb to mbw other pwlb etc plcesall share of grant vol sch brd total
board vol All schls 31-Mar £ places borrowing contribs cost cost
£ £ £ £ £ £ £M £M £M
1870 165 1,765,944  1,765,944  0.0 0.0 0.0
1871 406 1,878,584  1,878,584  0.5 0.0 0.5
1872 601 8,700          2,003,979  2,012,679  1.0 0.1 1.0
1873 812 70,000        2,225,894  2,295,894  1.8 0.6 2.4
1874 1019 138,300     2,444,249  2,582,549  266,784     252,935   2.7 1.1 4.1
1875 1265 245,508     2,626,318  2,871,826  370,956     266,694   3.4 2.0 5.7
1876 1513 386,400     2,760,024  3,146,424  4,607,605    90,000        20,000     491,854     4,717,605    100% 286,597   4.0 3.1 7.4
1877 1780 556,150     2,870,168  3,426,318  6,422,234    90,000        20,000     621,831     6,532,234    100% 303,397   4.4 4.4 9.2
1878 2048 705,122     2,948,296  3,653,418  8,217,941    90,000        20,000     743,364     8,327,941    100% 303,012   4.7 5.6 10.7
1879 2342 890,164     3,052,173  3,942,337  9,520,428    90,000        20,000     835,699     9,630,428    100% 307,052   5.1 7.1 12.6
1880 2562 1,016,464  3,125,760  4,142,224  10,615,919  590,000     20,000     928,177     11,225,919  66% 310,106   5.5 8.1 13.9
1881 2948 1,082,634  3,158,119  4,240,753  11,055,374  990,000     20,000     1,019,119  12,065,374  49% 311,544   5.6 8.7 14.5
1882 3312 1,194,268  3,195,365  4,389,633  11,836,818  1,390,000  20,000     1,124,524  13,246,818  56% 312,020   5.7 9.6 15.6
1883 3706 1,298,746  3,239,574  4,538,320  12,390,007  1,890,000  20,000     1,211,250  14,300,007  51% 312,200   5.9 10.4 16.6
1884 4091 1,396,604  3,273,839  4,670,443  12,797,650  2,740,000  20,000     1,319,245  15,557,650  42% 312,200   6.0 11.2 17.5
1885 4483 1,490,174  3,336,564  4,826,738  13,181,191  3,340,000  276,698   1,416,409  16,797,889  32% 312,200   6.3 11.9 18.5
1886 4849 1,600,718  3,338,000  4,938,718  13,450,832  3,730,000  605,747   1,489,729  17,786,579  34% 312,200   6.3 12.8 19.4
Sources BPP as shown in left hand cols. PWLB  MBW BPP 1875 BPP as in See text box  below
Annual Annual (268) Schl LH cols 4
Reports Reports Brd loans Unit costs 6 4 8
Notes PWLB lending data  is based on cash advances, not loan commitments. There were no PWLB annual Reports in the years 1870-75.
School places
to 31 aug prev year
The estimate of the total investment is based on two principles. First that there was a 2-3 year delay between PWLB granting a loan, and the resulting school places 
appearing in the annual return. (Or a two year delay between the cash advance appearing in PWLB annual report and the places in the statistics) The second principle is 
that a school place funded by PWLB cost £8 each, while a place financed by vol contribs cost £4 each.
The rest is simple.  By 1876, pwlb had agreed loans of £8M. These only turned into 1M places by 1879. So £8 a place.  For vol sector £4 a place is assumed (based on AR 
£5M & 1.2M places, and local records) - but grant aided sch cost £6 a place.
The cost of the new school places provided in the 1870s is therefore: 1 million school board places @£8 =  £8.1M
1.4 million voluntary places @ £4 =   £5.5M 
Government grant                                 £0.3M
Total cost of extra places in 1870      £13.9M
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Chapter 6, Data sources, methodology and challenges. Appendix 6.B
Borough School Boards
PWLB 1871 census share of Shortage of places PWLB lending: 
lending population attend places school voluntary all new places 1869 1879 head place
ance boards schools places pwlb funded £ £
141,120      liverpool 493,405      20,705    34,508    14,239    51,318    65,557    46% 58% 20% 0.29 10
71,846        manchester 351,189      11,541    19,235    14,383    32,398    46,781    52% 67% 20% 0.20 5
291,859      birmingham 343,787      12,863    21,438    20,572    29,080    49,652    73% 63% 13% 0.85 14
197,282      leeds 259,812      9,282      15,470    25,777    19,996    45,773    85% 64% -6% 0.76 8
164,921      sheffield 239,946      6,304      10,507    15,265    19,111    34,376    64% 74% 14% 0.69 11
57,302        bristol 182,552      5,871      9,785      4,106      17,131    21,237    36% 68% 30% 0.31 14
156,976      bradford 147,101      4,464      7,440      14,464    15,185    29,649    65% 70% -21% 1.07 11
54,021        newcastle 128,443      4,299      7,165      3,201      11,742    14,943    41% 67% 30% 0.42 17
18,830        nottingham 127,023      4,724      7,873      5,323      13,926    19,249    47% 63% 9% 0.15 4
1,640          salford 124,801      5,453      9,088      496          16,887    17,383    6% 56% 16% 0.01 3
78,934        hull 121,892      4,074      6,790      9,006      10,166    19,172    73% 67% 6% 0.65 9
76,901        portsmouth 113,569      253          422          8,895      8,895      105% 98% 53% 0.68 9
47,504        sunderland 98,242        1,549      2,582      5,765      3,239      9,004      90% 84% 45% 0.48 8
66,609        leicester 95,220        4,183      6,972      6,996      10,676    17,672    65% 56% -11% 0.70 10
47,581        brighton 92,481        3,521      5,868      4,339      8,817      13,156    60% 62% 15% 0.51 11
11,952        stoke 89,262        892          1,487      2,468      2,432      4,900      72% 90% 67% 0.13 5
1,890          preston 85,427        7,975      13,292    23,027    23,027    0% 7% -62% 0.02
1869 returns 1879 place returns
The table that follows shows the data for the 150 odd borough school boards in England and Wales.  The aim is to show the cha nge in 
school place numbers between 1869 and 1879; the reduction in the shortage of places between those dates; the level of loans g ranted 
by the PWLB; and the population for each borough.
The data comes from four separate sources. The list of borough school boards and their populations are from BPP 1878 (2342) p p. 2-
54. Most of the data was cross checked with the 1871 census populations in BPP 1872 (676). The 1869 school attendance date is from 
BPP 1870 (165), pp. 541-690, the Committee of Council on Education annual report for 1870. The PWLB lending comes from the PWLB 
6/1-6 applications ledger. Finally, the 1879 school places come from the Committee of Council annual report for 1879, BPP 1880 
(2562) pp. 549-757.
This data was used to calculate the shortage of school places in 1869 and 1879, the PWLB borrowing per head of population and per 
school place, and the extent to which boroughs relied on PWLB lending rather than voluntary contributions to fund new school places. 
Producing this analysis raised a number of challenges. These are, with the solutions adopted: 
1) The 1869 school data only include average  school attendance numbers, not place numbers. Nationally, average attendance was 
60% of the available place numbers. Therefore place numbers for each borough have been derived by dividing attendance numbers by
0.6. 
2) 31 August 1869 was used as the starting point for the comparison - rather than the more obvious  31 August  1870, because the
annual reports and associated commentary used 1869. To have used 1870 would have involved a series of qualifications. 
3) 1871 census populations are used for both 1869 and 1879 comparisons, even though the population had increased by around 10% 
over the ten years. This is not ideal, but annual estimated populations after 1871 were only available at national level, not at borough 
level. An alternative would have been to use a scaled back set of 1881 census populations for each borough. While this may ha ve been 
acceptable for the boroughs, it would not have made sense for the much smaller parishes. 
4)  There was a timescale challenge. There was normally a gap of up to two years between the PWLB granting a loan to a school board, 
and the full loan being advanced. There was then a further gap of a year before the place and attendance data for the new or enlarged 
school appeared in the annual report statistics.  The best combination was therefore felt to be the PWLB loan data up to the end of 
1876 with published school data for the year up to 31 August 1879. This also gave a clear 10 year period from 1869 to 1879. 
5) There is an inconsistency between the 1,016,000 new school board provided places in the annual report narrative summary, a nd 
the 970,000 school board places in the 150 pages listing individual schools. This is a discrepancy of 4.6%. However, the tota l number of 
school places in the narrative summary, and the total from the 150 pages are only an acceptable 0.5% different. The most like ly 
explanation of the 4.6% discrepancy is that a number of school board schools have not been identified as such in the 150 page s. The 
figures that follow record the actual numbers from the 150 pages, but in the tables derived from these numbers, school board 
numbers have been grossed up by 4.6%, and voluntary school numbers have been reduced by the same number. The result is tables
that are consistent with the published totals, while reflecting the detail in the 150 pages.
Similar analyses were undertaken for parish school board areas, and for boroughs and parishes that did not form school boards .  In the 
vast majority of cases results are only shown for eight large groups of areas: school boards in: London; the five largest bor oughs; 
boroughs with populations over 50,000; and all smaller boroughs; and large and small parishes with school boards; and borough s  and 
parishes without school boards. The large size of these groupings significantly reduces the risks associated with the six cha llenges 
referred to above, and avoid the problems of using small data samples drawn from a much larger data set.
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10,851        bolton 82,853        4,309      7,182      1,124      16,158    17,282    11% 48% -25% 0.13 10
12,500        oldham 82,629        2,060      3,433      2,101      11,659    13,760    20% 75% 0% 0.15 6
22,951        norwich 80,386        3,322      5,537      5,542      3,816      9,358      145% 59% 30% 0.29 4
blackburn 76,339        5,236      8,727      235          17,443    17,678    3% 31% -39% 0.00 0
78,141        huddersfield 70,355        2,210      3,683      8,092      4,780      12,872    88% 69% -10% 1.11 10
27,138        plymouth 68,758        3,947      6,578      3,377      6,913      10,290    91% 43% 10% 0.39 8
19,382        wolverhampton 68,291        3,986      6,643      4,265      8,523      12,788    69% 42% -12% 0.28 5
33,358        halifax 65,510        3,271      5,452      4,688      7,508      12,196    70% 50% -12% 0.51 7
5,420          rochdale 63,473        1,988      3,313      2,255      6,325      8,580      43% 69% 19% 0.09 2
61,400        swansea 61,390        2,270      3,783      4,748      3,970      8,718      96% 63% 15% 1.00 13
30,908        croydon 55,652        2,628      4,380      3,441      3,514      6,955      134% 53% 25% 0.56 9
13,665        southampton 53,741        2,024      3,373      3,291      4,741      8,032      71% 62% 10% 0.25 4
stockport 53,014        1,417      2,362      5,573      5,573      0% 73% 37% 0.00
2,700          bath 52,557        2,110      3,517      1,056      4,771      5,827      46% 60% 33% 0.05 3
derby 49,810        4,655      7,758      2,822      9,273      12,095    65% 7% -46%
devonport 49,449        1,268      2,113      2,854      3,334      6,188      70% 74% 25%
gateshead 48,627        2,466      4,110      5,431      3,409      8,840      115% 49% -9%
walsall 46,447        1,777      2,962      2,776      3,268      6,044      90% 62% 22%
south shields 45,336        2,789      4,648      3,683      4,523      8,206      104% 38% -9%
dudley 43,782        1,076      1,793      2,390      3,039      5,429      66% 75% 26%
ipswich 42,947        2,435      4,058      2,774      4,013      6,787      102% 43% 5%
gt yarmouth 41,810        1,525      2,542      977          3,334      4,311      55% 64% 38%
northampton 41,168        2,477      4,128      3,455      4,389      7,844      93% 40% -14%
burnley 40,858        2,434      4,057      7,792      7,792      0% 40% -14%
hanley 39,976        852          1,420      3,258      1,860      5,118      88% 79% 23%
middlesboro 39,543        1,373      2,288      3,855      4,661      8,516      62% 65% -29%
cardiff 39,536        2,496      4,160      1,679      3,859      5,538      122% 37% 16%
wigan 39,110        2,559      4,265      9,894      9,894      0% 35% -52%
tynemouth 38,941        200          333          2,135      1,491      3,626      65% 95% 44%
coventry 37,670        1,416      2,360      1,270      4,965      6,235      33% 62% 1%
exeter 36,362        1,145      1,908      1,528      3,128      4,656      56% 69% 23%
macclesfield 35,450        1,018      1,697      3,791      3,791      0% 71% 36%
worcester 33,226        2,049      3,415      810          4,166      4,976      52% 38% 10%
oxford 32,477        1,131      1,885      5,015      5,015      0% 65% 7%
reading 32,324        1,824      3,040      2,489      4,609      7,098      61% 44% -32%
Ashton 31,984        1,253      2,088      7,608      7,608      0% 61% -43%
carlisle 31,949        2,173      3,622      1,161      3,690      4,851      94% 32% 9%
hastings 30,889        655          1,092      1,362      2,175      3,537      56% 79% 31%
newport 30,269        724          1,207      858          2,491      3,349      40% 76% 34%
rotherham 28,892        859          1,432      1,289      1,230      2,519      119% 70% 48%
maidstone 28,196        1,435      2,392      4,373      4,373      0% 49% 7%
wakefield 28,069        1,765      2,942      1,126      4,342      5,468      45% 37% -17%
stockton 27,738        868          1,447      1,174      2,812      3,986      46% 69% 14%
darlington 27,729        2,299      3,832      2,339      3,570      5,909      113% 17% -28%
burton 25,731        1,022      1,703      4,083      1,573      5,656      103% 60% -32%
dewsbury 24,764        795          1,325      2,861      1,924      4,785      83% 68% -16%
scarboro 24,259        644          1,073      2,243      2,168      4,411      67% 73% -9%
barnsley 23,021        1,707      2,845      1,355      3,032      4,387      88% 26% -14%
gravesend 21,416        824          1,373      600          1,888      2,488      54% 62% 30%
staleybridge 21,092        652          1,087      2,122      2,122      0% 69% 40%
canterbury 20,962        827          1,378      606          2,353      2,959      38% 61% 15%
batley 20,871        728          1,213      1,493      1,619      3,112      79% 65% 11%
luton 20,733        -          1,510      2,253      3,763      40% 100% -9%
grimsby 20,244        640          1,067      1,045      1,897      2,942      56% 68% 13%
longton 19,748        -          1,630      1,425      3,055      53% 100% 7%
kidderminster 19,173        1,126      1,877      1,157      2,738      3,895      57% 41% -22%
rochester 18,352        506          843          822          992          1,814      85% 72% 41%
gloucester 18,341        1,959      3,265      150          4,166      4,316      14% -7% -41%
 PWLB 
lending to 
small 
boroughs 
was not 
separated 
over the 
102 smaller 
boroughs. 
Instead it 
was 
treated as 
a single 
total of 
£778,000. 
Because PWLB 
lending has not 
been separated 
over the 102 
smaller 
boroughs, 
PWLB loans per 
place and per 
head have only 
been calculated 
for all the 
smaller 
boroughs as a 
block.
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barrow 18,245        908          1,513      4,305      2,675      6,980      79% 50% -130%
bootle 16,247        898          1,497      3,291      3,291      0% 45% -22%
newcastle 15,948        1,058      1,763      1,085      1,900      2,985      89% 34% -12%
stafford 14,437        1,036      1,727      2,385      2,385      0% 28% 1%
durham 14,406        842          1,403      3,032      3,032      0% 42% -26%
margate 13,903        719          1,198      396          1,401      1,797      66% 48% 22%
pembroke 13,794        786          1,310      1,621      573          2,194      183% 43% 5%
kendal 13,448        1,249      2,082      3,028      3,028      0% 7% -35%
hartlepool 13,166        941          1,568      588          2,795      3,383      32% 29% -54%
salisbury 12,903        962          1,603      2,010      2,010      0% 25% 7%
bridgewater 12,789        614          1,023      727          641          1,368      211% 52% 36%
ryde 12,576        489          815          1,092      876          1,968      95% 61% 6%
newark 12,195        885          1,475      2,323      2,323      0% 27% -14%
swindon 11,720        906          1,510      510          2,119      2,629      46% 23% -35%
barnstable 11,679        682          1,137      2,004      2,004      0% 42% -3%
chesterfield 11,427        534          890          1,333      1,159      2,492      83% 53% -31%
congleton 11,344        674          1,123      2,285      2,285      0% 41% -21%
carmarthen 10,488        807          1,345      688          1,214      1,902      124% 23% -9%
falmouth 10,471        387          645          1,163      1,163      0% 63% 33%
tiverton 10,024        782          1,303      651          1,137      1,788      134% 22% -7%
carnarvon 9,449          660          1,100      537          1,238      1,775      80% 30% -13%
wisbeach 9,362          772          1,287      648          1,464      2,112      79% 18% -35%
wrexham 8,576          513          855          1,605      1,605      0% 40% -12%
yeovil 8,527          545          908          1,206      1,206      405% 36% 15%
st albans 8,298          349          582          97            1,038      1,135      18% 58% 18%
clitheroe 8,208          761          1,268      2,353      2,353      0% 7% -72%
newport 7,956          210          350          645          1,027      1,672      49% 74% -26%
oswestry 7,306          449          748          414          859          1,273      79% 39% -5%
haverfordwest 7,199          472          787          800          495          1,295      157% 34% -8%
st ives 6,965          370          617          505          505          0% 47% 56%
bideford 6,960          427          712          792          207          999          276% 39% 14%
aberystwyth 6,898          365          608          601          680          1,281      89% 47% -11%
liskeard 6,644          240          400          323          488          811          79% 64% 27%
east retford 6,358          622          1,037      1,316      1,316      0% 2% -24%
denbigh 6,323          355          592          760          336          1,096      151% 44% -4%
brecon 6,145          387          645          117          803          920          43% 37% 10%
monmouth 5,879          167          278          203          353          556          73% 72% 43%
dartmouth 5,338          75            125          407          407          144% 86% 54%
beccles 4,844          270          450          608          388          996          111% 44% -23%
chipping wycomb 4,811          184          307          1,920      1,920      119% 62% -139%
bodmin 4,672          274          457          571          571          0% 41% 27%
tamworth 4,589          159          265          676          211          887          109% 65% -16%
thetford 4,260          273          455          535          535          669% 36% 25%
totnes 4,073          -          326          174          500          65% 100% 26%
rye 3,865          292          487          354          68            422          -547% 24% 34%
buckingham 3,803          309          515          210          513          723          101% 19% -14%
helston 3,797          337          562          677          677          0% 11% -7%
ruthin 3,685          454          757          280          299          579          -158% -23% 6%
gt torrington 3,529          402          352          754          53% 100% -28%
droitwich 3,504          322          537          610          610          0% 8% -4%
cardigan 3,461          298          497          410          241          651          266% 14% -13%
llandiloes 3,425          248          413          677          257          934          130% 28% -64%
chard 3,296          190          317          350          501          851          66% 42% -55%
sandwich 3,095          104          173          458          458          161% 66% 11%
pwllheli 3,009          319          532          364          217          581          738% -6% -16%
launceston 2,935          179          298          218          309          527          95% 39% -8%
beaumaris 2,291          157          262          312          312          620% 31% 18%
hedon 996              -          -          170          170          100% 100% -2%
867,028      big 5 cities 1,688,139  60,695    101,158 95,236    151,903 242,139 68% 64% 14% 0.51 9
938,554      >50K population2,340,961  88,036    146,727 115,274 238,922 348,196 57% 62% 11% 0.40 8
778,518      <50K 1,884,812  91,238    152,063 108,266 216,518 318,784 65% 52% -1% 0.41 7
2,584,100  totals 5,913,912  239,969 399,948 318,776 607,343 909,119 63% 59% 8% 0.44 8
Source: BPP 1878 (2342) , BPP 1872 (676), BPP 1870 ( 165), BPP 1880 (2562), and PWLB 6/1-6 applications ledger.
Note: The four totals for school board places in 1879 have been grossed up by 4.6 per cent to reflect under recording
             of school board places in the details recorded for each borough. See appendix 6.B methodology note, section 5.
1869 returns 1879 place returns
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Appendix 7.A
Calculation of surpluses and losses on PWLB lending.
Average Office Surplus Annual
Lending stream lent paid charged PWLB 'Directed' lost int loan life expenses loss impact on
£m £000 £000 years 0.004 £000 int rates
Civic improvement 7.7 3.29% 5.00% 10 -           88 20 30.8 1,189     -0.8%
Workhouses 3.7 3.27% 4.10% 4 -           18 14.7 258        -0.4%
Schools 10.2 3.22% 3.50% 0 -           50 41.0 686        -0.1%
Water & sewerage 8.3 3.23% 3.80% 7 -           30 33.3 668        -0.3%
Bridges 0.3 3.63% 5.00% 13 -           20 1.3 30           -0.5%
Mines 0.3 3.93% 5.00% 5 -           4 8 1.2 3             -0.1%
Canals 0.9 3.85% 5.00% 43 -           20 3.5 54           -0.3%
Other loans 1.6 3.52% 5.00% 5 166          20 6.6 66           -0.2%
Harbours 3.1 3.35% 3.25% 49 20             54 40 12.3 194-        0.2%
Turnpike trusts 0.8 3.68% 5.00% 20 72             128 19 3.1 126-        0.9%
Ireland 5.1 3.26% 3.75% 0 1,532       237 20 20.5 1,541-     1.5%
Totals 42.1 3.29% 4.05% 158 1,790       511 20 168 1,092     -0.1%
Rate backed loans 29.9 3.25% 4.04% 20 -           88 33.0 119.8 2,800     -0.3%
Income backed loans 7.0 3.52% 4.23% 136 258          186 20.0 28.0 167-        0.1%
Irish loans 5.1 3.26% 3.75% 0 1,532       237 20.0 6.6 1,541-     1.5%
Sources: Appendix Homer. BPP 1851 BPP 1880 BPP 1880 BPP 1880BPP 1851BPP 1888 see see
1.A (512) (200) (200) (200) (512) (200) below below
Notes:    1. Surplus/loss over the life of the loan is calculated as 
(sum lent * interest rate margin * loan life)/2 less sums written off and expenses.
                  2. Annual impact of surplus/loss is the extent to which 
PWLB's interest rates needed to rise to recover the losses, or could have fallen to break even.
Sums written offInterest rates
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Appendix 7.B
Loans the PWLB made after parliamentary direction
Area Purpose Act Year Sum Sums
lent written
off
£000 £000
Roads London-Holyhead Road 1&2 G IV c30 1823 36       
6&7 W IV c35 1827 54       36         
Highland Roads 1 G IV c84 1820 52       36         
South Wales Trusts 7&8 V c91 1844 215     
ImprovementsCharing Cross, London 7 G IV c109 1826 400     
Battersea Park 9&10 V c38/83 1847 200     
Other Thames Tunnel 3&4 W IV c121 1831 250     150      
Bridges Chelsea Bridge 9&10 V c39/83 1847 80       
Harbours Dunbar harbour 20&21 V c63 1857 20       20         
Ceylon harbour and lighthouse 32&33 V c77/105 1869 320     
Rail Plymouth Dartmoor 1 G IV c54 1820 18       16         
Ireland Workhouses 1&2 V c56 1839 1,422 1,370   
Rail loans 12&13 V c62 1849 500     
Rail loans 29&30 V c95 1866 159     
Rail loans 31&32 V c81 1868 320     42         
Ulster canal 10 G IV c109 1831 120     120      
Totals 4,166 1,790   
Sources: PWLB Annual reports 1876, and 1888, BPP 1876 (269) and BPP 1888 (200) 
Notes:     In each case the Act approving the scheme directed the PWLB to make a loan.    
                  'Sums written off' excludes interest not received.
                  Charing Cross was the area now occupied by Trafalgar Square.
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